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1 Background 
In 1992 the European Commission announced its intention to present to the European 
Parliament and the Council a report evaluating the overall situation regarding VAT on 
passenger transport, taking account of developments in the transport sector and having 
regard to the proper functioning of the internal market. 
At present, passenger transport is taxed on the basis of distance covered in each Member 
State and tax is collected at internal frontiers. Many different tax rates apply to passenger 
transport across the EU with some Member States applying exemptions and zero-rates. 
Even within the same Member State competing modes of passenger transport may be 
taxed differently. 
The current arrangements are considered to be unsatisfactory in the context of the single 
market. Further, with the abolition of frontier controls the tax has become difficult to 
collect and impossible to enforce effectively. In consequence, this study explores the 
economic, fiscal and practical effects of a number of alternative taxation structures for 
passenger transport services performed within the EU. 
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2 Study Objectives 
In the process of producing this report the following areas have been considered: 
  the demand profile of the EU transport market and competition between modes; 
  Member States’ VAT regimes covering passenger transport at the domestic, intra-EU 
and EU-third country level for both business and non-business passenger transport; 
  the scale and extent of economic distortions in the transport market caused by 
variations in Member States’ VAT regimes; and 
  the practical, technical and economic implications and effects of the alternative 
taxation options under two VAT rate scenarios. 
The aim of this study is to answer the key questions set out below: 
  What are the characteristics and size of the EU transport market? 
  To what extent does the degree of competition in the EU passenger transport market 
permit the application of different tax rates to different modes of transport? 
  What are the deficiencies of the current VAT System? 
  What is the effect of the differences in the right of business to deduct tax on travel 
expenses? 
  What would be the practical, economic and fiscal effects in the intra-EU market of 
each of the following taxation options under a) uniform VAT rate across modes and 
Member States? and b) existing VAT rates in Member States?: 
-  taxation at the place of departure; 
-  taxation at the place of arrival; 
-  taxation at the place of establishment of the supplier; and 
-  taxation at the place of establishment of the customer. 
  What would be the practical, economic and fiscal effects of a uniform (positive) rate of 
VAT on passenger transport in the domestic EU market? 
  What would be the impact of the application of a uniform (positive) rate of VAT on 
passenger transport within the EU and to what extent would this policy damage the 
European transport industry with regard to third country operators? 
The findings of the study are presented in the following sections as the answers to these 
key questions with our conclusions presented at the end of the executive summary. 
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2.1.1  What are the characteristics and size of the EU transport market? 
Growth in the transport market in Europe is closely linked to changes in the level of gross 
domestic product. Demand for transport, in terms of passenger kilometres, has doubled in 
size since 1970. It is dominated by car while the non-car sector comprises 35% for air, 
37% for road (primarily bus and coach transport) 28% for rail and insignificant for other 
modes (the sea market is very small and accounts for only about 0.3% of all journeys). 
The passenger transport market in Europe is not homogenous. Not only does the level of 
demand vary across the individual Member States but the importance of the alternative 
modes is also different in different Member States. Any tax measures that affect the 
competitive position of the alternative modes in different ways will have differing 
consequences for different Member States. 
The European passenger transport industry is experiencing continuing change in its 
regulatory, environmental and financial circumstances. Governments are increasingly 
looking to reduce subsidies to all sectors and to privatise enterprises where this is 
politically viable and are using taxation to correct market failures and environmental 
externalities. 
Air 
Domestic, intra-EU and international trips account for roughly equal proportions of the 
total number of trips, although international trips account for a large proportion of 
revenue since they are, on average, significantly longer. The vast majority of passenger 
transport journeys within the EU are domestic. In the intra-EU rail and air passenger 
transport market, air accounts for approximately 75% of journeys. This is likely to change 
significantly as a result of the expansion of the High Speed Rail (HSR) network 
infrastructure. 
In the air sector, the national “flag carriers” dominate the total market for domestic, intra-
EU and EU: third country flights (currently holding 63% of the market). The chartered air 
market is also significant, accounting for approximately 25% of the combined scheduled 
and chartered market operated by carriers. 
Non-EU based carriers are beginning to increase market share, particularly on EU-third 
country routes (currently they hold 54% of the market); market penetration is somewhat 
less on domestic and intra-EU routes but is expected to increase, possibly significantly, in 
future years. These changes follow increasing deregulation in the EU air transportation 
market. Overall, the air sector is growing rapidly (from 8% of the market in 1970 to 35% 
of the market in 1994). 
The advent of low cost, scheduled operators coupled with the latest round of de-
regulation in the EU is likely to further increase competitive pressure on incumbent 
carriers. 
Rail 
In the rail sector, domestic journeys account for 99.5% of all journeys.  In comparison 
with the air sector, the EU rail sector handles approximately thirteen times the number of A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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passengers as the EU air sector. However, intra-EU trips are a much smaller proportion of 
overall trips for rail compared to air.  
Looking forward, HSR is widely regarded as being an important development. Studies on 
the potential impact of HSR have suggested that it is likely to take market share from 
both the private car and from air and is likely to increase the incidence of cross-border 
journeys significantly, particularly affecting France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
Sea 
Sea and inland waterway is a small market in relative and absolute terms and overall has 
only a small share of the total EU market. However, in the intra-EU market only, cross 
border journeys by sea take a more substantial proportion of the market. In addition, there 
are a number of important corridors, particularly on the periphery of the EU, where ferry 
traffic is significant.  
A significant proportion of traffic in the sea market is undertaken by non-EU operators, 
or EU operators using a ‘flag of convenience’, who at present command a 14% share of 
the intra-EU market. 
Coach 
Cross-border coach travel is  relatively small in scale compared to the total EU market 
and is estimated to be in the region of just 5 million passenger trips in 1996. However, the 
emergence of cheaper scheduled airline operations from cities such as Brussels and 
Amsterdam has created a new phenomenon of “coach-hubbing”, where passengers travel 
by coach in order to take advantage of cheaper air travel, departing from an EU state 
other than their own.  
There is considerable variation in the use of coach services by particular market segments 
with the young, low income groups and in some instances migrant workers being the 
most substantial users. 
In the coach market, there is some evidence of Eastern European operators beginning to 
penetrate the market, but at present this is on a limited scale. 
The public transport market 
The public transport market (which covers urban transport on railways, trams, metros, 
buses and coaches) differs across EU Member States; Italy and Spain have the largest 
markets at present. The market itself is characterised, overwhelmingly, by domestic 
journeys; there are few cross-border journeys. A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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2.1.2  To what extent does the degree of competition in the EU passenger transport 
market permit the application of different tax rates to different modes of transport? 
The transport market segments naturally into a number of sub-markets, defined by 
distance.  Within these markets, it is helpful to further identify business and non-business 
segments. 
The most important factor in determining both the demand for passenger transport and the 
choice of mode is the price and time costs involved. For any given trip, consumers tend to 
opt for the transport mode which minimises these costs by a trade-off between price and 
time. Sensitivity to price tends to be less in the business segment of the market, whilst 
sensitivity to time tends to be less in the non-business segment. 
Competition between modes tends to decrease with distance although competition 
between operators is quite strong in some parts of the long-distance market.  
The study analysis revealed that where competition is high (for example in urban 
areas) or between high speed rail and air over medium distances, taxing different 
modes or operators with varying rates of VAT is likely to have some distortive effect on 
competition between modes. 
Competition between modes can also only take place where appropriate infrastructure 
exists now or in the future. This is illustrated in the HSR sector where at present the 
capacity for competition is limited by the physical infrastructure of network, but in the 
future as HSR infrastructure is likely to grow rapidly in the next decade or so, the scope 
for competition will rise correspondingly. Estimates suggest an increase from the current 
size of 10 million passenger trips to around 32 million passenger trips by 2005. 
Other markets where competition between modes is strong (but to a lesser extent) is in the 
long distance leisure market between air, rail and coach travel (consisting of 11½ million 
passenger trips) and between air and overnight rail in the medium distance business 
segment (¼ million passenger trips).   
For any given transport segment where competition between modes exists, the impact of 
the VAT distortion will depend on the proportion of the non-business travel in the market 
in question (this sector is more price sensitive than the business market and travellers are 
unable to deduct input VAT) and the extent to which any VAT differences are passed on 
to prices. 
The analysis shows that different modes of passenger transport compete at different 
distances. In terms of the competitive impact of different VAT treatment of different 
modes, where there is little or no competition between modes, it is possible to levy 
different rates of VAT without giving rise to significant competitive distortions. 
For example, while competition may be high within urban transport markets, competition 
between the urban and long-distance market does not appear to exist. Therefore, there is 
no reason, on competitiveness grounds, to levy the same rate of VAT on urban and long-
distance transport. This is illustrated in Greece, where reduced rates of VAT are levied on 
passenger transport on certain islands, yet this causes no competitive distortions as the 
island transport markets are distinct from the rest of the Greek transport market. A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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2.1.3  What are the deficiencies of the current VAT System? 
Within the EU and within individual Member States, the VAT rules applicable to 
passenger transport differ significantly in terms of levels of taxation, coverage and 
application.  These variations can take a number of forms and exist both within States 
(such as Government not taxing modes equally) and between States.   
For wholly domestic journeys in the vast majority of Member States, there is no VAT-
induced distortion of competition between transport modes because the same VAT rate is 
applied to each. 
For intra-EU and international journeys commencing or terminating within the EU, the 
position is more complicated.  Distortions do arise between rail and air travel (on average, 
higher rates of VAT are levied on domestic legs of international/intra-EU journeys by rail 
and coach than by air in five Member States). 
The main justification for this is the risk of creating a competitive disadvantage for 
national airline operators in comparison with other (non-domestic or non-EU) operators. 
The study revealed that the passenger transport segments where there may be a 
competitive economic impact from VAT created distortions are: 
  medium-distance segment, current HSR routes where rail is positively taxed today 
and air is zero VAT rated, for business and leisure; 
  medium-distance segment, future HSR routes where rail is positively taxed today 
and air is zero rated, for business and leisure; 
  the medium-distance segment, overnight rail services which are positively taxed and 
air is zero rated, for business; and  
  long-distance segments, where rail and coach are positively taxed and air is zero 
rated and air competes with rail (conventional/HSR) and coach for the (very) price 
sensitive leisure market. 
Taxation, by leading to higher prices, leads to lower demand for trips;  the extent of the 
reduction depends on how sensitive demand for trips is to price.  Demand for business 
travel is less price sensitive and, therefore, tends to fall less than leisure travel for any 
given increase in VAT. 
Thus, our analysis shows that the current intra-EU HSR segment might have around 
19,000 (0.5% of current HSR traffic) fewer passengers as a result of the VAT difference. 
The worst case estimates could be as high as 54,000 fewer passengers in the segment, 
while the best case estimate could be as low as 6,600.  
By 2005, the estimates suggest that HSR might have anywhere between 36,000 and 
296,000 fewer passengers if the existing VAT induced distortion was not removed. This 
distortion represents up to 1.3% of HSR traffic, although the estimates are more modest 
in terms of the overall medium-distance intra-EU market (estimated to be around 55 
million trips and growing to 91 million in 2005). 
In addition, conventional rail also experiences distortions, most notably in the overnight 
rail segment for business travellers. However this is a very small market and thus the A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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magnitude of the distortion is very low, with at most only 5,000 fewer overnight rail 
passengers in the segment as a result of the VAT difference. 
In the long distance leisure segment the proportion of the distortion is much greater since 
the segment is more price sensitive and all passengers can not reclaim VAT. Estimates 
suggest that in the current market, between 29,000 (0.8% of the rail/coach segment) and 
192,000 (5.5% of the rail/coach segment) are currently not travelling in the rail/coach 
segment. Again the estimates are more modest in relation to the overall long distance 
market. 
In terms of practical distortions created by differences in the implementation of current 
rules, many Member States do not implement the legislative provisions relating to 
passenger transport services carried out within domestic territory in a uniform manner.  
This results in distortions which, in general, impact unfairly on the domestic operators 
because the obligations of non-domestic transport operators are not being enforced. 
For journeys with a stopover within a Member State of the EU, the possibility arises of 
different VAT treatment between the operators of that Member State and other operators.  
These discrepancies have implications for the competitive position of different operators 
within the same mode. 
Also, where the domestic leg of an international air journey is not taxed in practice (for 
example, in France when a single ticket covers a domestic “connection”), an additional 
distortion is introduced between air and rail in the domestic market.   
This is likely to be occur where there is an important HSR network which competes with 
air, such as France (although the French fiscal authorities have introduced a number of 
exemptions for specific cross-border HSR routes in an apparent attempt to address this 
distortion).  However, elsewhere in the EU, such distortions are likely to become more 
significant as the HSR network develops in the future.  The incidence of “tailor made” 
VAT provisions, designed to combat inter-modal distortions, may grow. 
To summarise, the distortion from differing VAT treatment is greatest where 
competition between modes occurs. The largest magnitude of distortion for example,  
occurs in the HSR segment where competition is greatest with at most 296,000 
passengers affected by 2005. The magnitude of the distortion in the long-distance 
leisure market is almost as large with at most 192,000 passengers affected.   
Overall, the effect of different VAT treatment of modes has a non-negligible effect on 
competition between modes. A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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2.1.4  What is the effect of the differences in the right of business to deduct tax on 
travel expenses? 
The imposition of VAT should not affect demand for business travel if the business is 
able to recover the VAT.  The extent to which the imposition of VAT will affect demand 
for business travel is, therefore, dependent upon whether the VAT can be recovered by 
the business. 
There is considerable variation in the regulations covering the deductibility of tax on 
transport expenses incurred by businesses. Six Member States do not permit deduction of 
tax incurred on business travel.  Even in those Member States where the tax is deductible 
in principle, many businesses do not do so because of the requirement to obtain 
documentation which can be burdensome, or because their business activities do not give 
rise to a right to deduct VAT. 
From an economic perspective, these variations, in principle, are a form of competitive 
distortion because, ceteris paribus, travel costs in these Member States that allow 
deduction of tax are likely to be lower, reducing costs to business and giving them a 
competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, for businesses as a whole, passenger transport costs form a small proportion 
of total costs.  One official estimate suggests that transport forms no more than 5–10% of 
an average business’s cost structure so that VAT costs for passenger transport purposes, 
are likely to be very small indeed and have little effect on the ability of most businesses 
to compete. 
Under the current system, the study revealed that many businesses, particularly non-EU 
businesses, forego their right to tax deduction or refund (even in circumstances where a 
full entitlement arises).  Where, on a single ticket, a tax charge arises in more than one 
Member State, the documentary requirements for tax deduction are viewed as 
cumbersome and the issue is not usually pursued by business purchasers of travel 
services.  The inconsistent rules for tax deduction, and the variety of documents required 
to support that tax deduction, appear to add to businesses’ costs unnecessarily. 
In terms of the quantitative significance of the competitive distortions arising from the 
existence of different rules relating to the deductibility of input VAT, the analysis on the 
HSR routes suggests that even in the worst case scenario these are very modest (around 
±0.1% of the current/future HSR segment).  In view of the fact that the HSR segment 
covers the vast majority of journeys where business travellers have a choice between 
alternative modes of transport (excluding the car), the results for the whole of the intra-
EU business passenger transport segment are likely to be of a very similar magnitude. 
In economic terms, therefore, the study research has revealed that the scale of this 
distortion is quite small; less than 0.1% across the scale of full tax deduction (in all 
Member States) to no tax deduction (in all Member States). A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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2.1.5  What would be the practical, economic and fiscal effects of each taxation option 
in the intra-EU market under either  
a) a harmonised VAT rate across modes and Member States? 
b) the existing VAT rates in Member States? 
The study explored how each of the following taxation options would work in practice 
under a harmonised and multi-VAT rate scenario arrangements and examined the scope 
and basis of taxation as well as the likely economic and fiscal effects of: 
  taxation at the place of departure; 
  taxation at the place of arrival; 
  taxation at the place of establishment of the supplier; and 
  taxation at the place of establishment of the customer. 
2.1.5.1  a) Harmonised VAT rates 
Harmonisation has the effect of removing the scope for one Member State to gain at the 
expense of another as a result of imposing a low VAT rate.  However, the operator option 
will give scope for a potential competitive advantage to arise for non-EU operators unless 
a mechanism is found to bring them within the scope of the EU regime.  Unless such a 
mechanism is implemented, it is anticipated that demand for EU operators’ services will 
fall by between 1.4% and 2.2%. In theory it may also be difficult to collect VAT revenues 
on non-EU operators in the departure/arrival and customer options. 
With respect to the wider economic effects on demand volumes, gross turnover etc, the 
impact of harmonising VAT rates will clearly depend on the rate chosen and its effect 
will vary according to the market under consideration.  If a positive rate is chosen, then 
the impact on transport markets in the zero or low rate Member States is likely to be 
negative, since this will result in rising costs and prices, whereas the effect on Member 
States with the higher rates are more likely to be beneficial. 
The study revealed that harmonising VAT rates across modes and countries at a level 
of VAT close to current rates is likely to have larger economic effects than moving to 
the alternative taxation options under existing rates.  This is because, in the case of 
harmonisation,  all operators would have to levy VAT rather than just some as is 
presently the case.  This, in turn, would lead to bigger changes in costs and prices and 
bigger effects on demand volumes etc. 
In terms of the demand profile, and modal share, a harmonised rate will see a shift away 
from sea and air markets.  Sea travel will be affected to a significant extent since it 
predominately embraces leisure travel.  There is likely to be a noticeable shift towards 
rail, particularly HSR, in the medium-distance sector.  In the long-distance sector, there is 
likely to be a significant shift towards “direct”, rather than “connecting” services. 
For countries with a high initial rate of VAT on rail and coach travel, harmonisation will 
have the impact of increasing the competitiveness of rail travel. In terms of particular 
routes, the medium distance HSR segment will be most affected with significant mode 
shifts towards rail occurring. The other medium distance segment will be affected, but 
due to smaller amount of competition between modes, the amount of shift will be 
considerably lower. A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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The study concludes that the choice of harmonised rate will be very important if any shift 
in the VAT regime is not to have a significant impact (positive or negative) on the intra-
EU transport market.  For instance, the air/coach/rail segment will suffer a 2.8 million 
passenger loss if an 8% harmonised VAT rate is implemented (or around 2% of the 
estimated traffic). 
Under each of the taxation options, the effect of harmonisation with a uniformed rate 
of 8% impacts most on the air sector which accounts for 92% of the intra-EU market in 
value terms. Furthermore, since VAT increases in the air sector will occur for all 
Member States, the effects at the country level are broadly similar in percentage terms.  
Overall the total market, under the departure/arrival and operator options suffers a fall in 
passenger demand of 7.1 million passengers while VAT revenues collected by the EU 
fiscal authorities increases to 3,049 million ECU (an additional 2,990 million ECU). 
While in terms of profitability, the market experiences a loss of 5.7% of gross turnover, 
or 2.3 billion ECU.   
Fiscally, certain Member States would gain significantly (the UK would generate 
additional VAT revenues of 534 million ECU under the departure and arrival options, 
rising to 727 million ECU under the operator option) whereas others would gain by a 
smaller amount (France would generate additional VAT revenues of 565 million ECU 
under the departure and arrival options, falling to 261 million ECU under the operator 
option).  Under both departure/arrival and operator options, the fiscal authorities of 
France, Germany and the UK collect half of all revenues. The VAT revenues are shown 
in figure 1 for all Member States under both options.  
Figure 1 - A comparison of options: revenue collected by fiscal authorities 
(departure/arrival option) and revenue paid by operators (operator option) - (1994 


















































































































Departure/Arrival Option Operator Option  
Source: KPMG analysis A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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In terms of net losses experienced by country and by operators, a similar picture arises 
which is shown in  Figure 2. 
Figure 2 A comparison options: net losses by country (departure/arrival option) and 
















































































































Departure/Arrival Option Operator Option  
Source: KPMG analysis 
Under the customer option with a harmonisation VAT rate, two effects contribute to make 
the growth in VAT revenues smaller than under the departure/arrival and operator. 
Firstly, non-EU customers are likely to escape the tax as it will be very difficult to 
enforce the VAT rate for these passengers. Secondly, it may also be difficult to collect 
VAT from EU customers using non-EU operators. If non-EU operators are brought 
within the scope of the taxation then total VAT revenues collected by the EU fiscal 
authorities are approximately 5% lower at 2,890 million ECU, as non-EU customers are 
still outside the scope of the VAT regime. 
2.1.5.2  b) Existing VAT rates 
The study analysed the effects of each of the taxation options under the present, multi-
VAT rate arrangements with respect to practical, economic and fiscal impacts.  
Where existing VAT rates are maintained, the departure and arrival options could have 
the effect of increasing existing distortions by raising the effective rate of VAT paid by 
the taxed modes for intra-EU travel involving Member States which levy a positive rate 
of VAT on some, but not all modes. It would not however, make any difference to the 
existing competitive position of operators providing services in the domestic and EU-
third country travel markets. 
For example, a rail journey from Brussels to London, under the departure option, would 
attract a 6% Belgian VAT charge, whereas the London to Brussels journey would be 
VAT-free.  The reverse would apply under the arrival option.  At present, the effective 
VAT rate is 2% for both journeys. A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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Fiscally, Germany would benefit most, realising an additional 20 million ECU from intra-
EU traffic (out of a total EU rise of 54 million ECU).  The effect elsewhere is likely to be 
minimal.  In competitive terms, Germany suffers the largest reduction in demand (by 
207,000 passenger trips).  By contrast, France experiences an increase in demand of 
134,000 passenger trips. 
Overall, the impact of a switch to the departure or arrival options under the current 
regime produces a marginal increase in the overall level of demand, with a very small 
shift towards rail and coach travel. Total demand changes by less than 1%.  
In addition, a net loss of less than 1% of gross turnover is experienced in the market. 
However, even though these losses are small in relation to total gross turnover, if it is 
assumed that profits account for 5–10% of gross turnover, they begin to look more 
significant.  
The operator option provides a potential incentive for operators from Member States 
where VAT is low or zero-rated to enter the markets where operators from Member States 
with high VAT rates currently provide transport services (in order to exploit cost 
advantages arising from the different VAT regimes).  Non-EU operators may also be 
tempted to register in low rate or zero-rated Member States to exploit this distortion. 
While competition through entry is a theoretical possibility, the extent to which entry into 
“high-rate” markets by “low rate” operators would actually take place would depend on 
barriers to exit and entry in any given market and the importance of price competition.  It 
is, therefore, most likely that there would be increased competition in the air and coach 
sector where these barriers are relatively low, but less likely in the rail market where such 
barriers are high. 
Under the operator option, the impact on demand profile is similar to that of the 
departure/arrival option.  In terms of VAT revenues, Germany gains by 42 million ECU, 
Belgium by 11 million ECU and Spain by 10 million ECU.  Others (notably France) 
suffer a reduction in VAT revenues. 
The customer option makes relatively little difference to existing competitive position of 
operators, except to the extent that one airline (for example) may be more dependent on 
EU price sensitive markets than another.  German operators suffer the largest reduction in 
demand (293,000 passengers) but German VAT revenues grow by 53  million ECU;   
France gains 80,000 passengers but loses 5 million ECU in VAT revenues. 
In terms of wider economic effects, these are driven by price changes that come from 
changes in VAT.  Given the size of price changes under consideration, the effects on any 
given transport market are likely to be small.  The biggest effects are likely to be under 
the operator option where new non-EU or “low rated” EU operators enter, or expand into 
a given market. 
 
 
2.1.6  What would be the impact of the application of a uniform (positive) rate of VAT 
on passenger transport on the domestic EU market? 
In the domestic market, urban trips dominate the market, accounting for over 84% of all 
trips and 60% in terms of gross turnover. Thus, the impact of a harmonised VAT rate in A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
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the domestic market will be determined predominately by gross turnover and the current 
taxation regime in place within the urban area. 
The impact of a harmonised VAT rate of 8% will be largely neutral, in terms of 
competition between modes, irrespective of the taxation option adopted.  However, the 
effect on demand across the EU varies from a 3.3% reduction to a 1.7% increase.  
In terms of VAT revenues, a rate of 8% will raise an additional 3,672 million ECU above 
the current revenues of 7,536 million ECU.  
The most significant changes in magnitude terms occurs for the UK which currently 
imposes zero rates of VAT on all domestic travel. Under harmonised rates, demand falls 
by 2.3% with a consequential fall in profits of 2.7% gross turnover. Large proportional 
falls also occur for Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg but as these countries have much 
smaller markets, the magnitude of the changes is considerably less. 
Although relatively modest changes in passenger demand occur, any reduction in 
demand for public transport in urban areas is likely to have significant consequences 
in terms of the additional congestion costs involved, as passengers switch to private 
cars.  
Where existing VAT rates are maintained, the departure and arrival options will make no 
difference to the existing competitive position of operators providing services in the 
domestic market. 
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2.1.7  What would be the impact of the application of a uniform (positive) rate of VAT 
on passenger transport within the EU and to what extent would this policy damage the 
European transport industry with regard to third country operators? 
This question is most relevant for the air sector, since that is where competition between 
EU and non-EU operators is most frequent and intense and where intra-EU transport 
represents a significant proportion of the overall business.  The answer to this question in 
part depends on the type of VAT system that might be introduced.  Under the operator or 
customer option, the impact on EU operators could, in theory, be more damaging than 
under the other options. 
In reality, the scale of the negative effect on EU based operators is likely to be 
dependent on the rate of VAT levied and the existence of secondary rules that would 
require non-EU based operators to register within an EU Member State for VAT 
purposes.  
Under all taxation options, competitive distortions between direct and indirect air services 
will be introduced if the VAT rate is applied to legs within the EU, while journeys 
commencing within the EU and terminating outside the EU are not subject to VAT. Since 
non-EU operators have a greater market share of these direct services, demand for 
services offered by in the non-EU operators will increase. 
If a harmonised rate was in force and anti-avoidance provisions rigorously applied, then 
there would be little or no difference in the treatment of operators on the grounds of their 
place of establishment.  The economic competitive effect would, therefore, be neutral. 
If anti-avoidance provisions were not effective, between 1.4% and 2.2% of demand 
would shift from EU-based airline operators to non-EU airline operators.  For other 
modes, since the penetration of the EU market by non-EU operators is less widespread, 
the effect will be less marked. 
If existing VAT rates are maintained, the departure and arrival options will make no 
difference to the existing competitive position of operators providing services in the 
international travel markets assuming that a return journey comprises two separate 
supplies: the outward and inward legs.   
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This section summarises the main conclusions which have emerged from the study of 
VAT on passenger transport within the EU. 
The transport market 
The EU passenger transport market consists of 31 billion passenger trips. Over 30 billion 
are in the domestic sector while the intra-EU market accounts for around 158 million 
passenger trips. In terms of the key indicator of interest gross turnover, the intra-EU 
market is more significant, due to the larger distances involved, with a turnover of ECU 
41 billion compared to ECU 231 billion for the total EU market. 
Competition 
Across Member States the transport market is not homogenous and tax measures that 
affect the competitive position of alternative modes in different ways will have differing 
consequences for different Member States. 
Competition between modes is only possible where appropriate infrastructure exists now 
or in the future. Where competition is high taxing different modes or operators with 
varying rates of VAT is likely to have some distortive effect on competition between 
modes. Where there is little or no competition between modes, it is possible to levy 
different rates of VAT without giving rise to significant competitive distortions.  
VAT induced distortions 
The economic distortion of differing VAT treatment is greatest where competition 
between modes occurs. The HSR segment experiences the largest magnitude of distortion 
with at most 296,000 passengers affected by 2005. Overall, the effect of different VAT 
treatment of modes has a non-negligible effect on competition between modes.  
VAT deductibility 
The imposition of VAT should not affect demand for business travel if the business is 
able to recover the VAT.  The extent to which the imposition of VAT will affect demand 
for business travel is, therefore, dependent upon whether the VAT can be recovered by 
the business. The scale of this distortion is quite small; less than 0.1% across the scale of 
full tax deduction (in all Member States) to no tax deduction (in all Member States). 
The intra-EU market: harmonised and existing VAT rates 
In the intra-EU market, harmonising VAT rates across modes and countries at a level of 
VAT close to current rates is likely to have larger economic effects than moving to the 
alternative taxation options under existing rates.   
For a harmonsied VAT rate scenario, under the departure/arrival and operator options the 
EU fiscal authorities collect 3,049 million ECU (an additional 2,990 million ECU) in 
VAT revenues. The fiscal authorities of France, Germany and the UK collect half of all 
revenues. Under the customer option 2,890 million ECU is collected as non-EU 
customers are outside the scope of the VAT regime. Overall, the effect of harmonisation 
is dominated by the air sector which accounts for 92% of the intra-EU market in value 
terms.A Study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
Executive Summary 




In the multi-VAT rate scenario, the departure/arrival option raises 112 million ECU (an 
additional 53 million ECU) for the fiscal authorities while the operator options raises 113 
million ECU (an additional 54 million ECU). 
Non-EU operators 
For routes consisting entirely of EU operators, the impact of a harmonised rate under the 
operator option will be identical to that under the departure/arrival options. For routes 
with non-EU operators present the impact will also be identical provided that the non-EU 
operators are treated consistently and brought within the scope of VAT. Unless such a 
mechanism is implemented, it is anticipated that demand for EU operators’ services will 
fall by between 1.4% and 2.2% as demand shifts to non-EU operators.  
Under all taxation options, competitive distortions between direct and indirect air services 
will be introduced if VAT is applied to legs within the EU and if journeys commencing 
within the EU and terminating outside the EU are not subject to VAT. 
The domestic EU market 
In the domestic EU market the impact of a harmonised VAT rate of 8% will produce a 
change in demand across the EU varying from a 3.3% reduction to a 1.7% increase.  This 
is likely to have significant consequences in terms of the additional congestion costs as 
public transport passengers switch to private cars.  
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1 Introduction: study objectives 
1.1  Background 
In 1992 the European Commission (the “Commission”) announced its intention to present 
to the European Parliament and the Council a report evaluating the overall situation 
regarding VAT on passenger transport, taking account of developments in the transport 
sector and having regard to the proper functioning of the internal market. 
At present, passenger transport is taxed on the basis of distance covered in each Member 
State and tax is collected at internal frontiers. Many different tax rates apply to passenger 
transport across the EU with some Member States applying exemptions and zero-rates. 
Even within the same Member State competing modes of passenger transport may be 
taxed differently. 
The current arrangements are considered to be unsatisfactory in the context of the single 
market. Further, with the abolition of frontier controls the tax has become difficult to 
collect and impossible to enforce effectively. In consequence, this study explores the 
economic, fiscal and practical effects of a number of alternative taxation structures for 
passenger transport services performed within the EU. 
1.2  Study objectives 
There are five key study objectives: 
  To provide an overview of the structure and characteristics of the EU passenger 
transport sector.  This is presented in Chapter 2. 
  To analyse the size of the competitive market between the differing modes of 
transport, in between particular high-speed rail transport and air transport, in order to 
determine whether the nature of the competition permits the application of different 
tax rates to the different modes of transport.  The study findings are outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
  To determine the deficiencies of the current taxation system (the “distance” option) 
which arise from the differing VAT treatment of different modes of transport (for 
domestic, intra-EU and international journeys) and from differences in the right to 
deduct input VAT, and to provide a quantitative assessment of these deficiencies.  The 
study findings are outlined in Chapter 4. 
  To determine the economic and fiscal effect of each of the following taxation options, 
under the existing, multi-tax rate system and under a uniform positive rate of tax: 
-  taxation at the place of departure (the “departure” option); 
-   taxation at the place of arrival (the “arrival” option); 
-    taxation at the place of establishment of the supplier (the “operator” 
option); and 
-   taxation at the place of establishment of the customer (the “customer” 
option). 
The study findings are outlined in Chapter 5. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




  To determine the impact of the application of a uniform (positive) tax rate on 
passenger transport within the EU, and in particular the extent to which such a policy 
would damage the EU transport industry, including airline and maritime operators, 
with regard to third country operators.  The study findings are provided in Chapter 6. 
1.3  Methodology 
The methodology for the study comprised a five stage process: 
  first, data gathering to provide an overview of the European transport market and 
passenger flows and to identify, inter alia, competitive issues between modes of 
transport so as to provide a preliminary assessment of whether this would allow 
differing tax treatment between modes; 
  second, data validation to identify the key implications of each of the taxation options 
for the different markets and modes; 
  third, route modelling to enable the impact of potential changes to the taxation regime 
to be assessed; 
  fourth, economic analysis based upon qualitative research, together with route 
modelling; and 
  fifth, fiscal analysis aimed at assessing the impact of VAT under the taxation options 
within two different scenarios: the present system of multiple rates and a uniform rate 
system. 
Detailed notes on the study methodology and route modelling can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
1.4  Report structure 
This report is structured as follows: 
  first, a separate Executive Summary which sets out the study objectives, the emerging 
findings and the next steps; 
  second, the main report which sets out, in detail, the work undertaken to enable the 
preliminary conclusions to be reached; 
  third, the appendices which set out, in more detail, the study methodology, estimates 
of the size of passenger transport segments and the results of the route and fiscal 
modelling; and 
  fourth, the annexes which comprise copies of the questionnaires and case studies used 
by the KPMG research team in conjunction with EU transport operators and trade 
associations. European Commission 
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2 Overview of the EU passenger transport market 
2.1  Introduction 
In this chapter a broad overview of the EU transport market is provided. The aims are: 
  to set the scene for the study by putting the transport market into context relative to 
other industries across the EU; 
  to identify the major demand and supply characteristics of the main non-car passenger 
transport modes – air, rail, coach and other public transport
1; and 
  to identify some of the major differences in transport patterns across alternative modes 
and across the different EU Member States. 
The aggregate market is examined first, followed by each of the three modes identified 
above in more detail. The majority of the statistics presented relate to the example year of 
1994, but in some instances due to lack of appropriate data it has been necessary to use 
other years. 
2.2  The size of the EU transport market 
The European transport sector makes a significant contribution to the EU economy. 
Taking the transport sector as a whole (i.e. including freight traffic), Eurostat
2 have 
estimated that in 1992, the contribution of the sector to the EU economy was just over 
4.1% of GDP, a figure which is equivalent to approximately ECU 212 billion.  This 
percentage contribution to GDP has remained fairly constant, between 4 and 4¼%, since 
1980.
3 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relative significance of the transport and storage sector, which 
covers both passenger and goods transport, in overall EU GDP. 
                                                      
1 Coach includes both scheduled and non-scheduled services and other public transport includes urban 
transport by bus, metro, tram and rail. 
2 Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
3 No breakdown is available of the proportion of passenger transport to the total figure. European Commission 
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Source:  KPMG analysis based on UN  National Accounts data, OECD Economic Outlook 
In terms of employment, transport services across the EU accounted for some 6 million 
jobs in 1992 – a figure which is equivalent to about 4¼% of EU civilian employment or 
8¼% of EU employment in services. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of employment by 
main mode for the EU in 1992. 



































































































Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1995/96, 1997 
The figure shows that by far the biggest employer among the major modes is “other land 
transport”, which includes buses, coaches and urban transport. After this, the next biggest 
employer is rail, with air, sea and inland waterways each accounting for less than 5% of 
employment. However, it is also noticeable that a significant proportion of employment 
in the transport services sector is accounted for by the categories of agents brokers and 
storage and other support services. European Commission 
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This distribution will differ slightly for the passenger only market. In particular, the share 
of the market will fall for sea, inland waterway and “other land” modes, which has a large 
proportion of employees in the goods sector, and increase for the air sector which deals 
primarily in the passenger market. The next section presents a more detailed analysis of 
the passenger only segment of the European transport market. 
2.3  The size of the EU passenger transport market 
This section presents an overview of the size of the passenger only segments in various 
markets.  Ideally, the key indicator of interest would be gross turnover, but this is not 
possible as published data is unavailable or difficult to collect. Passenger kilometres and 
passenger numbers have, therefore, been used. These statistics are a good proxy and 
provide a good indication of the likely trends in gross turnover. 
In 1994, total passenger transport at the EU level (including international journeys 
originating or terminating in the EU) exceeded 4,250  billion passenger kilometres
4, a 
figure which is equivalent to more than 12,000 kilometres for every person in the EU. 
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the EU15 passenger transport market by main mode, 
excluding sea and inland waterway, over the period 1970-1994. From this figure it is 
apparent that EU passenger transport is dominated by the private car. In 1994, close to 
80% of all passenger kilometres were undertaken by private car, with rail, air and 
buses/coaches all accounting for a broadly equal share of the remaining market. 






























Car Bus Rail Air  
Source: DG VII EC Transport Data Pocket Book, European Commission 
Note: Figures cover domestic, intra-EU and international journeys 
Examination of Figure 2.3 shows that the EU passenger transport market has more than 
doubled between 1970 and 1994. In fact, across all modes, passenger transport volumes 
                                                      
4 Revenue figures for passenger transport services are not available. We do provide an estimation of the 
approximate turnover by mode, in Chapter 3. Two possible measures are available, the number of passenger 
trips and the number of passenger kilometres travelled. However, information across the alternative modes is 
more commonly presented for the latter, passenger-kilometre measure. So for the aggregate market we 
present figures based on passenger-kilometre figures but give the number of passenger trips, where possible, 
when we look in more detail at the individual mode markets. European Commission 
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have grown at an average of just over 3% per annum. This compares to an average 
growth rate for GDP of just over 2½% per annum over the same period. This suggests 
that factors such as technological advance and changing social patterns have contributed 
to increased travel as well as a general increase in wealth. 
Taking the 1970–1994 period as a whole, by much the fastest growth has been 
experienced by the air sector, as shown in Figure 2.4. 











Air Car Coach Rail
 
Source:  Based on figures in DG VII EC Transport Data Pocket Book, European Commission 
Figure 2.5 compares the shares of the EU passenger transport market attributable to each 
mode in 1970 and 1994, excluding the private car.  
Figure 2.5:  Market shares by mode, excluding car, 1970 and 1994 (passenger 
kilometres) 














Source: Based on figures in DG VII EC Transport Data Pocket Book, European Commission. 
In 1970 the bus and coach sector dominated the market, accounting for half of all 
passenger kilometres travelled, while rail accounted for a further 42%. The air sector 
therefore took just an 8% share. In 1994, however, the market shares of both the rail and 
the bus and coach sectors have fallen by more than 10 percentage points. The passenger European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




transport market is now split almost equally between the three modes. Since air travel is 
used only for medium to long distance journeys,  air travel will have a much higher share 
in these segments compared to the market as a whole. 
In summary, the private car dominates in the aggregate European passenger transport 
market, with close to 80% of all passenger kilometres being travelled by this mode. Once 
the car is excluded, however, the remaining market is shared roughly equally between 
rail, air and bus. Passenger transport by inland waterway and sea is not significant in any 
Member State when compared to the other modes. The figures also show that, while the 
rail and coach sectors have been declining in relative terms, the growth of air transport 
has been very rapid, accounting for around one third of travel in 1994, from less than one 
tenth in 1970. 
2.3.1  Demand for passenger transport analysed by Member State 
Examination of these aggregate figures at the Member State level, reveals that the volume 
of passenger transport demand varies considerably across Member States.  Excluding the 
private car, the Netherlands is the nation whose people travel the most, averaging almost 
4,500 passenger kilometres per head in 1994. The nation that travels the least is Greece, 
where the average was 1,380 passenger kilometres per head in 1994. If the private car is 
included then the Danes top the league table with more than 15,250 passenger kilometres 
per head (see Figure 2.6) although Greece still remains at the bottom with 3,400 
passenger kilometres per head. 
A key factor in explaining this variation in passenger travel demand across Member 
States is the variation in GDP per capita and income levels (particularly relevant for the 
non-business market). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.6 with Member States 
plotted in descending order of GDP per capita and demand for transport shown as 
passenger kilometres per head of population, to adjust for the large variation in 
population. 
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GDP per capita Passenger/km per capita  
Source: Eurostat, DG VII EC Transport Data Pocket Book, European Commission. European Commission 
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A simple correlation suggests that just over 50% of the variation in passenger demand in 
Europe can be “explained” by variations in GDP per capita with higher levels of per 
capita income associated with higher levels of demand for passenger transport. Not only 
can the residents of richer countries afford to travel further and more frequently, but 
richer countries are likely to have more developed transport infrastructures. However, 
half of the variation is still “unexplained” suggesting that other influences are also 
important including: 
  time, which is a serious constraint on the amount of travel that may be undertaken, 
since beyond a certain level, increased income may only produce modest increases in 
transport demand, as travellers (particularly leisure travellers) have no more time 
available to travel; 
  variations in social tastes, population density, physical geography and geographical 
location within the EU - all of which will impact on the final demand for passenger 
travel; and 
  long-run influences such as the globalisation of international industry and the moves 
towards completion of the European single market.
5  
2.3.2  Demand for passenger transport by mode
6 
Figure 2.7 shows that, just as the overall demand for passenger transport varies 
significantly across Member States, so the market shares of the alternative modes is also 
far from uniform. These figures cover, domestic journeys within EU Member States, 
international journeys between Member States (intra-EU travel) and journeys from 
Member States to third countries outside the EU
7.  
                                                      
5 See, for example, Pan European Transport, Derek Done, 1996. 
6 Appendix 2.1 provides a summary of the key operational characteristics by mode. 
7 A fuller discussion of the individual segments, intra-EU and domestic, is presented in Chapter 6.  European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




Figure 2.7: Modal shares in passenger kilometres, by EU Member State, 1994 
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Source: Based on figures in DG VII EC Transport Data Pocket Book, AEA Yearbook (1995) 
The market share of bus travel ranges from 50% or more in Austria, Italy and Portugal, to 
just 20% in the Netherlands.  In the case of rail, the largest market share is observed in 
France (39%), but in Greece rail has just 7% of the market. Finally, the share of air travel 
ranges from between 55% and 60% in the Netherlands, Greece and the UK to only 14% 
in Austria. This figures need to be interpreted with care since air travel may often be the 
only option available for long international trips (especially inter-continental trips) and 
the distances involved mean that passenger kilometres may overstate the importance of 
air travel. 
The variations in the modal shares, shown in Figure 2.7, will also reflect other factors, in 
particular the importance of the main airport of Member States with respect to the wider 
European and International markets, for example: 
  in the UK, London has a key role as a hub in the European and international air market 
with 72.9 million passengers handled by London Heathrow and London Gatwick in 
1994, which was 25% more than Paris (Charles de Gaulle and Orly), the next biggest 
European destination; and  
  in the Netherlands, Amsterdam handled 23.6 million passengers in 1994, and is the 
fifth biggest airport in the EU; and the Dutch airline KLM, was the third biggest 
European carrier in 1994 on the North Atlantic route. These factors go some way 
towards explaining the importance of air travel in the Netherlands, shown in Figure 
2.7 above. 
Another reason for the variation in modal shares will be differences in individual Member 
States’ physical geography and transport infrastructure, for example: 
  in the UK and Ireland, regardless of the modal share for domestic transport, 
international transport will be dominated by air; and 
  in Greece, with its many islands, the potential for rail travel will be limited and air, 
coach and private car travel (including sea crossings) will predominate.  European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




Public policy towards different modes of transport, including tax treatment and support 
for infrastructure development and maintenance, will also play a role.
8 For example, the 
development of High Speed Rail (HSR) in France explains the relatively large rail share 
in that country.  
In summary it is clear that the passenger transport market is not homogenous across 
Member States, with the relative sizes reflecting factors such as: 
  the degree of development of Member States; 
  differing social tastes and physical geography; and 
  the relative importance of the alternative modes of transport within Member States. 
This means that any proposed tax measure which impacts differently on different modes 
of transport is likely to have different implications for individual Member States. This 
issue is examined in more detail later, when the existing distortions arising out of the 
current VAT system and the way it is applied to passenger transport in the EU is 
discussed. In the following sections, a more detailed overview of the air, rail, urban 
public transport (including coach traffic) and sea (and inland waterway) markets is 
presented. 
In terms of future prospects, Table 2.1 provides an overall summary of the growth 
forecasts for passenger transport across the EU. It should be noted that no distinction is 
drawn between classic rail and HSR.
9 
Table 2.1: Forecasts of growth in domestic and intra EU passenger transport 
market, in passenger kilometres, 1994–2000 (annual percentage change) 
Mode of transport  Average annual growth in passenger transport (%) 
Domestic  
- Road (excluding private car)  -1 
- Rail  +3 
- Air  +4 
Intra-EU  
- Road (excluding private car)  +1 
- Rail  +4 
- Air  +5 
Total +4 
Source:  Pan-European Transport, Derek Done, 1996 
2.4  Air transport 
This section provides a brief overview of the air passenger market in terms of passengers 
numbers, employment, infrastructure and the commercial and legal structure. A 
description of market structure and regulation with respect to competition between and 
within the various modes of transport is presented in Chapter 3. 
                                                      
8 A discussion of the main VAT distortions is presented in Chapter 4. 
9 Further estimates on the projected growth of HSR only are provided in section 2.5. European Commission 
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2.4.1  The size of the air market in Europe 
The data presented in this section uses, where possible, 1994 as the illustration year (the 
latest year for which figures are available). It should be noted that the data therefore  
reflects the regulatory environment prevailing at that time, as measures to liberalise the 
market were only just beginning to be felt by operators
10. 
2.4.1.1  Scheduled services 
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the European air passenger transport market based on 
figures published by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA).  In 1994, a total of 250 million passenger trips 
were made in the market (this figure includes trips to and from Europe). 
Table 2.2: European scheduled air passenger transport market in 1994 
    % share of passengers 
 Passengers 
(millions) 
EU national ‘flag’ 
carriers 
Other carriers  of which: 
EU carriers 
All flights  250  63%  37%  (1) 
- Domestic
11 80 59%  41%  26% 
- International:  170  65%  35%  (1) 
  - Intra-EU  71  79%  21%  (1) 
  - EU -third country  98  46%  54%  (1) 
Source: IATA World Air Transport Statistics Number 40, AEA Yearbook 1995 
(1) not  available 
Domestic and intra-EU traffic account for an equal proportion of overall traffic (around 
30%) with EU–third country traffic accounting for slightly more.  The table shows that 
the 15 major national carriers
12 (also called flag carriers) account for a significant 
share of all the markets that they operate in and dominate the market for travel 
between Member States. In the domestic market, the flag carriers and the other EU 
airlines such as Air UK, Deutsche BA, Viva Air and Skyways together account for 85% 
of the market.  Note, however, that in the EU–third country segment, EU national 
carriers have less than half of the market;  this reflects the strong position of non-EU 
national and other carriers and the increasing role of other EU operators such as Virgin. 
Since 1994 the dominance of the flag carriers has fallen slightly as a result of 
liberalisation, with the entry of both small and large airlines particularly in the intra-EU 
market. 
Figure 2.8 shows the market shares by flag carrier. By far the largest carriers are 
Lufthansa and British Airways, who each carried more than 28 million passengers in 
1994. The Scandinavian airline SAS is next largest with 18 million passengers in 1994. 
Air France, Alitalia and Iberia all accounted for around 12–14 million passengers. With 
                                                      
10 This also has implications for economic and fiscal modelling (which also uses 1994 as the reference year) 
and these are discussed in the appropriate chapters. 
11 Note: Domestic trips include EU Member States and other European countries such as Switzerland and 
Norway. 
12 Including UK-based British Midland. European Commission 
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the exception of the Dutch airline KLM each of  the other flag carriers accounted for less 
than 5 million passengers in 1994.  
Figure 2.8: Market shares of major flag carriers in passenger numbers, 1994 
British Airways – 19%
Lufthansa – 19%
SAS – 12% Air France – 10%
Alitalia – 9%
Iberia – 8.5%
KLM – 7.5% 
Others – 15%
 
Source: Based on figures in AEA Yearbook 1995 
Note: figures include all domestic, intra-EU and international journeys 
Figure 2.9 shows the breakdown of the operations of the major carriers between domestic, 
intra-EU and EU-third country flights. Austrian Airlines, Sabena, Luxair and KLM all 
have no domestic operations, which reflects the small size of their home countries. Aer 
Lingus and Air France
13 domestic services account for 8% and 12% of passengers moved 
respectively.  For the remaining  carriers domestic routes account for between 21 and 56 
% of passengers, with British Airways and Olympic Airways representing the low and 
high shares respectively. 
                                                      
13 Does not include the subsidiary Air Inter, a domestic  carrier, and therefore the share is slightly too low. European Commission 
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In 1994, British Midland and Luxair concentrated exclusively on the intra-EU market 
(including domestic flights). These companies offered no routes to destinations outside 
the EU. For the remaining airlines, intra-EU and domestic routes dominate their 
business, accounting for 80 % or more of trips for all but KLM, Air France and British 
Airways. Of those airlines with a significant share of business generated from EU–third 
country trips, this type of route is most significant for KLM, where 43 % of passengers 
are transported to or from points outside the EU. For Air France and British Airways, this 
figure is 37% and 31 % respectively. 
A schematic representation of the major flows of air traffic within Europe is presented in 
Figure 2.10. The map shows all the Member State to Member State flows representing 
more than 3 % of all intra-EU passenger movements, or (equivalently) more than 1 
million passengers a year. Some 60–65 % of the total intra-EU air passenger flows are 
represented here. 
Figure 2.10 shows: 
   the important role of the UK, Germany and France, and  
  the fact that most air transport is done over medium
15 to long-distance trips where the 
speed advantage of air transport is most pronounced, or where geographical barriers 
are present, such as water.  
                                                      
14 OS=Austrian Airways;  SN=Sabena (Belgium);  SAS=Scandinavian Airline System (Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway), AY=Finnair (Finland);  AF=Air France;  LH=Lufthansa (Germany);  OA= Olympic Airways 
(Greece);  EI=Aer Lingus (Ireland);  AZ=Alitalia (Italy);  LG=Luxair (Luxembourg);  KL=KLM 
(Netherlands);  TAP=Air Portugal;  IB=Iberia (Spain);  BA=British Airways;  BD= British Midland. 
15 In Chapter 3 a medium distance trip is defined as any trip of 300km to 1,000km. European Commission 
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In fact, some 74% of capacity for European trips in 1994 was devoted to routes of over 
400 kilometres. Of the remaining 26%, almost 20% was offered on routes that overflow 
water or were in direct competition with high speed rail links.
16 
2.4.1.2  Chartered services 
There are some 35 chartered operators in the EU.
17  Many of these are wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of either the regional operators (e.g. Air UK Leisure) or flag carriers (for 
example, Transavia Airlines, owned primarily by KLM Royal Dutch Airlines). 
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the key carriers. It is important to note that the 
concentration of north-west European operators in terms of market share is very high.  As 
with the scheduled operators it is apparent that certain Member States such as the UK and 
Germany enjoy a comparative advantage.  In the case of the UK, this is likely to stem 
from the more deregulated commercial environment. 
Table 2.3 also shows that chartered air services carried 67.5 million passengers in 1993; 
chartered air services account therefore for more than a quarter of all passenger traffic 
carried by European-based scheduled and chartered operators. The majority of this 
market is likely to fall within the intra-EU leisure market and reflect the holiday patterns 
and preferences of the citizens of the north European Member States. This suggests that 
the intra-EU charter market, which is satisfied by EU carriers, is of a similar 
magnitude to the intra-EU scheduled market operated by the major flag carrier 
airlines. Moreover, with respect to revenue passenger kilometres, the magnitude is 
greater with estimates placing market share close to 65%
18. 
Following European deregulation, charter airlines as separate entities were expected to 
disappear.  However,  the inclusive tour has remained a popular product and is still 
widely available.  In addition the charter sector’s position was to some degree 
strengthened by the greater protection given by competition laws and the removal of the 
licensing distinction between charter and scheduled services in the early 1990s.  This was 
reflected in the collective  profit  for EU operators in the sector of US $300 million 
(1992-1993) compared to the substantial losses experienced in the scheduled market over 
the same period. 
                                                      
16 AEA (Yearbook, 1995, p 26). 
17 AEA Yearbook 1995 
18Charter Airlines in Europe, EIU Travel and Tourism Analyst No 4 1995 European Commission 
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Table 2.3:  The European chartered air market, 1994 
Airline  Country  Passenger-km (millions)  Passengers 000’s 
Britannia Airways  UK  18,850  7913 
Condor Flugdienst  D  16,188  5500 
Virgin Atlantic AW  UK  12,231  1704 
Monarch Airlines  UK  10,732  4803 
Air 2000  UK  10,700  4201 
LTU Int’l Airways  D  10,634  3324 
Airtours Int’l  UK  9550  3520 
Hapag-Lloyd Flug  D  9450  4031 
Martinair Holland  NL  7953  1823 
Corsair F  7003  1206 
PremiAir DK  6749  1103 
LTU-Sud Int’l Airways  D  6435  2310 
Sobelair B  6209  688 
Caledonian Airways  UK  5970  1912 
Aero-Lloyd Flug  D  5597  1200 
Spanair E  5367  2906 
Air Europa/Espana  E  5078  3436 
Transavia Airlines  NL  3995  2005 
Germania D  3807  1346 
British Midland AW  UK  3611  5174 
Air Liberté  F  3400  700 
Transwede   S  3182  2033 
Lauda Air     3123  827 
Air Europe SpA  I  2746  182 
Futura E  2473  1255 
Oasis AL  E  2216  1351 
Air UK Leisure  UK  2046  1145 
Excalibur UK  1900  765 
Maersk Air  DK  1865  1729 
Air Berlin  D  1545  1048 
EuroBelgian AL  B  1454  837 
LTE Int’l Airways  E  1196  488 
Sterling European AL    1166  533 
Air Holland Charter  NL  1000  500 
TEA Italy  I  1000  500 
Euralair F  883  679 
Centennial E  864  575 
Air Belgium  B  784  173 
Deutsche BA  D  491  950 
Total   199,440  76,281 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
2.4.2  Employment 
Table 2.4 show direct employment in the airline sector, for each country and flag carrier, 
against the number of passengers carried by the flag carrier.  Most of the Member States 
with high levels of employment in the airline sector, are northern European. All countries 
that employ more than 50,000 are northern states, although Italy with nearly 43,000 
employed is comparable. In terms of the relative efficiency of each of the flag carriers, 
measured by passengers carried per employee; UK, Germany, Italy, Denmark and Ireland 
are the most efficient with approximately between 600 and 900 passengers transported European Commission 
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per employee, whereas France and Portugal are the least efficient with only around 400 
passengers transported per employee. 
Table 2.4: Airline employment (thousands) and passengers carried (millions) 
Airline Employment  (Total)  Employment (Flag carrier)  Passengers (Millions) 
UK 71.1  53.5  34.7 
France 57.3  37.5  15.6 
Germany 57.0  42.3  30.0 
Italy 42.7  18.7  14.5 
Netherlands 28.6  23.6  11.7 
Spain 25.8  23.0  13.4 
Belgium 14.7  9.8  4.3 
Portugal 14.4  8.8  3.5 
Greece 12.7  10.4  5.8 
Denmark 9.7  6.4  5.4 
Ireland 4.9  5.2  3.7 
Luxembourg 1.5  1.3  0.5 
Source:  AEA Yearbook 1995 and Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
2.4.3  Infrastructure 
Infrastructure for the airline sector can be thought of in terms of the physical factors 
required to service aircraft, such as airports, and the ‘softer’ infrastructure such as air 
traffic control space.  In both cases, capacity constraints appear to be growing.  This has, 
in part, been fuelled by the record growth in demand for air travel that has been witnessed 
in the last few years as the sector has come out of recession. In the case of air traffic 
control (ATC), Eurocontrol, Europe’s largest ATC grouping, has warned that the system 
is in major need of increased investment and harmonisation in order to avoid being 
overwhelmed in the near future.   
Table 2.5 provides a league table of the EU’s busiest airports. As with the airlines, it can 
be seen that there is a significant concentration of traffic in the north and north-western 
EU states. Heathrow became established at an early stage as the biggest “hub” (airports 
where many air routes converge and passengers can interchange between flights) in 
Northern Europe and competes with Frankfurt, Paris Charles de Gaulle and Amsterdam 
Schipol. Once an airport is established as a hub it can be very difficult for other airports 
in the local region to compete with it.   
Large airlines have protected their positions by seeking to dominate hubs as airlines 
which operate well co-ordinated flights through a hub can offer passengers a wide range 
of journey opportunities. Scheduled airlines are attracted to the hub because the 
availability of interline passengers increases the size of the market available there.  Other 
airports in the local region are reduced to serving the charter market, scheduled services 
with a very local catchment, or services which cannot obtain access to the hub. 
 European Commission 
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Table 2.5:  Passengers handled by European Airports, 1995 
Airport  Country  Passengers handled (millions) 
London Heathrow  UK  54.4 
Frankfurt  Ger  38.2 
Paris Charles de Gaulle  Fr  28.4 
Paris Orly  Fr  26.7 
Amsterdam NL  25.4 
London Gatwick  UK  22.5 
Rome Fiumicino  I  21.1 
Madrid  Spa  20.0 
Manchester  UK  15.0 
Dusseldorf  Ger  15.1 
Munich  Ger  14.9 
Stockholm Arlanda  Swe  13.4 
Palma de Mallorca  Spa  14.7 
Copenhagen Den  14.7 
Brussels Bel  12.6 
Barcelona Spa  11.7 
Milan Linate  Ita  10.8 
Athens  Gre  9.9 
Hamburg  Ger  8.2 
Vienna Aus  8.5 
Berlin  Ger  8.3 
Tenerife Sur  Spa  7.4 
Helsinki Fin  7.3 
Las Palmas  Spa  7.8 
Nice  Fra  6.1 
Dublin Ire  8.0 
Lisbon Por  6.2 
Malaga  Spa  6.2 
Glasgow  UK  5.4 
Birmingham  UK  5.3 
Stuttgart  Ger  5.2 
Marseilles Fra  5.1 
EU Total  464.6 
Other Europe     
Zurich Swi  15.3 
Istanbul Turk  12.1 
Oslo Nor  8.4 
Geneva Swi  6.2 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997  
Forecast figures from the AEA
19, indicate that demand at Europe’s most congested 
airports is likely to double between 1993 and 2005.  With respect to airport development, 
plans are afoot to increase capacity at individual airports across the EU. This process is 
primarily driven by Member State governments with a certain amount of assistance and 
co-ordination from the EU. 
                                                      
19 AEA Yearbook, 1995 European Commission 
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2.5  Rail transport 
2.5.1  The size of the EU rail market 
In 1994, the European rail passenger transport market was measured as some 4.9 billion 
passenger movements
20. Of these the vast majority were concerned with domestic trips. 
Using an analysis done by Eurostat for Intra-EU passenger flows (excluding Austria, 
Finland and Sweden) in 1990
21, it is possible to estimate figures for intra-EU trips in 
1994. Table 2.6 summarises the EU rail passenger transport market and shows that, in 
relation to domestic trips, the volume of cross-border travel is very small.  Recall that 
intra-EU air trips were estimated at 71 million (see Table 2.2), so that rail travel accounts 
for around 25% of all intra-EU air and rail trips. To some extent the variation in rail 
travel seen above might be expected to reflect the physical rail infrastructure of the 
Member States. While there is a reasonably clear relationship between the total number of 
passengers carried and the length of the national rail networks, the number of passengers 
primarily reflects the bigger populations of the geographically larger Member States. A 
comparison of rail use with rail density (length of rail network per square kilometre) is 
shown in Figure 2.12, and suggests no clear relationship. 
Table 2.6:  The rail market in the EU12, 1994 
Type of trip  No of passengers (millions)  % of 2nd class trips 
All journeys  4,945  97 
 – Domestic (Urban and Non-Urban)  4,923  97 
 – Intra-EU  22  98 
Source: UIC, Eurostat, KPMG estimates. Figures refer to EU12 i.e. they exclude Austria, Finland and 
Sweden. 
A closer examination of the rail market at the Member State level, shows that rail is most 
heavily used in Austria, Denmark and France, followed by Italy and the Netherlands. 
                                                      
20 International Union of Railways 1994. This includes all domestic, intra-EU and international trips made on 
the national railways of the EU15. These are OBB, SNCB, DSB, VR, SNCF, DB, AG, CH, NIR, FS, CFL, 
NS, CP, RENFE, SJ, BR and EPS. 
21 Transport Annual Statistics 1970-1990 European Commission 
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Passenger km per capita by rail Rail network density (right hand scale)  
Source:  UIC, Eurostat. Note: Rail network density is km of  rail track per 1,000 square kilometres. 
2.5.2  The arrival of High Speed Rail(HSR) 
The most important development in the European passenger transport market over the 
next decade or so is the planned development of high speed rail. HSR networks are 
already operational in a number of EU countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. By 
1996, these networks extended to nearly 9,000 km of track
22 and accounted for over 30 
billion passenger kilometres. 
The French carrier SNCF originally dominated the market, accounting for around three 
quarters of all HSR travel in 1993, meeting what was primarily a domestic demand. Since 
then, the position has changed with the development of services such as Eurostar (the 
HSR link between London-Brussels and London-Paris) which demonstrated the potential 
market for international HSR.  
The success of HSR across the EU will be driven by the extension and construction of the 
necessary infrastructure, much of which is designated as part of the Trans-European 
Networks or TENS
23.  Meeting in Essen in December 1994, the European Council of 
Heads of State and Government identified 14 priority TENS projects. Of these 14, 10 
involved rail or rail/road combinations and 5 were specific HSR projects
24 as summarised 
below: 
  Berlin–Nuremberg/Munich–Verona high speed rail; 
  Paris–Brussels–Cologne–Amsterdam–London high speed rail; 
  Spain–France, north and south from Madrid high speed rail; 
  Paris–eastern France–south west Germany, including Metz–Luxembourg branch, high 
speed train; 
                                                      
22 Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
23 The name given to the Community initiative to improve the transport network across the EU 
24 The TransEuropean Network:  Transforming a Patchwork into a Network, European Commission 1995 European Commission 
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  Rotterdam–Dutch/German border conventional rail; 
  Lyons–Turin-Milan–Venice-Trieste high speed rail; 
  Oresund fixed rail/road link between Denmark and Sweden; 
  Cork–Dublin-Belfast conventional rail; 
  Nordic Triangle, multi-modal corridors; and  
  the UK West coast main line. 
Figure 2.13 gives a diagrammatic representation of these projects and shows how these 
ten rail or rail/road TENS priorities will change the look of the HSR network in Europe 
once completed. Overall, the projects will bring a further 12,500 km of lines with the 
major expansion occurring over the 1998-2008 period. 
The report completed for the Community of European Railways (CER) in 1993 on the 
future impact of the HSR network on the market for passenger transport indicated that in 
a best-case scenario, the HSR network could increase the amount of rail travel (over 
80 km) by 142 billion passenger kilometres (72%) compared with the level of demand 
given an unchanged network.  This would reduce demand for intra-European air 
services by 17%  compared to a scenario with no change in the HSR network. 
In overall terms, the development of the HSR rail network is considered likely to have a 
relatively modest impact on the total market share of the motor car as a proportion of all 
passenger transport traffic over 80 km in trip length.  Estimates suggest a reduction in 
market share of around 10% from 71% (1988 figures) to 61%. 
The share of revenue generated by the high-speed network is estimated to increase from 
10% of all rail revenue (1988) to as much as 70% by 2010.  In ECU terms this would be 
reflected in a change in the market’s value from an estimated ECU 13 billion in 1988, to 
ECU 25 billion in 2010 (at 1988 prices). European Commission 
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2.6  Urban public transport
25  
This term, as defined by Eurostat, covers the urban public transport sectors of railways, 
trams, metros and buses as well as scheduled and shuttle coaches.
26 
Table 2.7 provides a summary of the number of enterprises, their turnover and number of 
people employed for the EU12 in public transport.  It can be seen that there are very large 
variations in the number of enterprises providing services.  This reflects the extent of 
private provision and deregulation.  For example, the UK figure of over 3,700 players 
reflects the large number of local/regional bus companies which sprang up following 
deregulation in 1988. 
Table 2.7:  Public Transport operators in the EU, 1992 
Member State  No of operators  Turnover (M ECU)  Employment 
Belgium 265  n/a  17,061 
Denmark 398  n/a  n/a 
Germany 3,056  2,808  n/a 
Greece 320  n/a  30,250 
Spain 1,148  2,137  44,825 
France 174  2,588  74,789 
Italy 1,117  1,788  117,129 
Luxembourg 3  5  581 
Netherlands 33  485  26,900 
Portugal 97  583  30,218 
United Kingdom  3,686  3,343  n/a 
Source:  Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
Turnover figures in this sector reflect to a lesser extent the higher expenditure and 
mobility rates of the northern European States (and indeed their size).  Italy and Spain 
both have large public transport markets.  This is reflected in Figure 2.14. 
                                                      
25 An urban area is defined as a town or city with a population greater than 100,000. 
26 The sector may therefore overlap slightly with the  rail sector. European Commission 
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In terms of the modal split between different forms of passenger transport, Table 2.8 
provides an indication of the share by type of service and the proportion of vehicles used 
to deliver services. 
Table 2.8:  Importance of different modes of public transport, 1994 
Mode  Proportion of passenger trips (%)  Proportion of Vehicles (%) 
Urban and suburban buses  52  63 
Commuter rail and local train 
services 
14 13 
Underground railway  24  15 
Light rail  9  9 
Trolley bus  1  1 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
Within each of the public transport modes - buses, coaches, light rail and trams, and 
heavy rail services, a number of key differences have been identified in terms of the 
market served: 
  buses tend to serve short-distance markets in urban areas where average journey 
length is relatively short and frequency is high; 
  coaches operating scheduled services mainly work inter-urban routes and where 
chartered tend to serve longer-distance markets; 
  trams tend to compete in the same market as bus services. In addition, their 
integration/transformation into light railways means that they are also competing with 
heavy rail services, as they increase penetration into the slightly longer-distance 
markets outside urban centres; and 
  heavy rail services are also undergoing change in the markets they serve as 
infrastructure improvements allow them to act as metros in urban areas and as longer 
distance commuter services (their traditional markets) which are more inter-urban.  
 European Commission 
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2.7  EU coach market 
The coach travel market, which includes both urban and inter-city bus and coach 
services
27, is summarised in Table 2.9. The large variance in passenger kilometres reflects 
the development of the transport market (more developed countries tend to have lower 
per capita bus traffic), population size, national policies and private attitudes towards the 
car. 
Table 2.9: Passenger kilometres in the European Bus and Coach Market, 1994 
Country  Passenger-Km (Billions)  % Market Share 
Austria 13.7  4% 
Belgium 5.3  1% 
Denmark 9.5  3% 
Germany 67.5  19% 
Greece 5.2  1% 
Spain 38.1  11% 
France 42.6  12% 
Ireland 2.8  1% 
Italy 81.5  23% 
Luxembourg 0.5  0% 
Netherlands 13.9  4% 
Portugal 12.6  4% 
Finland 8.0  2% 
Sweden 9.3  3% 
United Kingdom  43.0  12% 
    
Total 353.5  100% 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
Within the international coach market the European Conference of Ministers of Transport 
in 1987 defined three types of services. These are: scheduled services operating on a 
timetable basis over specified routes; shuttle services consisting of repeated trips for 
groups of passengers (for example migrant workers); and occasional or other services 
such as those provided to holiday-makers as part of a packaged trip that might include 
accommodation, travel and other costs. The total intra-EU coach market  is estimated at 
approximately 5 million passenger trips in 1996
28 and represents a relatively small 
proportion of intra-EU and third country travel; the flows are summarised by route in 
Figure 2.15. 
                                                      
27 This sector includes all regular and occasional services. 
28 Source: Bundesverband Deutscher Omnibusunternehmer, Eurolines, F.B.A.A, Fachverband Der 
Autobusunternehuungen and Koninklijk Nederlands.  European Commission 
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Scheduled Shuttle and Other services  
Source: Bundesverband Deutscher Omnibusunternehmer, Eurolines, F.B.A.A, Fachverband Der 
Autobusunternehuungen, Koninklijk Nederlands and KPMG analysis. 
Note: North is defined as Denmark, Ireland, UK and Sweden; Central as Belgium, France, Germany and 
Netherlands; and South as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
2.7.1  Infrastructure 
Buses and coaches operate almost entirely on the public highway.  Coach services are 
much more dependent on motorway and trunk road infrastructure than buses.  Overall, the 
EU15 have a dense road network averaging 1,000 km (all types) for every 1,000 square 
kilometres of area (1992 data).  Within the EU however, there is considerable variation in 
the levels of density and also the amount of motorway (see Figure 2.16).  For example, 
Portugal has a road density of 207 km per 1,000 square km whilst Belgium has nearly 
4,130 km to the same area of land.   
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Source: Eurostat 
Note: Road density is km of road per 1,000 square kilometres. European Commission 
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2.8  Sea and inland waterway transport 
2.8.1  The size of the EU sea market 
In all EU Member States, passenger transport by sea or inland waterway accounts for a 
very small proportion of the total market
29. According to the UN
30, sea transport accounts 
for only ¾ of a percentage point of total passenger/kilometres in Denmark and Finland.  
This figure is even lower in all other Member States.  According to the same source, only 
Italy has a significant level of passenger transport by inland waterway, just over half of a 
percentage point of all passenger kilometres travelled in Italy although the passenger 
transport arrangements in Venice may distort these figures. However, there are a number 
of important corridors, particularly on the periphery of the EU, where ferry traffic is 
significant. The most heavily used corridors are: 
  Baltic corridors between Denmark and Germany to Scandinavia; 
  Channel crossings, including the Dover-Calais short crossings and the Portsmouth-
Caen western routes; 
  Adriatic routes between Italy and Greece; 
  North Sea routes to Scandinavia and Holland; 
  Irish Sea services; and 
  Mediterranean routes between numerous islands. 
The total intra-EU sea market in 1994 consisted of 85 million passenger trips and around 
3.4 billion passenger kilometres. The vast majority of trips take place between UK-
France, Denmark-Sweden, Denmark-Germany and Finland-Sweden. 
The relative markets sizes, in terms of passenger kilometres, of these major corridors is 
summarised in Figure 2.17. The largest markets are again the Channel and Baltic 
crossings but UK-France and Finland-Sweden account for a larger share compared to 
Denmark-Sweden as the average trip length between their countries is much larger. 
However, in the near future these routes are likely to face major reductions as the 
Channel Tunnel becomes more competitive and the Oresund bridge between Copenhagen 
and south Sweden is completed. 
It is also worth noting, however, that this is a relatively a high number of trips in 
comparison to intra-EU passenger trips by other modes. This is because of the inclusion 
of travel by private car in the data, and the possible existence of double counting; for 
example passengers travelling by ferry between Denmark-Sweden with a main mode of 
rail or coach could appear in both sea and rail or coach passenger statistics. 
                                                      
29 The Panorama of EU Statistics says of the sector: “As passenger transportation is limited to a few ferry 
boats across rivers and boats for inner cruises, this part of the sector is very small and will not be considered 
in this monograph.” 
30 UN Annual Bulletin of Transport Statistics for Europe and North America – 1995 – Table 3B. European Commission 
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Source: ShipPax database 1994/95 
In addition to the international corridors there is a significant domestic sea market, for 
example the Greek inter-island links in the Aegean Sea, which is estimated to be broadly 
in the region of 121 million passengers in 1994
31. However, the complexity of domestic 
route networks, and the large number of small crafts used, makes it difficult to measure 
the market size accurately. 
Within the sea passenger market, the distinct type of transport and markets served can be 
segmented into the following categories: 
  roll-on roll-off ferries;  
  hovercraft, hydrofoils and catamarans; and 
  cruise liners and other leisure sailing. 
Roll-on roll-off ferries (the largest sector) caters for foot passengers, freight, accompanied 
cars and coaches. The success of these has been due to the efficient transit service 
provided for freight operators, rather than high quality services to the passenger market. 
The hovercraft category provides rapid, passenger-only, services catering for the small 
business and top-end leisure market, while cruise liners and leisure sailing take the 
remaining share of the market. For a selection of EU countries, turnover and the number 
of enterprises in the shipping industry, which includes both goods and passenger 
transport, is shown in Table 2.10. 
                                                      
31 Source: ShipPax database 1994/95 European Commission 
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Table 2.10: Sea transport operators in the EU, 1992 
Member State  No of enterprises  Turnover (M ECU) 
Belgium 188  1737 
Denmark 544  3138 
Germany 570  1226 
Greece 446  n/a 
France 155  3885 
Italy 273  2713 
Luxembourg 16  n/a 
Netherlands 486  2415 
Portugal 21  212 
Finland 61  1217 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
2.9  Inter-Modal Transport 
Inter-modal transport where two or more modes is used for a particular journey is very 
common throughout the EU. It is also a very important issue in the domestic market. 
Many governments have created policies, such as park and ride facilities to encourage 
people to use public transport. Such facilities allow people to park their car on the edge of 
large conurbation’s and continue their journey to the centre by public transport. These 
polices are currently high on the political agenda and are viewed by both government and 
the public as environmentally friendly in the way they help to reduce pollution and traffic 
congestion in city centres. 
In the context of the intra-EU market, an example of inter-modal transport is a person 
travelling Gothenburg–Hamburg who uses a number of different modes to complete the 
journey. These could include: private car between Gothenburg and Helsingor; ferry foot 
passenger between Helsingor and Helsingborg; the coach mode travel between Helsingor-
Copenhagen; and the rail mode between Copenhagen and Hamburg. 
However, in terms of how passenger kilometres and numbers in the proceeding sections 
are presented, they are treated as four separate journeys. These are first, a domestic car 
trip; second, an intra-EU sea journey; third, a domestic coach journey; and fourth, an 
intra-EU rail journey. Thus, the level of inter-modal activity does not affect the statistics 
presented in this chapter for intra-EU travel. Further, the level of inter-modal activity is 
irrelevant as it is only possible to cross a frontier by one mode only. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




2.10  Conclusions 
The passenger transport market in Europe is not homogenous. Not only does the level of 
demand vary across the individual Member States, but the importance of the alternative 
modes is different in different Member States.  Any tax measures that affect alternative 
modes in different ways will, therefore, have differing consequences for different 
Member States. 
The European passenger transport market is dominated by the car and whilst this sector 
would not be directly affected by any changes to the EU VAT regime, the indirect effect 
on the sector could be significant as the mode’s competitive position changes in relation 
to competing forms of transport. 
In terms of the other modes of transport, the key conclusions are: 
  within the air transport sector, the national flag carriers dominate the market for 
scheduled services for domestic and intra-EU trips, although this dominance has fallen 
very slightly since 1994. Domestic, intra-EU and international trips account for 
roughly equal proportions of the total number of trips, although international trips will 
account for a larger proportion of revenue, as they will be on average significantly 
longer; 
  in the EU–third country segment, EU national air carriers have less than 50% of the 
market, reflecting the strong position of non-EU and other EU (non-national) carriers; 
  the chartered air market is also significant, however, and accounts for around one 
quarter of the combined scheduled and chartered market operated by EU carriers; 
  intra-EU trips are a much smaller proportion of overall trips for rail compared to air; 
  HSR is an important potential development for the future. Studies on the impact of 
HSR have suggested that it is likely to take market share from both the private car and 
from air transport; 
  the vast majority of trips are domestic. In the intra-EU rail and air passenger transport 
market, air accounts for approximately 75% of journeys. This is likely to change 
significantly as a result of the expansion of the HSR network infrastructure; 
  the characteristics of each particular industry will need to be considered within the 
framework of any new taxation option and in the context of possible changes to the 
VAT accounting requirements; 
  although there are a number of differences, in commercial, operational and legal terms 
between transport modes, it is anticipated that the draft framework devised for each 
taxation option should be capable of being implemented by all operators, irrespective 
of mode.  However, specific modal characteristics (for example, the “Issuing Carrier” 
concept within the airline industry and the contractual position within the railway 
industry) may mean that Member States would need to adopt arrangements whereby 
operators other than the principal operator (or operators) account for the tax payable 
on passenger transport services provided within the EU; and 
  the characteristics of the EU transport industry mean that clear definitions are required 
in a number of areas (stopovers, transit passengers, return journeys, place of European Commission 
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establishment etc) to ensure consistency of application of legislation across the EU as 
a whole. 
These conclusions set out the key characteristics of the EU passenger transport market 
and form the basis for the assessment and analysis of the size and significance of the 
competitive segment and the current VAT-created distortions that follow in Chapters 3 
and 4. 
 European Commission 
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3 Competition in the EU passenger transport market 
3.1  Introduction 
One of the key objectives of the study is to assess the extent to which competition 
between different modes of transport may be affected by differences in the VAT 
treatment of different modes of passenger transport. In this chapter, the issue of 
competition between modes in both theoretical and practical terms is discussed, and the 
major areas where competition exists in the European passenger transport sector are 
identified. Building on the overview of the transport market presented in Chapter 2, some 
estimates of the size and importance of the segments where competition is greatest are 
presented.  The chapter is organised as follows: 
  first, a brief outline of the determinants of competition is presented involving 
-  market and ownership structure, and 
-  the regulatory environment; 
  second, a segmentation of the passenger market to enable an assessment of where 
competition between modes is significant is made; and  
  third, rough quantitative estimates of the size of the segments where competition exists 
are provided. 
The primary emphasis of this chapter is inter-modal competition (i.e. competition 
between rail, air and coach), since the ultimate aim is to assess the impact of different 
VAT rates applied to different modes of transport.  There are segments within the 
passenger transport market, however, where there is both inter-modal competition (e.g. 
between airline operators and HSR) and intra-modal competition (e.g. between airline 
operators).  Moreover, competition increases with the number of operators on a route;  
thus, competition between rail and air will therefore be stronger in the Paris–London 
route (where more than 10 airline operators compete), compared to the Lyon–Madrid 
route (where only 1 or 2 airline operators provide passenger services – see Chapter 2). 
3.2  Factors determining the degree of competition in the passenger 
transport market 
3.2.1  General principles 
The most important factor in determining the degree of competition in any given market 
is market structure. This is generally divided into two groups and both are important for 
pricing and competition. Firstly, a vertical structure where competition takes place 
between different operators within the same mode and secondly, a horizontal structure 
where competition takes place between different modes. 
Market structure will depend on the inherent cost characteristics of providing passenger 
transport services and in particular the relative significance of fixed costs 
32. Given the 
                                                      
32 Fixed costs are those costs that are independent of the number of passengers transported, e.g. costs of 
maintenance of railway track and stations.  In practice it is sunk costs that matter, i.e. fixed costs that are 
irrecoverable after exit (see S Sutton, “Sunk Costs and Market Structure”, 1992). European Commission 
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large role of fixed costs in the operation of rail (costs of building and maintaining the rail 
track), there are significant economies of scale in rail passenger transport and therefore 
the structure of the rail market is, in general, very concentrated.  In most Member States 
there is just a single operator.  Air operators and coach operators face lower fixed costs 
(landing or aeronautical charges for air and fixed administration costs for air and coach), 
and in general the degree of concentration
33 would be expected to be lower
34. 
Another key factor is the regulatory environment which will determine the ease with 
which small numbers of suppliers can operate anti-competitive agreements. Across 
Europe, national regulation has historically acted to limit competition by creating public 
monopolies or ensuring only small number of suppliers exist, especially in rail and air. 
Even if there are two, three or four suppliers in a market, they may find it in their interest 
not to compete with each other but to collude and fix prices such that they share the 
market together. While anti-collusion legislation exists in most Member States, proving 
anti-competitive behaviour is notoriously difficult. While it is perfectly possible for two 
firms to compete, it is generally the case that the larger the number of suppliers, the 
greater the degree of competition that will exist
35. This issue is discussed in more detail, 
for each of the modes air, rail, coach and other urban public transport, in the sections that 
follow. 
3.2.2  Air 
Over recent years, there have been dramatic changes in all areas of the European air 
market. These changes are expected to continue in the future. To understand the full 
dynamics of this market, therefore, it has been necessary to describe in detail ownership, 
market structure, and regulation issues in terms of both historical and future trends within 
the air market. This section on the air market, therefore, is more extensive than for the 
other modes. 
3.2.2.1  Regulation 
Changes to the regulatory structure of the sector could best be described as incremental
36. 
Following the moves by individual Member States such as the UK and Netherlands to 
deregulate air transport on UK-Dutch routes in the early and mid 1980s, the European 
Commission introduced a series of four packages, designed to bring non-liberalised 
Member States into line with the more progressive members. 
Significant EU measures to liberalise the air transport market include: 
  the Directive on Inter-Regional Air Services (July 1983).  This liberalised access to 
routes between regional airports for aircraft with capacity for up to 70 passengers; 
                                                      
33 Concentration is a combined measure of the number of firms in any given market and their market power.  
The lower the degree of concentration, the more competition there is likely to be. 
34 For a detailed exposition and some good examples see Chapter 10 of Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 
“Economics”, 4th Edition. 
35 It is worth noting in this respect the recent referral to the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission of the 
proposed merger between the two major channel operators, P&O and Stena. 
36 See, for example, discussion in Panorama of EU Industry 1997 European Commission 
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  the ‘First Package’ which came into effect in December 1987.  This measure relaxed 
the bilateral rules on equal sharing of capacity and reduced the powers of governments 
to regulate fares.  It also gave open access to some ‘fifth freedom’ routes as extensions 
of services from an airline’s home country (the latter provision allowed Aer Lingus to 
extend its Dublin–Manchester service to Milan); 
  the ‘Second Package’ which came into effect in July 1990 gave further relaxations on 
similar lines to the First Package; 
  the ‘Third Package’. Provisions of the Third Package which came into effect on 1 
January 1993 gave EU airlines open access to almost all international routes in the EU 
and gave airlines the freedom to set their own fares; and 
  the ‘Fourth Package’ which came into effect in April 1997 gave EU airlines access to 
most domestic routes, the last significant barrier to competition within the EU. 
A key point is that the most significant measure implemented so far (the Third Package 
deregulation of international routes within the EU) is relatively recent and its effects on 
the market are not yet entirely evident. 
Member States have been responsible for negotiating bilateral agreements with non-EU 
states where the European Commission has not taken the lead role for EU wide 
agreements. This means that a significant part of the market available to EU airlines has 
not been directly affected by the EU liberalisation measures.  
3.2.2.2  Ownership 
Aviation has historically been subject to heavy government control and has been 
dominated by state ownership. In recent years, as the dual processes of privatisation and 
deregulation have intensified, there has been a change in the market structure. This 
change has been characterised by increased competition in certain parts of the market and 
a consolidation in the number of large scale operators
37. 
There are three tiers to the scheduled market within the EU.  These can be defined as: 
  the flag carriers, many of which are still under some form of public ownership; 
  non-flag carrying major airlines, for example, British Midland or Virgin; and 
  the regional carriers, such as Air UK or Air Inter, and the point-to-point carriers, such 
as World Airlines. 
As shown in Chapter 2, the dominant players in the European market are the flag 
carriers. Within this group, the market concentration is high; the top four operators 
account for around 70% of the flag carrier market. In spite of this concentration, the 
number of airlines operating in the EU market is quite high; there are some 109 scheduled 
service providers in all
38. 
Table 3.1 provides a list of the main EU scheduled operators and their ownership 
structure as well as the country of origin of the operator; within each broad ownership 
category, the airlines are ranked in ascending order of state ownership. 
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Table 3.1: Ownership structure of main EU scheduled airlines, 1995 
Airline State  ownership  Country 
British Airways  0%  UK 
Sabena 33.8%  Belgium 
Luxair 36.5%  Luxembourg 
KLM 38.2%  Netherlands 
Lufthansa 40.6%  Germany 
SAS  50.0%  Denmark, Sweden, Norway (ratio 2:3:2) 
Alitalia 86.4%  Italy 
Air France  99.3%  France 
Iberia 99.8%  Spain 
Aer Lingus  100.0%  Ireland 
Olympic Airways  100.0%  Greece 
TAP Air Portugal  100.0%  Portugal 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1997 
The table shows that 6 of the flag carriers are more than 50% state-owned with Air 
France, Iberia, Aer Lingus, Olympic Airways and TAP Air Portugal being virtually 100% 
state owned. Only British Airways can be classified as a 100% private company; Sabena,  
Luxair, KLM and Lufthansa are more than 50% privately owned. Against this 
background the EU flag carrier market might be expected to react relatively slowly to 
changes in market forces and market structure. In addition, customer loyalty towards their 
own national airline will act against services by other EU airlines, especially in the 
domestic market. 
Despite the relatively high concentration of market share amongst the largest airlines, 
competition within the sector varies by route. On the London–Paris route, ICAO
39 
figures suggest that 13 airlines operated services in 1994. The three biggest carriers were 
Air France, British Airways and British Midland, who shared just over 80% of the 
market. These figures suggest competition does exist on this route. On the other hand, 7 
carriers operated on the Copenhagen–Stockholm route in 1994, yet SAS accounted for 
some 91% of passengers carried, suggesting that there is less competition here. Lyon–
Madrid is an example of a significant route where only one carrier, Air France, operates 
services.  A more detailed analysis of competition is provided in the next chapter. 
3.2.2.3  International links 
As a direct result of the changing regulatory structure, the creation of true multinational 
airlines and a handful of global consortia has become a distinct possibility. The airline 
industry is experiencing a period of consolidation and a growth in co-operation as 
alliances become the strategy most in favour. 
The popularity of co-operation, through an alliance, merger or code-sharing agreement 
(the emphasis on equity links has been reduced) is particularly evident from the increase 
in their number and scale, rising from 280 in 1994 to 389 in 1996. The effect of these 
world-wide alliances, particularly transatlantic, has important ramifications for the 
European market which continues to be one of the world’s three major markets both in its 
own right and as a major origin and destination location for flows between  the American 
and Asia-Pacific regions. 
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The history of alliances starts with British Airways in 1987 when it signed a ground 
breaking code-sharing agreement with United Airlines; this, along with many of the older 
agreements, has subsequently been dissolved.  After UA, British Airways engaged in an 
alliance with USAir, which is still in effect today but under increased pressure from the 
prospective alliance with American Airlines. Other key developments throughout the 90s 
include: 
  Northwest and KLM alliance in 1992; 
  United and Lufthansa alliance in 1994, joined later in the ‘Star Alliance’ by Air 
Canada, Thai Airways International, SAS and (potentially) South African Airways and 
British Midland in the future; and 
  Delta, Austrian, Swissair and Sabena alliance in 1995, joined later by Singapore. 
The success of the above alliances hinged upon exemption from US antitrust laws, given 
only if an open-skies agreement between the US and the country concerned was reached. 
For example in the Northwest/KLM alliance the initial open-skies agreement paved the 
way for US antitrust immunity and a successful alliance.  At present, the proposed 
alliance between BA and American is subject to considerable delay because of regulatory 
concerns from US, UK and EU authorities.  In particular, the UK and US administrations 
have experienced considerable difficulties in reaching a bi-lateral agreement on open-
skies, irrespective of  issues surrounding regulation at the EU level. 
For the Delta group, antitrust exemption was granted as Belgium and Switzerland had 
already signed up to an open-skies agreement. In the Lufthansa case, the deal was 
conditional on acceptance of antitrust immunity, and with a German open-skies deal in 
March 1996 this was not long in coming. 
By early 1996 six (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg and Belgium) of the 
EU Member States had signed up with open-skies agreements with the US. Recently this 
has enlarged to include Germany and Netherlands. 
3.2.2.4  Outlook 
Over the next few years, a number of important factors will affect the competitive 
structure of the market: 
  the further deregulation of the sector; 
  the anticipated privatisation of those airlines still in state ownership within the EU; 
  increasing competition from Eastern European airlines and Asian based carriers that 
are likely to have a much lower cost base than their EU counterparts; and 
  the increasing use of outsourced air carriers to depress operating costs. 
External factors include: 
  the emergence of HSR transport across the European continent; and 
  the deregulation of the longer-distance scheduled coach market. 
By contrast, however, factors whose impact will be to decrease competition will also 
grow in importance. Such factors include: 
  the increasing trend towards strategic alliances; European Commission 
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  extended code-sharing agreements; and  
  increased take-overs and equity swaps/stakes. 
Such anti-competitive pressures are by no means new to the airline industry although they 
are likely to increase over time.  The current view
40 is that at least in the short to medium 
term, competition and competitive pressures are likely to intensify in the EU air transport 
market, as a direct result of the deregulation due to come into force in April 1997.   
However, in the longer term greater pressures towards mergers and acquisitions (to 
improve or at least stabilise margins) might lead to a smaller number of airlines and thus 
an overall reduction in competition. Further, the combination of airport and airspace 
congestion means that the demand for landing slots will exceed supply.  This could 
increase barriers to entry in the air transport segment and reduce the effective 
competition. 
3.2.2.5  Low-cost air operators 
Although major scheduled operators are moving towards closer co-operation and as near 
to merging as anti-trust regulations will permit, liberalisation of the regulatory structure 
combined with a number of cost advantages for new entrants, has enabled some low-cost 
operators such as easyJet, Debonair, and Virgin Express to enter the market of scheduled 
low-cost service provision.   Previously these operators have been satisfied with niche 
routes, but some are now offering low priced alternatives between larger city pairs such 
as Brussels-Madrid, Paris-London, and Amsterdam-London.  In many cases, they are also 
competing on domestic routes.  The further deregulation of the Fourth Package might 
well create more opportunities suitable to low-cost operators which a number are already 
actively considering
41. Debonair and Virgin Express apparently  intend to enter the 
German domestic market in the near future.  
Table 3.2 summarises the profile of three key low-cost carriers. Operators tend to share 
some similar attributes such as a standard range of aircraft, and to some extent private 
(i.e. neither public sector nor publicly floated) ownership.   Standardised aircraft types are 
arguably an important factor in reducing aircraft maintenance and training costs. Private 
ownership means that operators are less likely to be under the pressure to meet the 
demands of shareholders or political pressures of government that might be more 
important in other ownership structures. 
                                                      
40 See, for example, “Is there a future for Europe’s airlines?”, Barton et al in the McKinsey Quarterly, 04/94 
and V Pryce, KPMG, “The Current State of the Industry” speaking at the 3rd Annual Conference of the IEA, 
Dec 1995. 
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Table 3.2:  Summary of key characteristics of a selection of low-cost scheduled 
carriers 
  EuroBelgian Airlines Express   easyJet  airline co.  Ryanair 
Established  1991 (charter) Late 1994 Low-cost 
scheduled 
1995 1991 
Ownership  From May 1996 Virgin European 
Airways 90%, former owners 10% 
100% private  100% private (Ryan Trust) 
Operating base  Brussels  London Luton   Dublin, London Stansted  
Traffic  1.3m (235,000 scheduled) (1995)  1.6m
42(1996)  1995: 2.5m  
1996 tgt: 3m 
Finances  1995 rev BEF ECU 150m  of which 
sched. ECU 18m 
pre tax profits BEF 5.mn (charter 
operations only) 
1997
43 rev ECU 72m 
 
pre tax profits n/a 
1995 rev ECU 121m,  
 
pre tax profits, ECU 2.4m 
Fleet  737-300/400s (13) 
Up to 4 yrs old.  Craft used for both 
scheduled and charter services 
737-200s (5) owned 
 
737-200s (11) 
Average age 14 yrs plus 
some wet leases
44 
Employees  n/a  c200 (1996)  595 (1995) 
Spatial coverage 
in  EU  




Ireland, UK (Sweden from 
summer 1997) 
Source: Travel and Tourism Analyst No. 3, EIU, 1996; updated from KPMG airline interviews 1997 
Low-cost scheduled operators have succeeded in other markets such as North America by 
pursuing a strategy based on the principle of cost control.  Staff and aircraft
45 are 
particularly important areas of controllable cost where these operators have tried to be 
more successful than the established and larger airlines.  For example it has been 
estimated that these carriers achieve up to 50% unit labour cost advantages over 
unrationalised larger carriers
46.  Airline and labour costs, however, are somewhat cyclical 
in nature, falling as economic growth falls and rising during economic upturns.  This 
phenomenon has in recent years allowed low-cost European operators the opportunity to 
enter and expand into new markets.  
By drawing on a pool of skilled surplus labour released by the larger operators 
(themselves engaging in cost cutting) and the availability of cheap aircraft, these new 
operators  have at least for the present been able to sustain low priced services on a 
number of EU routes.  This view of the drivers of success is disputed by some of the 
airlines.  easyJet for example claims that its labour and aircraft costs are broadly 
comparable to the larger carriers on a like-with-like basis but that it is in areas such as 
ticketless sales (where direct sales have taken over the role of travel agents),  higher 
levels of labour productivity  (less cabin staff needed with single cabin class) and       
higher aircraft utilisation where real cost savings are generated. Table 3.3 provides a 
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45 French, “No Frills Airlines in Europe”, TTA, 1996 
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summary of where the cost savings are made and gives an indication of  their contribution 
to total costs for low-cost and typical scheduled carriers
47. 
Table 3.3 Variation in cost structure between easyJet and notional “big” carrier 
Cost item 
 
Number of full seats 
needed to cover cost 
item - easyJet and 
notional “big” airlines 
Additional “big” airline costs  Additional full seats 
needed to meet 
other costs - for 
“big” airlines only 
Advertising 12  Computer  Reservation System fees  6 
Pilots  6  Travel agent commission  6 
Insurance 6  Expensive  airports  6 
Aircraft ownership 
cost 
12 In-flight  catering  6 
Fuel 6  Ticketing  costs  6 
Telltales  6  Lower aircraft utilisation  6 
Cabin crew  6  Extra cabin crew to serve business 
class passengers 
6 
Ground handling  6     
Airport landing fees  12     
Air traffic control 
fees 
12    
Maintenance 12     
Total seats to meet 
costs  - easyJet 
96  Total seats to meet  
costs - “big” airline 
138 
Source: Based on “Why the big airlines cannot match our fares” in “easyCome easyGo”, easyJet in-flight 
magazine, issue 4, February/April 1997. Based on an aircraft with total seating capacity of 138. 
The table suggests that easyJet is claiming to be able to provide services with a cost 
structure up to 44% less than for a notional competitor.  Their overall conclusion is that 
“...they [the big carriers] could never make money even if they filled every seat in their 
aircraft.”
48 
This assessment of costs by easyJet has been in part behind its complaints to the 
European Commission about the allegedly predatory and misleading pricing strategies of 
other carriers on some of its routes.  The response from the majors to low-cost scheduled 
carriers has been an aggressive strategy in pricing and seat availability for the leisure 
market. This allegedly predatory pricing has not been ignored; easyJet commenced 
proceedings against KLM in Autumn 1996 and Belgium VLM accused British Airways 
carrier City Flyer Express of predatory behaviour in January 1997. Even without this 
anti-competitive behaviour it is still difficult for smaller operators to compete against the 
majors which have large frequent flyer programs and a strong reluctance to give up 
unused airport slots.  However, in some markets they have arguably been successful at 
changing the status quo.  For example, both Air France and Air Inter withdrew from the 
London–Nice service following the introduction of a service by easyJet, and easyJet is 
now the second largest carrier on this route after British Airways
49. 
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Contrary to widely-held opinion, low-cost operators are in some cases focusing on the 
business traveller to achieve growth in their markets by increasing daily frequencies. In 
addition, low-cost carriers see the importance of creating new markets amongst people 
who have historically not travelled before or who travelled less frequently as crucial to 
creating sustainable demand.   
The strength of the competitor response (particularly on price) suggests that operators 
across a number of other modes, particularly air and coach, are concerned that they are 
losing markets to low-cost air carriers.  In the medium term, it is likely that a combination 
of developing and maintaining new markets as well as winning demand from other 
operators will be important to the success of these relatively new carriers. 
In the terms of the future, whether these carriers are able to remain viable as labour and 
aircraft costs rise with the upturn in the sector is by no means certain, but neither is the 
future of the larger carriers that are unable to reduce their own costs in the face of   
decreasing real income per passenger kilometre for the foreseeable future. 
3.2.2.6  Operational Characteristics 
Airline ticketing is standardised on a world-wide basis with a number of computerised 
databases in use.  In addition, flight tariffs are set by the airlines and it should be 
relatively straightforward to set VAT-inclusive tariffs for those flights on which VAT is 
chargeable.  That said, there are a number of quite complex industry practices which need 
to be addressed. 
The sophistication of the various computerised reservation systems within the airline 
industry enable tickets to be issued by agents anywhere in the world for any route in the 
world.  Accordingly, it is possible for a traveller to purchase a ticket from Milan to 
Madrid at a travel agent’s shop in New York.  The ticket can be issued in the name of a 
carrier (for example, United Airlines – the “issuing carrier”) which does not actually 
operate the route in question.  In these circumstances, the responsibility for carrying the 
passenger will transfer to another operator (possibly Alitalia – the “uplifting carrier”). 
Where the issuing carrier is not the uplifting carrier, a financial settlement will take place 
between the two airlines (in the above example, United Airlines and Alitalia).  However, 
the amount of the settlement will not always correspond with the original price of the 
ticket (as billed to the traveller).  All airlines have entered into bilateral agreements with 
each other and these arrangements fix the level of remuneration in circumstances where 
the issuing carrier is not the uplifting carrier. 
Similarly, in circumstances where a passenger purchases a through ticket for a single 
price but changes airlines on route, the settlement is also determined by agreement 
between the two airlines concerned.  For example, a passenger may purchase a ticket 
from New York to Athens which includes a stopover in London.  American Airlines 
could carry the passenger from New York to London where upon the passenger could 
change airlines to Olympic Airways for the London to Athens leg of the journey.  The 
passenger would receive a single ticket, issued by American Airlines, for a single price.  
The remuneration payable to Olympic Airways will be determined by the previously 
agreed price payable under the bilateral agreement. 
In addition, passengers may transfer from one flight to another without any adjustment in 
their ticket price.  For example, a passenger who has bought a British Airways ticket from 
London to Brussels could arrange a transfer to Sabena for no additional consideration.  European Commission 
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Although the passenger may have paid £300 (UK Sterling) to British Airways, the 
amount British Airways pays to Sabena in settlement can either be above or below this 
value and is totally dependent on the bilateral agreement between the parties. 
Financial settlement of these transactions (known as “interline” transactions) is effected 
through the IATA clearing house system.  The IATA system does not, however, store 
data; it merely acts as a “post box”, receiving and distributing invoices issued, usually on 
a monthly basis, by the participating airlines.  Settlement by the IATA system has 
historically been on a tax-exclusive basis since the clearing house procedures are not 
designed to cope with tax on the transactions which they process.  However, it is 
understood that a number of airlines have unofficially agreed that charges for passenger 
taxes may be passed through the system. 
With regard to interlining, where the passenger travels with more than one airline, the 
contractual position is not clear cut.  Some airlines recognise the full price charge for a 
ticket as their revenue, offsetting the amount paid to the sub-contracting airline as a cost, 
whereas others recognise only the net ticketing income, after the deduction of payments 
to other airlines.  It is not clear whether the passenger enters into a series of separate 
contracts with each uplifting airline or into a single contract with the issuing airline. 
To date, for transit passengers and “stopovers”, the airline industry has not defined clear 
rules.  Because their tickets are generally valid for one year, it is possible passengers may 
stopover, within an intermediate country, for a period of days, weeks or even months 
before continuing their journey to their ultimate destination.  However, it is understood 
that the airline ticketing arrangements do enable tickets sold with an entitlement to a 
stopover to be identified at the point of sale. 
3.2.3  Rail 
3.2.3.1  Ownership 
The national railways can generally be thought of as being nationalised, state regulated 
and subject to considerable public service obligations. In addition they are somewhat 
dependent on public subsidy both for infrastructure investment and to help meet the costs 
of service provision.  The major exception to this is the UK where the British Rail train 
services have recently been privatised and are now run by 25 train operating companies 
(TOCs). In addition there are a small amount of privately owned railways in Germany, 
Italy and Switzerland which mainly cover mountain regions. 
In general, the national transport market structure has not encouraged competition 
between operators, neither has it, in some cases, between modes of transport.  For 
example, in France, Germany and a number of the Scandinavian countries the scheduled 
coach market is virtually non-existent.  Where it does exist (in these states) it tends to be 
tightly regulated by local and/or central governments, and in some cases operators are 
wholly owned subsidiaries of the railway companies.   
3.2.3.2  Regulation 
With respect to the regulatory environment for rail at the EU level, the Commission has 
been keen to ensure a fairer balance between the public and loss-making railways and 
other modes of transport, primarily by harmonising rules covering the competition for 
resources between the different modes. For the railways, this has taken the form of a European Commission 
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move towards greater transparency with respect to the allocation of resources for capital 
investment projects (such as track, signalling and new rolling stock) as well as operating 
subsidy.  According to an EU directive, railways have been obliged since June 1997 to set 
up two structures which separate management of the railway infrastructure from service 
provision. This was designed to improve the efficiency of state railways, encourage 
greater accounting transparency and to facilitate cross-border supply. 
3.2.3.3  Operational Characteristics 
In the European rail industry, travellers may purchase single tickets, for a single price, 
which enable them to travel across a number of EU Member States (either on a single 
locomotive or on a series of different carriers). 
European railway operators redistribute ticketing revenues by use of a sophisticated 
clearing house system known as COTIF.  This system repatriates ticketing income 
according to the distance travelled (in kilometres) within each Member State.  Because 
the railway track is a fixed feature, the measurement of distance is precise. 
For interlining, the contractual position between the operator issuing the ticket, 
intermediate operator and traveller is clear.  For example, for a rail journey from Brussels 
to Frankfurt, the passenger buys a ticket from Belgian Railways in Brussels and travels on 
a Belgian Railways locomotive for the whole of his journey to Frankfurt.  However, the 
passenger legally contracts with Belgian Railways for that part of his journey up to the 
German border and with German Railways thereafter. 
Settlement between the Belgian and German Railways, for the German leg of the trip, is 
made via the COTIF system and revenues are apportioned according to the distance 
travelled in each Member State. 
All European rail operators are members of the COTIF system (with the exception of 
Eurostar). Accordingly, ticketing revenue earned by non-EU operators for intra-EU travel 
(for example, a ticket issued by the Hungarian railway authorities (for an Amsterdam to 
Vienna leg of a through journey from Amsterdam to Budapest) would be capable of being 
audited independently). 
Finally, within the EU railway industry, transit passengers and stopovers is not thought to 
be a significant issue; nonetheless, the issue does arise (the terms of the ticket usually 
entitle the traveller to stopover at each stop on the journey - as set out on the ticket) and 
will need to be recognised within the framework of any revised taxation system. 
3.2.4  Urban public transport 
Many of the service operators of public transport are still in public ownership, but this 
trend is changing as governments look to reduce the level of operating subsidy provided 
to operators and introduce “competition around the table” where operators compete on 
the basis of cost and/or quality before they win a franchised service. The exception is the 
UK coach market which has already experienced wide deregulation following the 1980 
Transport Act and in small German towns where many privately owned operators are 
prevalent. European Commission 
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3.2.5  Coach 
Among the larger operators in the EU coach market are De Jong Intratours in the 
Netherlands, ASLA and Iberbus in Spain, GTI in France, Deutsche Touring in Germany 
and National Express in the UK. With respect to international coach services, Eurolines, a 
separate company operated by National Express, is the key operator. It has a major 
network of services in most European countries.  Service providers come from all over 
EU and non-EU countries.  
Eurolines acts as marketing, timetabling and ticketing organisation for operators 
providing services on a franchised basis.  Eurolines does not operate coach services itself.  
In some cases, the operators are themselves still owned by nationalised railway 
businesses.  For example Eurolines France services are one third owned by SNCF.   
Eurolines has typically between one and three service providers in each EU (or indeed 
non-EU, i.e. Eastern European) state that it serves. Eurolines’ target is to secure one 
operator per country of operation. 
3.2.5.1  Structure 
In the context of the intra-EU coach market, there is considerable variation in the use of 
coach services across the Member States.  Scheduled and shuttle coach services tend to be 
used by the young, low income groups and in some instances migrant workers
50. For the 
first market, single trips of up to and around 500 to 700 km normally represent the limit 
of how far people are prepared to travel by coach, in preference to other modes 
(depending on price) or, indeed, in preference to not travelling at all.  Typical city paired 
trips include Amsterdam–London, Brussels–Munich, Paris–Brussels, Frankfurt–
Amsterdam, and Copenhagen–Gothenburg. 
For migrant workers, trips are in many cases longer, and will typically be made on a less 
frequent basis (2 to 3 times a year depending on the time and distance involved).  They 
are more likely to be from southern to northern European states, with some important 
flows also from eastern into central Europe.  Examples of typical flows include 
Hamburg–Lisbon or Faro, Amsterdam–Barcelona, Bucharest–Munich, Tallinn–Hannover 
and Zagreb–Frankfurt. 
Another market segment developing is coach (particularly scheduled ) to airport services.   
With the emergence of cheaper scheduled airline operations from cities such as Brussels 
and Amsterdam, a new phenomenon of “coach-hubbing” – much of it intra-EU – is 
emerging, catering for members of those price-sensitive market segments who are making 
leisure trips abroad.  Passengers  are travelling by coach (often considerable distances) in 
order to take advantage of cheaper air travel, departing from an EU state other than their 
own
51. 
Paradoxically, this suggests that low-cost air travel and coach operations might actually 
complement each other, rather than operating in direct competition, in some EU markets – 
depending on the origin and destination points of the services being offered.  Estimates of 
the volume of coach-hubbing are not known, but clearly this is a market which might 
develop further if significant price differentials exist in the cost of travel from EU airports 
and the intra-EU coach market is able to expand. 
                                                      
50 Eurolines, Amsterdam, February 1997. 
51 Eurolines, Amsterdam, February 1997. European Commission 
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3.2.5.2  Operational characteristics 
At present, there is no standard ticketing system operated by the industry; typically, 
independent travel agents do not issue tickets, merely vouchers which are exchangeable 
for tickets at the point of departure of the transport.  However, tickets could be sold in 
other  Member States (for example, Holland) for journeys which originate in a second 
Member State (for example, Belgium).  However, in these circumstances, the place of 
departure of the journey will always be shown on the face of the ticket. 
The vast majority of coach and bus transport within the EU represent domestic journeys 
within a single Member State.  For cross-border journeys, there are revenue sharing 
agreements in place between the EU-based operators.  These arrangements mean that 
operators sell tickets only in their home Member States; if the ticket is for a return 
journey and the return leg is performed by an operator based in another Member State, 
there is a financial settlement between the two operators. 
With regard to interlining, co-operative agreements and joint ventures between coach and 
bus operators are becoming increasingly commonplace within the EU.  A ticket for a 
journey across the EU would typically be sold, as principal, by the coach operator 
residing in the Member State of first departure (which, usually, is the country in which 
the ticket is sold).  However, as indicated above the return journey would usually be 
performed by a coach operator in the country of destination for the outbound trip. 
EU deregulation of coach and bus services has led to an increased incidence of non-EU 
operators offering services within the EU (particularly operators based in Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic).  Although these non-EU operators do not employ 
independent travel agents within the EU, they generate income from ticket sales through 
other sources (most notably ex-patriate organisations).  While single journeys from a non-
EU place of departure to a destination inside the EU is currently treated as an 
international journey, future deregulation will mean that non-EU operators will be able to 
offer services which pick up and set down in EU Member States.  Given the absence of a 
central clearing house system and a formalised agency agreement between non-EU 
operators and EU-based independent travel agents, distortions of competition could arise 
if the non-EU operators are not brought within the scope of EU VAT. 
Finally, transit passengers and “stopovers” is not thought to be a significant issue within 
the EU bus and coach industry. 
3.2.6  Sea 
3.2.6.1  Ownership 
A significant proportion of traffic in the sea market is undertaken by non-EU operators. 
This may take the form of a Norwegian operator servicing the Swedish-Denmark route or 
more commonly an EU operator using a “flag of convenience” (FOC). 
The extent to which a FOC is used on the major intra-EU routes is summarised in Figure 
3.1. It shows considerable variations in their use, reflecting the different tax rates and 
safety requirements in operation throughout Europe. For example, in the Greece to Italy 
corridor 28% of passenger trips are with FOC operators, a direct result of strict regulation 
of a vessel’s age by the Greek authorities, and a means of reducing crew costs. European Commission 
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Source: ShipPax database 1994/95 
With respect to the domestic market, the level of non-EU and FOC operators, shown in 
Figure 3.2, is much lower. UK and Finland are the only countries with any significant 
amount, and in the Finland case this is due to Norwegian-based companies operating in 
the market. 




































































































Source: ShipPax database 1994/95 
3.2.6.2  Operational Characteristics 
The EU shipping and ferry industry does not operate standardised ticketing and 
reservation systems.  Each operator has its own arrangements which may need upgrading 
if changes to the VAT treatment of the operator’s services are introduced. 
The industry does not operate a centralised clearing house.  The industry, as a whole, is 
far less integrated than the airline industry and route sharing arrangements are not 
commonplace. European Commission 
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Tickets enable a customer to “stopover” during the course of a particular journey for up 
to three nights in an intermediate destination.  For example, for a journey from Dublin, 
Ireland to Hamburg, Germany, the passenger may legitimately break his journey in 
Zeebrugge, Belgium, for up to three nights.  These arrangements are not dissimilar to the 
stopover arrangements which apply within the airline industry. 
 European Commission 
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3.3  Segmentation of the passenger transport market 
In considering competition between modes in the passenger transport market, it is 
necessary to draw the distinction between markets where competition takes place, and 
markets where competition is feasible, but does not exist. Clearly competition will only 
take place where transport services are reasonably close substitutes for each other.  In 
order to identify where substitution between alternative modes (and therefore 
competition) is feasible, it is necessary to consider transport services at some level below 
the aggregate national or international market
52.  For any given market, it is necessary to 
consider: 
  the characteristics of individual modes (e.g. price, speed, comfort etc); and 
  whether the necessary infrastructure is in place to permit competition (e.g. airports, 
rail lines). 
The total cost of travel by each mode will determine which mode of is chosen by the 
consumer. These costs consists of both monetary (the price of the trip) and non-monetary 
components. The most important non-monetary component is time (i.e. waiting for a 
service to arrive, time spent in traffic queues, time spent walking between different 
mechanised modes and time spent travelling by a given mode).  
For any given journey, the consumer arbitrates between the extra monetary cost of the 
trip and the time saved. By trading off this price and time, consumers tend to opt for the 
transport mode which minimises these costs. The concept of generalised cost is used in 
economic theory to explain this choice.  This is calculated by assigning a monetary cost 
(value of time) to the time components of a particularly journey. The theory states that the 
consumer chooses the mode with the lowest generalised cost.  
Thus, the two most important factors determining both the demand for passenger 
transport and inter-modal competition and the choice of mode for any given journey are: 
  the price of that trip; and 
  the time costs involved. 
The above discussion therefore, points to a disaggregation that makes a distinction 
between: 
  different groups of passengers based on their demand characteristics; and 
  the length of the journey, since this will be the most important factor in determining 
the time costs of a given journey. 
This is a standard segmentation which has been used extensively in transport studies
53 
and takes into account the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative modes of 
transport.  The proposed disaggregation therefore makes a split between those passengers 
                                                      
52 Defining the relevant market is also important – the focus is on the passenger transport market where there 
can be competition by operators between modes (inter-modal). For a practical application of the concept of 
the relevant market see the Commission Decision of 21/9/94 (DG IV, 34.600) on competition between air and 
overnight rail services in the Paris-Madrid route. 
53 See, for example, references in “Common position on changes envisaged by the European Commission in 
respect of VAT regulation applicable to passenger transport”, CER, 1996. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




who travel for reasons of business, and those who travel for other non-business reasons 
(also called the leisure segment). In terms of distance, a distinction is made between short 
journeys, up to 300 km, medium journeys, 300–1,000 km and long journeys of more than 
1,000  km. The characteristics of business and non-business passengers and the 
characteristics of different length journeys are discussed below. 
3.3.1  Characteristics of the business and non-business markets 
Sensitivity to price tends to be less in the business segment of the market, whilst 
sensitivity to time tends to be less in the non-business segment. Furthermore, business 
travellers put more weight on factors such as comfort, while non-business travellers are 
more likely to balance these factors against the price of the journey. Table 3.4 
summarises, in general, the importance of these various factors to business and non-
business travellers.  
Table 3.4: Business and non-business travellers – weights attached to modal choice 
factors 
Modal choice factor  Business travellers  Non-business travellers 
Price  Low High 
Time  High Low 
Punctuality  High Moderate 
Frequency of service  High Moderate 
Comfort/On-board service  High Moderate 
Ability to work  Moderate Low 
Accessibility of departure/ arrival point  Moderate to low  Low 
Source: S Cole, Applied Transport Economics 
The table suggests that the most important difference between the two customer markets 
is the weight attached to time and price for any given journey, with business passengers 
placing a higher weight on considerations of time (subject to the ability to be productive 
on work related matters during a particular journey) and the non-business passengers 
placing more weight on price
54.  
In some cases, certain modes will be competitive in both the business and non-business 
market segments because they offer time savings and are low cost. Walking and cycling 
will both be highly competitive at extremely short distances and the car will be able to 
offer considerable time savings and low marginal cost for longer distances. 
In addition to price and time, quality of service indicators such as comfort, punctuality, 
frequency of service, ease of access, ability to work, on-board services etc will also be 
important
55 in determining choice of transport mode. 
                                                      
54 Detailed assessment of the way in which demand by business and non-business customers reacts to 
changes in price is provided in later chapters. A further distinction between non-business holiday and non-
business other (e.g. visiting friends and relatives) is made in some studies to reflect the greater price 
sensitivity of holiday relative to other. There are however no consistent estimates of  the relative significance 
of  the two groups across Europe and the study therefore treats non-business as a single group.  
55 See S. Cole, “Applied transport economics” and the factors identified by passengers travelling on the 
Madrid–Seville route as presented in COST 318, Interaction between high speed and air passenger transport, 
page 40. European Commission 
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3.3.2  Characteristics of journeys by length of trip 
While splitting the market into business and non-business sectors is necessary to 
understand the dynamics of demand for passenger transport, competition between modes 
varies according to the distance travelled, as the competitive strength of a mode will also 
vary according to the distance travelled. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Coach is 
included as part of car travel but is less than 5% of its market
56 and sea travel, which in 
most cases will be a complementary mode rather than a substitute is excluded. 
Figure 3.3: Market shares of transport modes by distance 
The chart shows how the market 
shares of the private car, train 
(including HSR) and air vary as the 
distance involved in a journey 
increases. This variation can be 
explained by reference to the key 
characteristics of the three modes 






The very short-distance market, up to 100 km 
Over this distance, as illustrated in Figure 3.4, the car dominates the market, because of 
its flexibility, and low marginal cost, with the major competitor being the classic train and 
the coach. 
The exception to this are urban journeys, typically under 15–20 km where the private car 
will face more competition from modes such as the bus, tram, metro and taxi. In the urban 
market the advantages which stem from the flexibility of the car may be outweighed by 
considerations such as congestion and parking restrictions. 
 
 
Short-distance journeys of 100 to 300 km 
Figure 3.4 highlights the short-distance market. 
                                                      




















Source: Reproduced from High Level Group, “The European 
High Speed Train Network” February 1995, High Speed 
Europe, page 23 European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




Figure 3.4: Market shares of transport modes by distance, 100–300 km 
At distances of around 100  km, it is 
clear that the private car is dominant, 
accounting for around 90% of all trips, 
with classic rail accounting for the 
remaining 10%. As the distance 
travelled increases, up to around 
300 km, the car begins to lose its share 
to rail (of all types). 
 
 
The major reasons for the dominance of the car over this range of distances are: 
  its flexibility, as it offers an “anytime, anywhere” service; and 
  its advantage of being able to be used at the destination of any trip. 
These factors will often compensate for the slightly longer journey time, particularly for 
non-business passengers who put a lower weight on time considerations. 
In addition, much of the costs of car driving are incurred up-front, in the form of the 
purchase, insurance and servicing costs. Car drivers often think only in terms of the direct 
variable costs of a journey (or the fuel costs). This can make driving appear a relatively 
cheap option compared to other forms of purchased passenger transport, where the fares 
will reflect a fuller range of fixed operational costs. 
Medium-distance journeys of 300–1,000 km 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the market shares of different modes over medium-distance journeys 
of 300–1,000 km. 
Figure 3.5: Market shares of transport modes by distance, 300–1,000 km 
As the journey distance increases above 
300  km, the car loses share more 
rapidly to both rail and air travel. By 
the time the journey distance is 500 km, 
the car accounts for only a little more 
than 50% of all trips, with rail taking 
around a 25–30% share and air 
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Between 500 and 1,000 km, the air sector gains market share most quickly, while the 
market share of rail remains fairly constant. At distances of around 1,000 km, the market 
share of the car has fallen to around  40 %, while the train and air each take around 30%.  
In this medium-distance market, HSR becomes a significant player, with its market share 
reaching around 20% between distances of 500–900  km. While more expensive than 
classic rail, HSR has a much faster average speed and continues to offer the convenience 
of city centre to city centre services. Over these distances, the chart shows that it absorbs 
market share almost equally from both air and the private car.  
As the distance travelled increases, the ability of air to sustain its much greater average 
speed begins to pay off in the form of considerable time advantages. At distances of 
500 km or more, these time savings begin to outweigh the higher prices of air travel and 
the lack of city centre to city centre services. 
Information from case studies on some selected European routes, summarised in Table 
3.5, illustrates the above points. Note that even in the case of long journeys above 
1,000  km, as indicated in Figure 3.3, the car maintains a significant market share. 
Furthermore, in addition to distance, the less significant the leisure segment the lower, in 
relative terms, the share of the car (and rail) over longer distances. 
Table 3.5: Market shares by mode, selected routes
† 





Car Air  Rail  Coach 
Frankfurt–Dusseldorf *  230 74%  87%  1%  10%  1% 
Frankfurt–Munich *  400 56%  34%  31% 35%  n/a 
London–Brussels+  528 57%  16%  46% 33%  5% 
Paris–Madrid^  1310 78% 16%  53%  31%  n/a 
Source: * Mercer (1995), ^ Bossard (1995), + KPMG case study (1996) 
†Note: sea travel would be included in the car/rail/coach figures European Commission 
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Long  journeys of 1,000 km or more 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the market shares of different modes over long-distance journeys of 
more than 1,000 km. 
Figure 3.6: Market shares of transport modes by distance, > 1,000 km 
For journeys over 1,000 km, air gains 
market share rapidly and the 
importance of rail (both classic and 
high speed) begins to diminish rapidly. 
Once distances of 1500 km or more are 
involved the air sector accounts for 60–
75% of the market with the car 
accounting for the majority of the 
remainder and still maintaining a 20% 
share at distances of 1700km or more. 
Air dominates over such long distances, 
where the advantage of its much higher average speed can be fully realised. Over such 
distances, the likelihood of encountering geographical barriers (e.g. sea crossings) which 
make air the most convenient form of transport, is also much higher. 
3.3.3  Characteristics by transport modes 
Table 3.6 illustrates a summary of the information provided in terms of which competing 
modes of transport have advantages in particular sub-sectors defined by: 
  distance; and  
  type of travel (business, non-business). 
Table 3.6: Competition between transport modes, by market 
  Main competing modes 
Distance   Business  Non-business 
Urban  Car, taxi, bus, metro, tram  Car, taxi, bus, metro, tram 
Short non-urban (50–300 km)  Car, classic train  Car, classic train, coach 
Medium (300–1,000 km)  Car, plane, HSR  Car, plane, HSR, classic train, overnight train, coach 
Long  Plane  Plane, car  
Source: Buchanan and Partners, “Optimising Rail Air Intermodality in Europe” European Commission 
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3.4  The size of the passenger transport segments 
In this section, rough estimates of the size of the market segments identified above, in 
both volume and value terms, are provided. Table 3.7 provides the estimates of the size of 
the segments in volume terms and Table 3.10 gives estimates in value terms. In both 
cases the figures exclude trips by car
57.  More detail on the methodology used to calculate 
these figures is provided in Appendix 2. 
3.4.1  The market in volume terms  
Table 3.7: Estimates of the urban, short, medium and long-distance passenger 
transport markets in 1994 
  Passenger trips (millions)  Market share % 
(excluding urban and non-
urban domestic trips) 
Urban  (approx. < 50 km)  26,100   
Short-distance (approx. 50–300 km) – intra EU  27  10% 
Medium-distance (approx. 300–1,000 km) – intra EU  55  21% 
Long-distance (approx. >1,000 km)  179  69% 
of which intra-EU  76 29% 
of which leisure  68 26% 
               non-leisure  8 3% 
  third-country  103  40% 
      
Non-urban domestic trips  4,840   
    
Total passenger trips  31,200  100% 
Source: IATA, AEA, Eurolines, KPMG analysis 
Note: “Total passenger trips” is the total by air, rail and public transport (including coach) and is derived 
from figures in Chapter 2. 
The urban and long-distance markets 
The above table makes clear the dominance of short urban journeys in the overall EU 
passenger transport market. In fact, the figures above suggest that over 80% of all 
journeys are short urban trips. Even the long-distance market which includes trips 
between the EU and the rest of the world is swamped by the size of the urban market.  
However, estimates suggest that a high proportion of the intra-EU long-distance market is 
accounted for by the non-business sector. The dominance of leisure in this sector, 
accounting for 68 million passenger trips, reflects the estimated size of the long-distance 
charter market and an assumption that all charter air traffic is undertaken for leisure 
                                                      
57The accuracy of any estimates of the size of the passenger transport segments is determined primarily by 
data availability; there is very little data on average journey length by mode, on the business/non-business 
split, on medium and long-distance coach travel or on the origin–destination split for chartered airlines. As 
already indicated there is also very little consistent data on the value of passenger transport markets. The 
estimates provided therefore should be considered rough approximations rather than accurate statements. European Commission 
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purposes. A similar assumption is made with respect to coach traffic though the absolute 
number of trips in this sector is small relative to air.  
In terms of the competition, the size of the competitive segment in the intra-EU long-
distance leisure market is estimated at around 11½ million passenger trips which consists 
of 3½ million rail and coach trips, and 8 million air trips. The calculation of these figures 
is described in Appendix 2 and is determined by making general assumptions about 
routes, socio-economic groups and types of leisure passengers which are most open to 
competition. Figure 3.7 gives an illustration of the significance of this competitive 
segment with respect to the long-distance leisure market and  the market as a whole.  
Figure 3.7:  The competitive segment in the long-distance leisure market 
Intra-EU market
(158 million trips)




Rail and coach segment
(3.5 million trips)
 
The medium-distance segment 
The medium-distance market is the smallest market according to the figures above. 
However, it must be remembered that in this case, all domestic journeys are excluded. 
While it is not possible to distinguish domestic journeys by distance, Table 3.7 shows that 
the number of domestic trips is many times larger than intra-EU or international journeys. 
The HSR sub-segment 
The earlier analysis has shown that an important and growing sub-sector in terms of 
competition between modes within the medium-distance sector is the HSR sector, i.e. 
those routes where HSR and air compete.  As has already been seen in Chapter 2, the 
existing HSR infrastructure in Europe is limited and heavily concentrated in France.   
Also, the majority of available trips by HSR are domestic.  In 1994, only four 
international trips were available, of which only two were intra-EU:  
  London–Brussels; 
  London–Paris; 
  Paris–Geneva; and  
  Paris–Berne. 
Since 1994, the number of routes has enlarged slightly to include: 
  Paris–Brussels; and 
  Paris–Grenoble. European Commission 
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Table 3.8 gives an illustration of the importance of the HSR segment in the current intra-
EU medium-distance market and an estimate of its potential in 2005. The HSR segment is 
defined as the total number of classic rail and HSR trips over the routes (current and 
potential) where HSR infrastructure exists. It therefore provides an estimate of the size of 
the market in which competition between rail and air can potentially take place. The 
detailed methodology used to produce these estimates is described in Appendix 2. 
Table 3.8:  The significance of HSR in the intra-EU medium-distance market 
  Total no. of intra-EU 
trips, medium-distance 
(millions) 
Size of HSR segment 
(HSR and air) 
(millions) 
Share of HSR in HSR segment
(%) 
1994 55  10  40% 
2005 91  32  74% 
Source: IATA, KPMG calculations 
Figure 3.8 provides an illustration of the relative significance of the HSR segment, 
currently and in the future. 









    * Note: 70% of chartered flights are
assumed to be intra-EU
  ** Rail and scheduled air trips only
*** HSR segment: market where












The figure shows that not only will the HSR segment grow faster than the overall intra-
EU market at this distance, but the importance of HSR within the HSR segment is likely European Commission 
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to grow significantly as the infrastructure expands under the TENS programme.  The 
figures must be regarded as illustrative projections rather than accurate forecasts.   
Nevertheless, they serve to demonstrate the potential of the HSR segment in the future 
EU passenger transport market and suggest that competition between air and HSR 
services is likely to intensify in the future. 
The above estimates, in terms of the size of the passenger market where competition 
exists, represent a “floor” as competition can also take place between conventional rail 
and air. For example overnight services by conventional rail will be a possible substitute 
for air, due to the high level of comfort provided and timetables especially suited to the 
business segment. Overnight services have a much larger route network than HSR, 
mainly medium-distance, and therefore in principle will compete with a larger proportion 
of air transport. However, the level of competition or substitution from air to overnight 
rail is likely to be very low.  
Table 3.9 presents a comparison of the size of the overnight rail market which competes 
directly with the air market; the calculations involved in this are described in Appendix 2. 
In summary, the size of the competitive market between air and overnight rail is quite 
small, estimated to be around 1.5 million passengers. This consists of 1.3 million air and 
0.2 million rail passengers and represents around 2.8% of the total medium-distance 
market. 
Table 3.9:  The significance of overnight rail in the intra-EU medium-distance 
market 
  Air  Rail  Coach  Total 
Total no. of intra-EU trips, medium-
distance (millions) 
40.8 12.9  1.2  54.8 
Size of competitive segment 
(rail and air) (millions) 
1.3 0.2 0.0  1.5 
Share of Market (%)  3.2%  1.6%  0.0%  2.8% 
Source: KPMG calculations 
3.4.2  The market in value terms 
As has been noted above, reliable information on the value of the passenger transport 
market is extremely rare, and it has been necessary to make a number of assumptions in 
order to provide even approximations of the value of the competitive market segments. 
Essentially, such information as is available on the revenue per passenger-kilometre 
generated by the different transport modes has been used, and assumptions about the 
average length of trip in each market segment have been made. Together with the trip 
volumes given in Table 3.7, this information (and the assumptions) allows estimates of  
the value of the markets to be derived. More detail on the assumptions used is presented 
in Appendix 2.  European Commission 
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Table 3.10: Value estimates of the urban, short, medium and long-distance 
passenger transport markets in 1994 
  Gross turnover 
(ECU millions) 
Market share %   Market share % 
(excluding urban and 
non-urban domestic 
trips) 
Urban (approx. < 50 km)  45,000  20%   
Short-distance – intra EU  1,900  1%  2% 
Medium-distance  – intra EU  10,200  4%  12% 
of which HSR segment  2,000 1%  2% 
Long-distance (approx. >1,000 km)  76,000  33%  86% 
of which intra-EU  28,600 12%  32% 
of which leisure  25,300 11%  29% 
               non-leisure  3,300 1%    4% 
  third-country  47,400 21%  54% 
      
Non-urban domestic trips  98,100  42%   
      
Total gross turnover  231,200  100%  100% 
Source: Intraplan, LT Marketing, Eurolines, KPMG analysis 
The estimates presented in Table 3.7 suggest that the total value of the EU passenger 
transport market is around ECU 231 billion.  This is close to the ECU 212 billion given in 
Panorama of EU Industry 1997 and consistent with other studies which analyse sub-
sections of the EU transport market
58, but it should be stressed that these estimates are 
sensitive to the assumptions used. While it has been possible to obtain information on 
revenue per kilometre by alternative modes, it has been necessary to make some fairly 
strong assumptions about the average distances travelled and the variation, or lack of it, in 
the revenue per passenger-kilometre figures across the different market segments 
identified in the table. These estimates by segment should therefore be treated as broad 
approximations. 
Once the analysis is expressed in terms of the value of the market segments as opposed to 
the volume, the dominance of the urban and non-urban domestic market segments is 
reduced significantly with the long-distance intra-EU market being almost of an 
equivalent size. 
Table 3.10 also suggests that the long-distance leisure market becomes much more 
significant when measured in value rather than volume terms. This is a potentially 
significant result, as it is in this market that the demand sensitivity to price changes as a 
result of a change in the VAT regime is likely to be at its greatest.  
In terms of medium-distance trips, the size of market when measured in value terms is 
now more than five times as large as the short-distance market compared to a ratio of 2:1 
when the markets are measured in volume terms. The highly competitive HSR segment 
also takes a similar share of the medium-distance in both value and volume terms – 
approximately 20% in each case. 
                                                      
58 Considering sub-sections of the EU transport market; Pan-European transport give a combined turnover of 
ECU 72 billion for the top 10 European transport companies and OECD state 1992 travel account 
expenditure (in 1994 prices) for six of the EU15 (Germany, UK, Italy, France, Netherlands and Austria) as 
ECU 92 billion. European Commission 
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3.5  Conclusions 
The European passenger transport industry is experiencing continuing change in its 
regulatory, environmental and financial circumstances. Governments are increasingly 
looking to reduce subsidies to all sectors and to privatise enterprises where this is 
politically viable. In the air transport market, increased market concentration caused by 
the merging of large carriers and their taking over smaller operators is likely to continue.  
However, as the market grows new entrants are likely to continue to be attracted to it 
even though they might not be active for long.  This has very much been the US 
experience since deregulation in the late 70s and early 80s took place there. In addition, 
the advent of low-cost scheduled operators coupled with the latest round of de-regulation 
in the EU is likely to further increase competitive pressure on incumbent carriers. 
In general terms, the EU passenger transport market remains dominated by EU-based 
operators.  Even in the most deregulated rail markets of the EU such as the UK, new 
entrants tend to be of EU origin.  For example, under the UK rail franchising programme, 
a number of services have been sold to French-led consortia.  In the bus/coach market, 
UK bus and coach operators are now active in the Portuguese, Swedish, Dutch, French 
and Belgian transport markets.  However, the existence of non-EU based operators in the 
rail and bus/coach sectors tends to be extremely limited
59. This is not the case for the sea 
market, where a significant number of non-EU or FOC operators exist. About 14% of 
passengers in the intra-EU sea market use non-EU based operators, with the largest 
presence felt on the Greece to Italy corridor.    
In recognition of the fact that the aggregate EU passenger transport market is not 
homogenous, the preceding analysis proposed a segmentation of the market into four sub-
markets.  The analysis suggested that: 
  in the urban market, the car, taxi, bus, tram and metro are all in competition with each 
other; 
  in the short-distance, non-urban market, the car competes primarily with the coach and 
the train; 
  in the medium-distance market, the competing modes are the car, HSR, air and 
(particularly for the leisure segment) the coach; and 
  in the long-distance market, the car competes with air and rail (and, to a lesser extent, 
coach). 
The short-distance market (including urban trips) is by far the most significant in terms of 
number of trips.  Both the short and long-distance markets are, however, dominated in 
terms of market share by the car and air respectively.  The key segment where 
competition between modes is (and could be) strongest is therefore the medium-distance 
segment, especially for competition between HSR and air.  At present the capacity for 
such competition is limited by the physical infrastructure of the HSR network. However, 
as has been discussed above, the HSR infrastructure is likely to grow rapidly in the next 
decade or so and the scope for competition will rise correspondingly. Other markets 
where competition between modes is strong, but to a lesser degree, is in the long-distance 
                                                      
59 In the coach market, there is some evidence of Eastern European operators beginning to penetrate the 
market.  However, at present, this is thought to be on a limited scale. European Commission 
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leisure market between air, rail and coach travel and between air and overnight rail in the 
medium-distance business segment. 
In terms of the size of each of these sectors, the HSR segment, defined as the market 
where competition between air and HSR can take place, is currently estimated to be 
limited to 10 million trips and represents around 18% of medium-distance intra-EU trips 
(excluding chartered air trips); this is just over 6% of the overall intra-EU market in terms 
of number of trips.  This is likely to increase significantly in the future, as the HSR 
segment expands to reach a total of around 32 million trips, representing more than 35% 
of medium-distance intra-EU trips according to our estimates, based on the planned future 
HSR routes.  
For the long-distance leisure segment, the size of the competitive segment is estimated at 
around 11½ million passenger trips, of which the vast majority are air trips.  In the 
overnight rail segment under ¼ million conventional rail passenger trips are open to 
competition from air. 
As would be expected, the analysis shows that when the value of the passenger transport 
market and its various sub-sectors is considered, the short-distance market (including 
urban trips) becomes less significant with the long-distance market dominating. In terms 
of the competitive HSR segment the estimates presented in Table 3.6 suggest that this 
accounts for some ECU 2 billion in 1994, a figure which is expected to grow rapidly as 
the network infrastructure expands and demand volumes grow. 
The research undertaken confirms that different modes of passenger transport compete at 
different distances.  In terms of the competitive impact of different VAT treatment of 
different modes, as Chapter 4 will show, some Member States do identify distinct markets 
(distinguishing between urban and non-urban markets and between domestic and 
international markets) and impose different VAT rates in each. European Commission 
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4 The VAT System: overview and distortions 
4.1  Introduction 
Within the EU and within individual Member States, the VAT rules applicable to 
passenger transport differ significantly in terms of levels of taxation, coverage and 
application.  There is concern that variations in fiscal regimes might distort the allocative 
efficiency of the market, harming the competitiveness of EU economies and 
disadvantaging domestic EU operators vis-à-vis other EU operators and/or non-EU 
operators. 
This chapter presents an overview of the current VAT system together with an assessment 
of the economic distortions arising from the application of different rates of VAT to 
different modes of transport at both the domestic and international level, as well as from 
inconsistent enforcement of the rules by the fiscal authorities.  The chapter is organised as 
follows: 
  first, an examination of the rationale for taxation and how it is justified in the context 
of passenger transport services; 
  second, a summary of the standard economic framework used to assess the impact of 
taxation.  This is used to highlight: 
–  the economic effects of taxation, 
–  the competitive distortions arising from different VAT treatment of different 
modes, and 
–  the way in which taxes get passed on in prices. 
  third, an overview of the current VAT system, highlighting the existing discrepancies 
in treatment of supplies, followed by an assessment of the differences in the right to 
deduct input VAT; 
  fourth, a quantitative assessment of the distortions arising from the current VAT 
system, based on the assessment of the size of the competitive passenger transport 
segments of the EU market provided in Chapter 3 and the existing VAT rates, together 
with an identification of the economic distortions arising from practical differences in 
the way VAT rules are implemented; 
  fifth, a summary of other non-VAT related distortions in the transport market, such as 
regulation and environmental externalities, and their implications for the VAT induced 
distortions; and  
  sixth, overall conclusions on the significance of the distortions of the existing VAT 
system. European Commission 
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In view of the complexity and scope of the issues addressed in this chapter, the key points 
addressed are highlighted within each section.  In summary, the chapter sections aim to 
answer the following questions: 
  How is the taxation of passenger transport services justified? 
  How does tax affect pricing and competition in the passenger transport sector?  Can 
different modes of transport be taxed differently? 
  What are the current VAT rules for passenger transport services performed within the 
EU and what is the rationale for taxing passenger transport in this manner? 
  What distortions are created by the current VAT rules? 
  What is the national practice with regard to the administration of the legislation?  
Where is national practice different from the legislative provisions and why? 
  What examples are there of local practice differing from national legislation? 
  Are the VAT induced distortions (created by legislative treatment and national 
practice) affected by other indirect taxes? 
  What are the current rules for the deduction of VAT incurred on passenger transport 
services?  How do these rules work in practice and what is their effect? 
  Taking all of the above together, what are the quantifiable distortions of the current 
VAT system now and in the future? 
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4.2  The rationale for taxation 
How is the taxation of passenger transport services justified? 
Taxation, in the form of VAT, excise duty and income tax, has in general terms the 
following objectives: 
  first, to raise revenue to cover public expenditure using VAT mainly, but, in a way 
that does not contribute to market failures; 
  second, to correct market failures related to externalities,
 using excise duty as the main 
instrument; and 
  third, to achieve a more desirable distribution of income, from income tax 
predominately. 
Different levels of public expenditure (as a ratio of GDP) in different EU countries, as 
well as differences in the composition of tax revenue in terms of direct and indirect tax 
can and do give rise to different levels of national VAT between countries.  This is true in 
national passenger transport as in other sectors of the economy (section 4.3 provides a 
detailed assessment).  One of the characteristics of passenger transport is, however, that 
VAT rates can vary between different modes of transport both within the same country 
and between countries. 
The Commission’s recent Green Paper Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing focuses on the 
correction of externalities (second objective above). This arises where the market 
outcome is considered either above the socially desirable (in which case the good is 
taxed) or below it (in which case the good is subsidised). The report focuses on the extent 
to which environmental externalities in the areas of (air pollution, noise pollution), 
accidents and meeting infrastructure costs can be remedied by various policy instruments, 
many of which are founded on price related mechanisms. 
The key concern is the environmental impact of different modes of transport, particularly 
in the domestic market. The paper indicates that for many journeys there is a significant 
mismatch between prices paid by individual transport users and the costs they cause, both 
in structure and level. In the case of pollution, accidents and congestion it states that cost 
are not fully covered and differ significantly by mode. These issues are discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.8. 
Many Member States have already used fiscal measures (such as excise duty) to correct 
what they consider to be market failure. Taxation is used to increase prices in order to 
reduce demand (see section 4.3.1) for the less environmentally friendly modes. One of the 
most clear examples of this process in action is in the case of motor car where a high level 
of fuel duty applies which reflects environmental concerns of vehicle emissions, 
infrastructure damage and to some extent accidents and congestion 
Note, however, that in the case of passenger transport, the achievement of the second and 
third objectives may be conflicting in the case of the urban passenger transport market 
(which accounts for the vast majority of trips); the least environmentally friendly modes 
of transport (coach, bus) can often be the ones most used by the relatively less well-off; 
this issue is examined in more detail in the section on the current VAT system that 
follows. European Commission 
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In the case of international transport, different VAT treatment of different modes could be 
justified on similar grounds.  As already indicated in Chapter 3, however, such trips form 
a small proportion of total trips
60, so that such arguments are unlikely to provide a 
credible rationale.  For the same reason, arguments based on distribution of income (i.e. 
taxing of the mode which is used by the better off) are also difficult to sustain.
61  Two 
possible explanations emerge: 
  first, different VAT treatment aims to correct an existing distortion, by taxing the 
mode which enjoys a competitive advantage through a subsidy or preferential 
treatment, or  
  second, the different treatment is related to the complexity of the passenger transport 
market; equal positive VAT treatment of modes for international trips could put EU air 
operators at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non-EU operators and would be difficult to apply 
and administer. 
The relative merits of these arguments are re-assessed below, after the detailed 
presentation and assessment of the existing VAT system. 
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4.3  The economic effects of taxation 
62 
How does tax affect pricing and competition in the passenger transport sector? Can 
different modes be taxed differently? 
4.3.1  The economic impact of taxation 
The introduction (or increase) of a tax in passenger transport will result in a positive 
difference between the price paid by consumers and the price received by operators.  As 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, the introduction of a tax leads to consumers paying a higher 
price (Ftax) than they would if there was no tax (Fno tax); note also that in this case, where 
supply of travel is assumed to be horizontal
63, operators receive the same price after 
taxation so that the whole of the tax is passed on to the consumers.  
This is the most likely case, but there are a number of other possible options for 
operators. For example, operators may modify the pricing structure by holding the leisure 
fare constant and raising the business fare by a disproportionate amount. This is a valid 
plan as the business sector is less price sensitive and in some countries VAT is a 
deductible expense (these issues are discussed in greater detail in section 4.8). 
Where taxation leads to higher prices, lower demand for trips follows; the extent of the 
reduction depends on how sensitive demand for trips is to price; i.e. the steepness of the 
line showing the demand for travel.  The steeper the line (i.e. the more insensitive 
demand to price changes) the smaller the reduction in demand for any given increase in 
prices; it follows that demand for business travel, which is more price insensitive (see 
Chapter 3), would fall by less compared to leisure travel for any given level (or increase) 
in VAT
64. 
                                                      
62 This section uses some basic economic tools; it can be omitted without loss of generality.  For a more 
detailed illustration see R Layard and A Walters, “Microeconomics”, McGraw Hill, 1988. 
63 This means that any increase in the number of people travelling can be provided at the same cost per 
passenger; this is likely to be true at the margin for all passenger transport operators (i.e. rail, air and coach), 
although the actual level of the cost will differ between operators and routes. 
64 Under the assumption of no VAT deductibility.  Clearly where VAT is deductible for business purposes, 
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Supply of trips 
(= average cost per passenger)
Fno tax
Dtax Dno tax  
4.3.2  The implications for competition 
Consider now the impact of different tax treatment on operators who offer services in the 
same market.  At the one extreme, these services are perfectly substitutable for each 
other; in such a case, if operators face the same cost conditions, a positive VAT rate on 
one operator would drive them out of business as they would have to charge a higher 
price than the other operator (see Figure 4.1).  This largely explains why the VAT rates 
set by different national authorities for international (including intra-EU) air journeys 
have all been largely harmonised at zero. 
Note, however, that where cost conditions are not the same, then the introduction of a 
positive VAT rate on the service of the lower cost operator could essentially ensure that 
both operators do face the same cost conditions.  In the case of one operator (or group of 
operators) facing lower costs as a result of subsidy, the introduction of a positive VAT 
rate on the lower cost operator can restore a “level playing field”. Alternatively, where all 
operators already face a VAT rate, the same result can be achieved by the exemption of 
VAT for the higher cost operator. 
At the other extreme, the services provided by different operators will not be 
substitutable (e.g. an urban metro operator and a long-distance rail operator), in which 
case different taxation will have no impact on the competitive position of the operators.  
In practice, for a range of passenger travel segments
65 the degree of substitutability 
between different modes will be in between those two extremes.  In such cases, an 
operator will be able to hold a positive market share even if its prices are higher than 
its competitor(s).  The relative market share of the different operators will be higher: 
                                                      
65 Recall that these have been identified in Chapter 3 as the short-distance urban market for competition 
between rail, car and bus; the medium-distance, business and leisure market for competition between air and 
HSR/conventional rail; and the long-distance, leisure market for competition between air, rail and coach. European Commission 
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  the smaller the positive price differential relative to their competitors (as shown in 
Figure 4.1), and 
  for any given price differential, the smaller the extent of substitutability between the 
services offered by the competing operators. 
This latter factor is captured by a parameter reflecting the sensitivity of demand for the 
services of one operator to changes in the price of the services offered by the competing 
operator (or operators).
66  Such parameters for substitution between rail and air/coach/car 
services have been estimated for the passenger transport sector and a relevant selection is 
presented in Table 4.1. The greater the elasticity, the bigger the extent of substitution 
between the modes.  Note that all the estimates are significantly different from zero 
indicating that there is indeed substitutability between modes. An increase of rail prices 
by, say, 10% could lead to an increase in demand for air (and/or coach/car) trips of 
between 5% (with an elasticity of 0.5) and 15% (with an elasticity of 1.5). 
Table 4.1: Estimates of cross-price elasticity 
Route Cross-elasticity  (leisure) 
Frankfurt–Munich^  +0.5 
Frankfurt–Dusseldorf^  +1.3 
Paris–Madrid +  +1.5 
UK domestic : short to medium distance~  0.8–1.2 
TGV* 3  hours  0.5 
TGV* 5  hours  0.8 
Source: Mercer^, Bossard+, Leeds University~ (cross-elasticity between rail and coach), ITA* 
As section 4.4 will show, some Member States do identify distinct markets 
(distinguishing between urban and non-urban markets and domestic and international 
markets), and impose different VAT rates in each.  For example, air never competes 
with tram or urban bus services so, in principle, differential tax rates can be applied. 
However, the precise segmentation of the market, in a way that includes only one 
modal category, is difficult and differential tax rates therefore may not be feasible. 
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4.4  Current VAT system: VAT rates 
What are the current VAT rules for passenger transport services performed within the EU 
and what is the rationale for taxing passenger transport in this manner? 
The current taxation system is governed by the Sixth Directive
67 and taxes passenger 
transport services according to the distance travelled within each Member State.  The 
apparent rationale behind this option, the “distance option”, is to allow Member States to 
apply a positive rate of VAT to domestic passenger transport and to domestic legs of 
intra-EU and international transport (ie taxation of the proportion of the journey enjoyed 
within the Member State itself). 
The Directive fixes the minimum standard rate of VAT
68, until 31 December 1998, at 
15% but also permits Member States to apply one or two reduced rates of VAT (of not 
less than 5%) to supplies of specific goods and services
69. Included within this category 
are passenger transport services. 
Member States applying reduced rates
70 lower than the minimum fixed by the Directive 
are permitted to continue to do so provided those lower rates were in force on 1 January 
1991.  This provision enables Member States to retain zero or super-reduced rates of 
passenger transport taxation until the end of the transitional period. 
Member States may also exempt
71, without right to deduction of tax incurred at an earlier 
stage, passenger transport services
72. 
In addition to the above, there are a number of derogations affecting Germany 
(specifically in the context of internal waterways transport), Greece, Spain and Portugal 
(specifically in the context of travel to, from and between certain islands). In particular, 
Portugal applies reduced rates to transactions carried out in the autonomous regions of the 
Azores and Madeira
73, whereas Greece is able to apply VAT rates up to 30% lower than 
the rates applied in mainland Greece in the departments of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, the 
Dodecanese and the Cyclades and on the Aegean islands of Thasos, Northern Sporades, 
Samothrace and Skiros
74. 
The Directive envisages that, at the end of the transitional period, passenger transport 
shall be taxed in the country of departure for that part of the journey taking place within 
the EU
75. 
                                                      
67 Article 9(2)(b): EU Sixth Directive 
68 Article 12(3): EU Sixth Directive. 
69 Annex H:  EU Sixth Directive. 
70 Article 28(2): EU Sixth Directive. 
71 Article 28(3): EU Sixth Directive. 
72 Paragraph 17, Annex F: EU Sixth Directive. 
73 Article 12(6): EU Sixth Directive. 
74 Article 28(2): EU Sixth Directive. 
75 Article 28(5): EU Sixth Directive. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




In circumstances where an operator is not established in the Member State in which the 
transport service is being provided, the operators may appoint an independent fiscal 
representative to pay the tax due, on the operator’s behalf, to the appropriate fiscal 
authority
76. 
In 1994, an EC Commission report
77 noted that the use of the fiscal representation 
procedure was not uniformly applied or required across the EU (at that time, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands and the UK did not require it).  The report also concluded that the 
procedure gave rise to increased costs for suppliers and there were also difficulties in 
identifying organisations prepared to be jointly and severally liable for the tax due.  In 
this connection, the report noted that the mere fact of the use of a fiscal representative 
restricted a Member State’s abilities to properly audit transactions since, having 
appointed or directed the use of a fiscal representative as being responsible for payment 
of the tax due, it then restricted (under domestic VAT law) the persons from whom 
information can be sought and verification undertaken.  In conclusion, the report 
summarised that the use of the fiscal representation procedure should only be used as a 
last resort and that Member States should use the existing legal framework for mutual 
assistance for verification purposes. 
4.4.1  Competitive distortions in domestic markets 
What distortions are created by the current VAT rules? 
In accordance with the provisions allowed by the Sixth Directive,
78 nearly all Member 
States levy VAT at a reduced rate, or at a zero rate or exempt
79 passenger transport 
services. Table 4.2 sets out the current VAT domestic rates. 
 
 
                                                      
76 Article 21:  EU Sixth Directive. 
77 Com (94) 471 Final:  “Common System of Value Added Tax: arrangements for taxing transactions carried 
out by non-established taxable persons” 
78 Annex H: EU Sixth Directive. 
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Table 4.2: VAT Treatment of domestic passenger transport 




Austria 10.0  Not  Applicable  10.0  10.0  10.0  20.0 
Belgium 6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  21.0 





Finland 6.0    6.0  6.0 6.0  6.0  22.0 
France 5.5
2 5.5
2 5.5  5.5  5.5  20.6 
Germany  15.0  7.0  15.0 (distances over 
50km and non-urban 
services); 7.0 (distances 
of less than 50km and 
urban services ) 0 for 
ferry transport on Rhine, 




















Greece 8.0  (travel 
within and 
between certain 





islands is taxed 
at 6.0) 
8.0 8.0  8.0  18.0 
Ireland Exempt  Exempt  Exempt Exempt    Exempt  21.0 









Luxembourg 3.0  Not  Applicable 3.0  3.0  3.0  12.0
5 
Netherlands 6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  17.5 









taxed at 0) 
5.0 5.0  5.0  17.0 









is taxed at 7.0) 
16.0 7.0  7.0  16.0 
Sweden 12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  25.0 






Source: European Commission COM(02) 416 Final Commission of the European Communities, 1992: KPMG analysis 
Notes 
1  Tourist bus services are not specifically defined, but exclude regular scheduled transport buses.  “Bus” is defined as 
a road vehicle carrying nine people or more (including the driver). 
2  Transport to and from Corsica, which is taxed at 0% insofar as it involves travel outside the French territorial area, 
is subject to an extra tax at FFR 40 per person, or FF 10 if the journey is less than 10km, from one part of Corsica to 
another. 
3  Urban services are defined as occurring entirely within one municipality.
  
4  Urban public transport is defined as transport either entirely within the territory of one municipality, or between two 
municipalities which are 50km or less apart. 
5  15% rate for leaded petrol. 
6  Except for means of transport carrying <12 persons. Transportation in vehicles which carry fewer than 12 persons is 
subject to VAT at 17.5%. 
Table 4.2 indicates that in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal (with the exception of travel to Madeira) and Sweden there is no European Commission 
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variation in the rate of VAT levied on passenger transport services, irrespective of length 
of trip, mode of travel used or type of vehicle in operation. 
The United Kingdom’s regime is similarly harmonised across the modes, the key 
difference being that for all modes VAT is chargeable if vehicular capacity is for less than 
twelve persons.  This means that transport in taxis, minibuses and some small aircraft is 
subject to levy VAT. 
Thus, for the majority (ten) Member States of the Union, it is possible to say that they 
are effectively operating a harmonised domestic VAT regime for passenger transport 
with respect to the rates levied.  Other variations, for example with respect to 
deductibility, do exist in certain cases and these are examined further below. 
An additional cluster of Member States can be identified, which, whilst not possessing 
such a closely harmonised regime as for the group of ten identified above, does not 
generally have significant variations in the range of VAT rates levied.  These states 
comprise Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain and Denmark.  The distinctive characteristic of 
this group of states is that all of them (except Denmark) levy reduced VAT rates for trips 
in specified markets.  These include urban markets (Germany, Italy) and island markets 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain). 
This policy aims to address distribution of income objectives, as short-distance travel is a 
necessity linked with commuting to work, compared to longer-distance travel, linked 
largely to business travel and/or leisure.  Table A3.1 in Appendix 3.1 provides a detailed 
assessment of the rationale behind the different VAT treatment of domestic transport. 
In Denmark, economic concerns have led to the taxation of tourist or occasional bus 
services at a 25% rate
80.  This compares with wholesale exemptions for other passenger 
transport services within the country. The Danish approach stems from the distortion of 
trade caused by the difference in the country’s standard-rate of VAT (25%) in comparison 
with the standard-rate in neighbouring Germany (15%). 
Consumers choosing private car travel as an option face a VAT charge on their fuel at the 
full standard rate, in every Member State without exception  In addition, Governments 
also levy high levels of other duties, which often form the largest cost component of the 
product. It is unlikely, therefore, that tax differentials would lead to loss of business by 
any public transport system  in favour of cars.  
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In summary, variations in domestic VAT rates on passenger transport are not of 
economic significance in so far as they do not distort the choice of demand made 
between modes of transport.  The reason is that any variations in rates which exist are 
primarily between modes of transport that do not compete directly with each other. 
Furthermore, where variations were identified they sought to meet distributive 
objectives, with the exception of the treatment of the car which also sought to correct 
environmental externalities. 
4.4.2  Competitive distortions in intra-EU and international passenger markets 
What distortions are created by the current VAT rules? 
This market effectively covers all journeys which either begin, end or pass through more 
than one Member State.  Historically, VAT has been levied only on a pro rata basis for 
land-based forms of transport in some Member States, in accordance with the principle of 
territoriality.  This means that VAT is not applied to the whole journey, but only to an 
imputed value given to that part of the journey taking place within the Member State in 
question (i.e. up to the border). Table 4.3 illustrate the relevant intra-EU and international 
VAT rates. 
Member States can be grouped into those where there is little or no variation in rates 
between modes for intra-EU and international journeys and those where this is not the 
case.   
The former group consists of: 
  Finland,  
  Ireland, 
  Italy, 
  Luxembourg, 
  Netherlands 
  Portugal, 
  Sweden, and 
  United Kingdom. 
The group of countries for which variations in VAT rates exist, consists of: 
  Austria, 
  Belgium, 
  Denmark, 
  France,
81 
  Germany, 
  Greece,
82 and 
  Spain, although the variations are not rigorously enforced. 
                                                      
81 A significant number of international rail routes are exempt from VAT – see Appendix 4.2. 
82 The geographic position of Greece implies that the positive rate levied on international journeys by coach, 
to the extent that it is implemented, is unlikely to effect in any substantial way, competition between coach 
and air (or rail). European Commission 
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Table 4.3: VAT treatment of intra-EU and international passenger transport
83 
Member State  Air %  Sea %  Inland Waterways 
% 
Rail %  Buses/Coaches % 
Austria 0
1 0
2  0 and 10.0 for trips 




1 6.0  6.0  6.0 
Denmark 0
1 0
1 Not  Applicable  0
1  0 (scheduled traffic); 
25.0 (tourist bus 
services)
3 
Finland  Outside the  scope  Outside the  
scope 
Outside the  scope  Outside the  
scope 
Outside the  scope 
France 0
1 0
1  5.5  0 for transit 








1 for transit services
7,
 
5.5 for all other 
services 
Germany 0
5  7.0 (transport in 
German territorial 
waters is treated 
as taking  place 
outside Germany) 
7.0 but ferry 
transport on the 
Rhine, Danube, 
Elbe, Oder and 
Neisse is treated as 
taking place outside 
of German territory 
and  is, therefore, 
taxed at 0 
15.0 but 7.0 for 
journeys of 
under 50km or 
urban transport 
15.0 but 7.0 for 
journeys of under 
50km or urban 
transport 






























6 7.0  7.0 
Sweden  Outside the  scope  Outside the  
scope 
Outside the  scope  Outside the  
scope 
Outside the  scope 






Source: European Commission COM (92) 416 Final, Commission of the European Communities, 1992; KPMG network 
Notes 
1  Zero in this table refers to “zero rated” or “exempt with credit”, which are in effect identical. 
2  Austria taxes international passenger transport by ship (whether on rivers, lakes or seas) at 0% (with the 
exception of journeys on Lake Constance). 
3  Tourist bus services are not specifically defined, but exclude regular scheduled transport buses. “Bus” is 
defined as a road vehicle carrying nine people or more (including the driver). 
4  The exempted rail routes are detailed in Appendix 3.2. 
5  Germany reserves the right to tax (at 15%) the domestic legs of flights to/from countries which tax the domestic 
legs of flights to/from Germany.  Where “reciprocal” arrangements apply, the German tax charge is waived.  
Routes which are taxed are those to countries other than those detailed in Appendix 3.3. Where tax is to be 
levied, the tax base will be the difference between the cost of a direct flight from the stopover point to the 
destination and a direct flight from the point of origin to the destination. For example, if a flight from Berlin to 
foreign city X costs DM 1,200 and a flight from Frankfurt to X costs DM1,000, the tax base for a flight Berlin-
Frankfurt-X will be DM 200. 
  If there is no difference between the cost of direct flights, or the difference is negative, no tax is assessed. 
For journeys involving stopovers, the operator must not issue a ticket for the separate domestic leg.  If it does, tax is 
due.  The zero VAT charge applies only where the passenger stops over at the intermediary airport no longer 
than is necessary to catch the next onward flight.  Longer stopovers attract a VAT charge on the domestic leg - 
see paragraph 4.4.1. 
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6  It is understood that, although Spanish VAT legislation applies a VAT rate of 16% for Spanish legs of intra-
EU/international journeys by air and sea, this legislation is not applied in practice. There is also no set 
procedure for putting a value on the domestic leg element.
84 
7  For road journeys which commence outside France, travel through French territory, and terminate outside 
France provided at least ten persons are transported in the same vehicle (Article 262, French General VAT 
Code).  The relief does not apply if there is any break in the journey within France or if the service is performed 
by a transport operator with a “place of establishment” in France.  For road journeys involving the collection 
of passengers at a French airport (for onward transportation to a destination within France), no VAT charge 
arises (under the terms of Article 73F, Annex III of the French VAT Code) if the operator provides a document 
detailing particulars of the vehicle and the number of passengers.  The document must be stamped by the 
Customs authorities. 
Table A3.2 in Appendix 3.1 provides a detailed assessment of the economic rationale and 
impact of these variations in rates. 
From an analysis of the VAT rates for intra-EU markets, it emerges that the most 
significant distortion is between rail and air travel in certain routes.
85 A number of 
significant routes to and from France are exempted, reflecting the recognition of the 
competition between HSR and air. 
In some markets, particularly Germany and Austria, there is a substantial additional VAT 
cost on that part of an international rail trip which takes place in either of these States. 
Another significant distortion appears to be the levying of VAT on chartered or shuttle 
coach services, especially where they are competing with chartered air services.  As with 
competition between air and rail, the coach market is faced with a VAT rate of up to 25% 
compared to a VAT rate on air travel of 0% across the board (with the possible exception 
of Germany and Spain). 
Note that, save for the specific route exemptions in France, there are no differences in 
VAT treatment between coach and rail; there are therefore no VAT-induced competitive 
distortions between those two modes. 
In comparing the treatment between modes, the argument (see section 4.2) that different 
VAT rates are applied to different modes as a way of correcting existing distortions 
appears difficult to sustain because: 
  as already indicated in Chapter 3, intra-EU transport by rail accounts for a very small 
proportion of total; it is therefore unlikely that any VAT difference on international 
journeys could correct any distortions to competition arising from significant 
subsidies. This is re-enforced by the fact that domestic VAT rates across the modes are 
the same in almost all EU Member States, 
  there is no information to suggest that the rail operators of the countries where VAT 
rates on rail are positive are subsidised (or more heavily subsidised) compared to the 
operators where the VAT rates are zero,
86 
                                                      
84 Source: KPMG fieldwork 1996: EU air and sea operators. 
85 The positive VAT rates levied for domestic legs of international journeys by rail and coach, are the same 
as the domestic ones (see Table 4.2 and 4.3) for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands.  This 
implies that in these countries there are no incentives for applying (reduced) domestic rates on the domestic 
legs of international journeys. 
86 This is based on interviews with the European association. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




  rail and coach operators are taxed equally where positive VAT rates are levied and yet 
coach operators are private companies with no direct support from the government, 
and 
  air operators in some of the countries with positive VAT rates on rail/coach are loss-
making.
87 
The main argument, therefore, providing a credible justification for different VAT 
treatment of air and rail/coach for international journeys is the complexity of 
international air passenger transport in terms of the potential competition of any 
number of operators from different countries on any route; this implies a real risk of 
creating competitive disadvantages for national airline operators vis-à-vis other EU 
and international operators.
88  This has led some governments to apply a zero VAT rate 
on air, while at the same time maintaining a positive VAT rate on rail/coach.  This was 
not expected to create any significant distortions, as: 
  international rail journeys are a very small proportion of total, and 
  air was considered to compete with rail/coach in a relatively small sub-segment of the 
market. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the validity of these arguments by providing a 
quantitative assessment of the distortions created by the existing VAT system both 
currently and in the future.  This follows an assessment of differences in the 
implementation of the current VAT rules (section 4.4) and differences in the right to 
deduct input VAT (section 4.5) which affect significantly the extent of the economic 
impact on demand for business travel of any given differences in VAT rates between air 
and rail/coach. 
                                                      
87 Sabena and Austrian Airlines. 
88 This is particularly true for Sabena, Austrian Airlines and KLM for which intra-EU and international 
journeys represent 100% or the vast majority of their flights - see Figure 2.9 in Chapter 2. European Commission 
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4.5  Variations in implementation of domestic VAT legislation by 
Member States 
What is the national practice with regard to the administration of the legislation? Where, 
and why is national practice different from legislative provisions? 
Recognising the potential difficulty in collecting VAT revenues from non-domestic 
operators, certain countries have implemented simplification procedures to enable them to 
collect the taxation revenues without imposing the administrative burden of requiring 
non-domestic operators to register and account for VAT locally.  However, it is 
understood that these reliefs apply only to those “non-resident” operators providing “non-
cabotage” services (principally return international trips).  Cabotage operators (who “pick 
up” in other Member States) must register for VAT locally.  The local VAT registration 
rules and reliefs for non-cabotage services are detailed in Table 4.4. 
However, notwithstanding the special provisions adopted by certain Member States 
(principally Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK), research has 
revealed that many Member States do not implement the legislative provisions relating to 
passenger transport services carried out within domestic territory in a uniform manner
89.  
This inconsistency of implementation has caused a number of distortions to arise. In 
general, the distortions impact unfairly on the domestic operators; although (in most 
cases) non-domestic transport operators are required to account for VAT on the same 
basis as domestic operators, it is clear that this requirement is not being observed.  
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Table 4.4: VAT registration requirements: non-cabotage (international) services 
provided by non-domestic transport operators 
Member 
State 
Operator registrable?  Details of special procedures  Legislative 
reference for special 
procedures 
Austria  Yes (subject to special 
provisions)
1 
i.  If the services are supplied to an Austrian 
taxable person who would enjoy full recovery 
of any VAT charges, the VAT registration 
requirement can be waived 
ii.  For transport involving a foreign registered 
motor vehicle moving between Austria and a 
non-EU state, a flat rate tax of ATS 0.60 (ECU 
0.05) per passenger per kilometre driven in 
Austria can be levied as an alternative to normal 
VAT taxation 
Paragraph 20, 
subsection 4, and  
paragraph 4, 
subsection 9 of the 
1994 VAT Act 
Belgium  Yes (for regular 
operators) 
For non-regular operators (not specifically defined) 
“spontaneous” declarations of VAT may be made to 
the authorities in lieu of full registration. These may 
be yearly for VAT due figures of up to BEF 




practice, no legal 
reference. 
Denmark  Yes (subject to special 
provision for bus 
transport) 
For operators who perform transport in Denmark 
only “occasionally” (undefined) and use foreign 
registered buses, it is possible to request taxation at 




1135 of 12 December 
1995. 
Finland No  (international 
services are “outside the 
scope” of Finnish VAT) 
None None 
France Yes  (international 
services) 
No (transit services) 
None None 
Germany   Yes (but only where 
services are supplied to 
non-registered persons)
3 
i.  Supplies to VAT-registered persons are taxable 
under the reverse charge mechanism - no 
registration is necessary for the supplier. 
ii.  Domestic legs of international flights are zero-
rated where the stopover is only long enough to 
catch the next appropriate flight. 
iii.  The use of buses that are licensed in another 
country is taxed at DEM0.013 (ECU 0.01) per 
km per person. This tax is only levied when 
crossing a border between Germany and a non-
EU Member State. 
i.  s.3(6)(1), VAT 
Act 
 
ii.  s.278(2), VAT 
Regulations 
 
iii.  s.16(5) VAT Act 
s.221(3) VAT 
Regulations 
Decree of 24 
January 1993 
Greece   Yes  None  None 
Ireland No  None  None 
Italy  Yes, if supplies are 
made to non VAT 
registered entities a 
fiscal representative 
must be appointed.  If 
all supplies are to VAT 
registered entities then 
the reverse charge is 
applicable. 
None None European Commission 
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Operator registrable?  Details of special procedures  Legislative 
reference for special 
procedures 
Luxembourg  No (for national legs at 
international transport) 
None None 
Netherlands  Yes, unless all its 




Provider may agree a percentage of total revenue 
which is taxable in the Netherlands where journeys 
involve Dutch and non-Dutch elements. 
None 
Portugal Yes  None  None 
Spain  Yes, but only if 
established in Spain
4 
Under normal VAT rules a company can only 
register if it has a permanent establishment or 
deemed permanent establishment in Spain.
5 
None 
Sweden No  (international 
services are “outside the 
scope” of Swedish 
VAT) 
None None 
UK Yes  i.  If  the recipient is an entrepreneur registered for 
VAT in the UK a tax shift mechanism may place 
the liability on the recipient 
ii.   If the supplies are principally  zero-rated  the 
entrepreneur may opt not to register, even if the 
turnover exceeds the normal limit of £48,000 (ECU 
57923) per annum 
i.  VAT Act 1994 




ii.  VAT Act 1994 
Schedule 1(14) 
Notes: 
1.  There is currently a technical requirement for non-domestic operators to account for VAT.  However, this 
requirement can be avoided if the operator is based in a country which itself does not tax Austrian 
operators who provide passenger transport services in that country.  These arrangements are known as 
“reciprocity agreements” and enable non-domestic operators to escape a VAT charge in Austria if 
Austrian operators escape a VAT charge in the country of the non-domestic operator. The agreements 
take priority over other relevant legislation within Austrian VAT law. 
2.  In Belgium, the “spontaneous” declaration procedure was introduced after 1 January 1993 in an attempt 
to secure revenues following the withdrawal of the “flat rate” charge for non-domestic operators (which 
used to be levied at the external Belgian border).  However, the spontaneous declaration procedure has 
not been successful because the Belgian authorities requested a retrospective payment (stretching back to 
1 January 1993) from non-domestic operators. 
3.  Within Germany, the Belgian Trade Association (which represents Belgian Coach Operators) has 
negotiated a special deal with the German authorities.  The Trade Association acts as a single fiscal 
representative on behalf of the Belgian operators providing passenger transport services on German 
territory.  However, the VAT reclaimable under the 8th Directive procedure is off-set by a notional 
output VAT charge on services performed within Germany.  It appears that it is only the Belgian Coach 
Operators which have reached a specific agreement along these lines. 
4.  Within the Netherlands and Spain, unofficial arrangements operate which enable the authorities to 
secure the tax base by denying non-domestic operators an 8th Directive refund claim for fuel and toll 
fees. 
5.  For VAT purposes, a company has a permanent establishment in Spain in the following cases: 
–  if it has an office, factory, installation, or shop in Spain; 
–  if it has an agent with powers to act in the name and on behalf of the company in Spain; 
–  if it carries out construction work lasting over 12 months; 
–  if it owns or rents a warehouse on a permanent basis for the storage of its goods; 
–  if it has a centre of purchase of goods or services in Spain. European Commission 
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For ground transport, the removal of fiscal controls between Member States has increased 
the scope for distortion and it appears that EU fiscal authorities are increasingly unable to 
administer the collection of VAT payable on passenger transport services provided within 
their borders by non-domestic transport operators, particularly in circumstances where 
those operators have no place of business in the Member State concerned. 
The implementation distortions, by transport mode, are outlined in detail below.   
However, notwithstanding the effect of the examples which follow, it is clear that “single 
ticketing”, where a traveller contracts with a single operator for a journey which is split 
into different modes (or separate trips), allows VAT distortions to arise.  For example, a 
UK court case involving Virgin Atlantic Airways concluded that the airline was making a 
single supply of a zero-rated journey (from or to a place outside the UK) in circumstances 
where the airline provided limousine transport to the airport of departure (or from the 
airport of arrival).  If supplied as a separate service, the limousine supply would be 
subject to VAT at 17.5%.  Similarly, travellers purchasing a single ticket for a journey 
which commences or terminates outside France, but involves a change of aircraft or 
stopover at the end (or commencement) of a domestic French leg of the journey, would 
not incur a French VAT charge in respect of the journey which takes place within France.  
However, if a separate ticket was bought for the French leg, a French VAT charge would 
apply to that leg. 
4.5.1  Implementation  distortions: air  
What examples are there of local practice differing from national legislation? 
The VAT treatment of domestic and international (including intra-EU) air journeys, 
respectively, differs for most EU Member States
90: domestic journeys are taxed at a 
positive VAT rate whereas international journeys are taxed at a zero rate.  This has the 
following implications: 
  first, for those journeys with a stopover within a Member State of the EU (either 
inbound to the EU or outbound from the EU), the possibility arises of different VAT 
treatment between the operators of that Member State and other operators, and 
  second, where the positive VAT rate is applied in practice on the domestic leg of a 
journey, demand for air passenger transport would favour a direct trip (e.g. New 
York–Berlin) rather than a stopover trip (e.g. New York–Frankfurt–Berlin). 
Data for Germany illustrates the significance of such a distortion.  Some 5% of 
international flights, including intra-EU, originating in Germany
91 are broken by a 
domestic stopover. For example, a passenger can buy a through ticket from Berlin to New 
York where they stop over in Frankfurt. Since air tickets are sometimes valid for one 
year, the passenger may legitimately break this journey in Frankfurt. The German fiscal 
authorities currently consider that in such circumstances the Berlin to Frankfurt leg 
represents a domestic German journey which is subject to German VAT at 15%. Using a 
sampling procedure, the German authorities collect VAT from a major German airline, in 
respect of the domestic leg (broken by a stopover) of international journeys. The 
additional VAT payable by the German operator amounts to several million 
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Deutschmarks each year.  It is understood that non-German airlines operating similar 
stopover arrangements within Germany may not be accounting for the additional VAT 
charge.
92 
The German position differs markedly from that of the French fiscal authorities; for 
example, flights from Nice to New York with a stopover in Paris do not attract a French 
VAT charge on the domestic legs as long as both trips are taken together on one ticket. 
In Spain, a VAT charge of 16% technically applies to the distance travelled within 
Spanish air space for journeys originating or terminating in Spain, although it appears that 
the Spanish fiscal authorities do not apply these provisions, either to Spanish or non-
Spanish operators.
93 
In terms of inter-modal competition, the distortion implies that for stopover air journeys 
where air competes with rail, for the whole journey, and the domestic leg of an 
international air journey is taxed positively
94, the relative tax-created competitive 
advantage for air will be smaller.  The significance of this is likely to be small, however, 
given: 
  the small proportion of stopover trips as a share of total (as indicated by the German 
data), and 
  the fact that rail will only compete with air for the full journey in an even smaller 
proportion of these trips. 
In addition, where the domestic leg of an international air journey with a stopover is 
not taxed in practice, an additional distortion is introduced between air and rail in the 
domestic market
95. This is likely to occur where there is an important HSR network 
which competes with air such as in France (although France has implemented a number 
of exemptions for specific cross-border rail routes) and will become more larger as the 
HSR network develops in the future (unless further exemptions are introduced). In terms 
of the other major markets where rail competes domestically with air there is no distortion 
since: 
  in Germany, a positive VAT rate is levied on air for domestic routes, and 
  in the UK, the domestic VAT rates are also zero. 
4.5.2  Implementation  distortions: road 
What examples are there of local practice differing from national legislation? 
Effective, consistent enforcement of the existing measures for road transport is very 
difficult for most Member States. Fieldwork suggests that the theoretical obligation upon 
coach operators to register for VAT in each Member State in which they physically 
perform services is largely ignored. 
                                                      
92 Source:  Airline operators interview programme. 
93 Source:  EU airline industry. 
94 i.e. mainly Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain (in theory, Finland, Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden would also be included). 
95 This is similar to the distortion that exists in intra-EU/international routes where zero VAT rated air 
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Before the introduction of the EU single market on 1 January 1993, some Member States 
collected the VAT payable on domestic legs of intra-EU or international transport at the 
international frontier.  The abolition of fiscal frontiers has, however, left most states 
without any effective mechanism to control the activities of other states’ coach operators 
on their territory; it is practically impossible to police the movements of the foreign 
operators’ coaches in and out of the country. The result is significant distortions across 
the EU for some coach operators, especially where local operators can be forced to apply 
a VAT charge which foreign ones can in practice escape without levying. It is understood 
that these distortions include:
96 
  inconsistent enforcement of VAT rules for domestic legs of international transport in 
Austria.  Incoming or outgoing coaches are required to pay VAT, at the external EU 
border, on an intermittent basis; 
  within Germany, the VAT rules for domestic legs of intra-EU transport are similarly 
enforced inconsistently.  Some non-German coach operators are required to register 
and account for VAT in Germany whereas others are not.  Further, the enforcement of 
the “flat rate” charge (which is levied per kilometre) is also inconsistent.  However, 
the Trade Association representing Belgian coach operators has negotiated a specific 
agreement with the German fiscal authorities.  Under this agreement, the trade 
association acts as the fiscal representative of the Belgian coach operators and is 
responsible for organising input VAT refunds via a local VAT registration for the 
operator.  However, any input VAT refundable is offset by the notional output VAT 
due on kilometres travelled by the Belgian operators within Germany.  Aside from the 
specific agreement relating to Belgian coach operators, it is understood that operators 
based in other EU Member States are not, generally, being required to account for 
German VAT for coach journeys performed within German territory. It is understood 
that the flat rate charge is usually restricted to operators entering the EU via Germany 
it is therefore enforced on the Czech, Polish and Swiss borders.  
  in the Netherlands, the Dutch fiscal authorities do not enforce the provision which 
requires operators based outside the Netherlands to register and account for Dutch 
VAT.  Instead, it is understood that the Dutch authorities collect part of their VAT by 
refusing EU Eighth Directive refund claims made by operators in respect of VAT 
incurred on fuel purchased within the Netherlands; 
  within Belgium, the fiscal authorities do not strictly enforce the requirement for non-
domestic coach operators to register and account for VAT for journeys undertaken 
within Belgian territory.  Non-domestic coach operators are required to make 
“spontaneous declarations” if they undertake “occasional” tourist services within 
Belgian territory.  However, the introduction of this new provision was accompanied 
by a demand for a retrospective VAT payment (stretching back to 1 January 1993)  
and it is understood that few non-domestic coach operators are complying with this 
requirement.  Before 1 January 1993, a flat rate formula applied (similar to Germany) 
which was dependent on the size of the coach and the type of the service.  The flat rate 
payable was computed on a daily basis; 
  within France, there is discrimination between French and non-French operators (it is 
understood that French operators are required to account for French VAT on French 
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legs of intra-EU journeys terminating or commencing in France whereas non-French 
operators are not); 
  within Greece, although there is a technical requirement for non-domestic coach 
operators to register and account for VAT for journeys performed on Greek territory, 
this requirement is not enforced by the Greek fiscal authorities; 
  within Spain, the fiscal authorities do not enforce the legislative provisions which 
require non-domestic operators performing passenger transport services within Spain 
to register for VAT locally.  However, the Spanish authorities secure part of the VAT 
due by refusing EU Eighth Directive refunds for VAT incurred on road tolls and fuel 
purchased within Spain. 
4.5.3  Implementation distortions: maritime and inland  waterway travel 
What examples are there of local practice differing from national legislation? 
Because of the widespread exemptions for domestic legs of intra-EU and international sea 
travel, the practical distortions in this sector are fewer. Only Spain applies a positive rate 
of VAT to domestic legs of sea travel. However, it is understood that the Spanish fiscal 
authorities do not enforce this rule strictly and, as a result, ferry and cruise operators are 
not required to account for VAT on ticketing revenue derived from journeys wholly or 
partly made within Spanish waters. Even if an inspector were to pursue an assessment of 
VAT on a domestic leg, there also appears to be no set procedure laid down for placing a 
tax value on an internal leg of an international journey.
97 
For inland waterway transport, the requirement for non-domestic operators to account for 
VAT on journeys wholly or partly taken within Belgian, French, Dutch and Spanish 
inland waterways does not appear to be enforced by the fiscal authorities.
98  T h i s  
contrasts with the position of domestic operators who are required to account for VAT on 
such income in their appropriate home Member State. 
4.5.4  Implementation distortions: rail 
What examples are there of local practice differing from national legislation? 
The possibility of inter-modal competitive distortions between air and rail, arising from 
different VAT treatment of the domestic legs of international air journeys has already 
been discussed in the Air section.  The existence of different VAT rates for domestic and 
international journeys in four Member States
99 provides the possibility of a distortion, 
where the domestic leg (e.g. Rome–Milan) of an international rail trip with a stopover 
(e.g. Rome–Milan–Nice) could be taxed at the international rate of 0%, neutralising any 
competitive advantage provided to air, as a result of a domestic leg being taxed at the 
international rate.  This seems more of a theoretical possibility however, as: 
  in three out of the four countries where such a discrepancy arises (Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Sweden) stopovers are unlikely to be of any significance, and 
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  in Italy, (10% for domestic and 0% for international) VAT rates are the same across 
all modes.  As long as domestic legs of international journeys by air and rail are 
treated in the same way by the fiscal authorities, no inter-modal competitive 
distortions would arise. 
There is no evidence to suggest that any very large VAT-related distortions occur in the 
European railway industry as a result of application of the VAT rules.  Unlike the 
situation with respect to roads, the enforcement process is eased by the fact that the 
railway sector in most countries is run by a single state-owned monopoly (even in Britain, 
where rail transport has been privatised, there are a small number of large operators rather 
than the immense number of coach firms). Cross border travel is governed by agreements 
between the monopolies, making the issue of cross-border trips by unregistered entities 
much less significant. 
Ticketing revenues are distributed amongst European railway operators according to the 
total distance travelled, for all journeys, in each Member State. These revenues are 
distributed through a pan-European clearing house system. Legally, the “home” railway 
operator acts as principal for all railway journeys undertaken on track physically located 
in its home Member State. 
This structure ensures that railway operators, in each Member State, receive all ticketing 
revenue for journeys physically undertaken within their country and, as such, are able to 
account accurately for the VAT payable. Since no non-domestic operator acts as principal 
for journeys provided outside its home country, there cannot be any requirement for 
railway operators to register and account for VAT outside their home Member State. 
However, some distortions may arise on particular journeys. Finland and Sweden treat 
international rail journeys as outside the scope of VAT in their entirety, whereas domestic 
rail journeys are taxable (at 6% and 12% respectively). The potential exists for a 
passenger buying a fare to a border town to save money by paying the higher net fare to 
the first stop past the border, since this fare will have no VAT. 
Research suggest that there is a least one rail route in Sweden where this is a practical 
problem, this being Stockholm - Lulea - Narvik. This is a route of over 1,000km where 
travellers who book a ticket to the Norwegian stops (all of which lie along the final 50km 
of the line) can enjoy a 12% VAT saving on the whole journey, making it economical for 
travellers to Northern Sweden to buy a ticket to Norway and get  off the train early
100. 
Similar situations could occur for journeys to Finland and Finnish journeys to Sweden, 
Norway and Russia, although we have no specific information on these routes in practice. 
They could have two effects: 
i.  Distortion of ticketing revenue allocation 
ii.  Distortion of competition with air travel (a traveller going by air from Stockholm to 
Northern Sweden will have to use an internal flight which goes to Lulea, for instance, 
and terminals there, no chance to avoid VAT). 
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4.5.5  Implementation distortions: modal 
Are the VAT-induced distortions (created by legislative treatment and national practice) 
affected  by other indirect taxes? 
There are differing applications of other indirect taxes between modes of transport.  For 
example, exemptions from excise duties on fuel are possible for airline and maritime 
transport, whereas railway operators incur a positive rate of VAT on electricity supplies.  
Although this VAT is deductible, operators must finance the cost in the period between 
payment and refund. 
Further, there are differences in the VAT treatment of passenger transportation vehicles.  
For example, the Sixth Directive
101 provides VAT reliefs for the purchase, lease and 
repair of air and maritime vehicles, whereas the purchase of rail and road vehicles 
invariably bear a VAT charge which transport operators must finance between payment 
and deduction. In certain Member States, for example Ireland, where domestic transport 
is VAT exempt, no deduction is technically allowed for costs related to domestic 
journeys. International transport is, however, exempt with credit. This tends to hit mainly 
the bus and rail sectors: sea and air operators enjoy full or nearly full deduction since 
most of their business is international (domestic legs count as “international” for recovery 
purposes).
102   An exception to this rule is, however, a major domestic air operator, Ryan 
Air.  Since the operator’s supplies are principally “exempt without credit”, it suffers an 
irrecoverable VAT cost on its expenditure.  However, since Aer Lingus is principally an 
international operator, its supplies are principally “exempt with credit”, enabling related 
recovery of input VAT.  
Across the EU, airport taxes and/or other charges are commonplace.  Out of the EU15, 
only Finland and Spain do not levy surcharges to passengers.  The type and size of the 
charges involved, summarised in Appendix 4, varies substantially between Member 
States both for international and domestic flights.  All of the EU15 except for the United 
Kingdom treat EU flights as international; the UK has one departure tax for EU and 
domestic flights and another for all other non-EU international services. Most charges and 
taxes are defined as being either departure taxes or passenger security taxes, although 
whether these taxes are always allocated to the same organisation (eg the airport, 
government etc) is not clear. 
In the context of this study, a distinction needs to be drawn between those taxes that are 
in effect service charges (e.g. for providing security at the airport) and those that are pure 
taxes – that is, charges that go to either local or central government and are not used 
specifically for the purpose of directly providing a service to the payer associated with 
travelling. 
 In summary, the main results of the analysis of the practical distortions are that: 
  there are significant differences in the way individual Member States apply the VAT 
rules;  the key ones relate to the treatment of domestic (or transit) legs of 
international journeys for air and coach; 
  in the air passenger transport sector, Germany does apply the domestic VAT rate to 
German legs of some international air journeys; administrative difficulties have the 
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result that non-German operators are less likely to be paying tax for such legs.  
France, on the other hand, applies a 0% rate (the international VAT rate) to French 
legs of international journeys when the operator issues a single ticket which covers 
the whole journey; and 
  such discrepancies do have implications for the competitive position of different 
operators, within the same mode;  the relatively small number of journeys affected 
means, however, that the impact on inter-modal competition is likely to be 
negligible. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




4.6  Current VAT system: differences in the right to deduct input VAT 
What are the current rules for the deduction of VAT incurred on passenger transport 
services?  How do these rules work in practice and what is their effect? 
The Sixth Directive provides that tax shall “in no circumstances be deductible on 
expenditure which is not strictly business expenditure, such as that on luxuries, 
amusements or entertainment”.
103 The right to treat certain categories of expenditure as 
non-deductible has been allowed since the adoption of the Second Directive on 11 April 
1967. 
Businesses making non-taxable supplies
104 and tour operators
105 are unable to claim full 
credit for input VAT incurred.  A detailed description of the current rules is provided in 
Table 4.7. 
It was initially planned that the current situation with respect to deduction would be 
strictly temporary. The European Commission had drafted a proposed Twelfth VAT 
Directive to harmonise the VAT deduction rules in each Member State.  This would, 
essentially, have made travel costs 50% deductible.  However, since there was no 
unanimity within the Council of Ministers, the draft Directive was withdrawn by the 
Commission. 
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Table 4.7: Tax deduction/refund arrangements at Member State level 
Member State  Passenger Transport  Documentation Required  Road Fuel 
Austria  Deduction Permitted   Travel ticket is acceptable so long as 
it identifies the supplier’s name and 
address and the net and VAT values. 
International tickets must itemise the 
element taxable in Austria in order to 
be acceptable. 
Deduction Permitted 
Belgium  Deduction Permitted  Travel ticket acceptable evidence for 
domestic journeys; tax certificate 
required for domestic legs of 
international rail journeys 
maximum 50% of 
tax incurred 
deductible 
Denmark  Deduction Not Permitted: 
business travel services exempt 
None  Deduction  Not 
Permitted 
Finland  Deduction Permitted  Travel ticket acceptable if the name 
of the operator, the date, price and 
amount of tax are shown 
Deduction Permitted 
France  Deduction  Not Permitted  None  Deduction  Not 
Permitted 
Germany  Deduction Permitted  Full tax invoice required if the ticket 
price exceeds DM 200. In practice, a 
travel ticket is usually accepted as 
appropriate evidence provided 
suitable information is shown. For 
intra-EU rail journeys, a tax 
certificate, showing tax paid on the 
German leg of the journey, is 
required. 
Deduction Permitted 
Greece  Deduction Not Permitted  None  None 
Ireland  Deduction Not Permitted None  Deduction  Not 
Permitted 
Italy  Deduction Not Permitted save 
for exceptional circumstances
1 
None  Deduction  Not 
Permitted 
Luxembourg  Deduction Permitted  Full tax invoice required  Deduction Permitted 
Netherlands Deduction  Permitted  Air  travel: full tax invoice required 
Rail travel: travel ticket acceptable 
Deduction Permitted 
Portugal  Deduction Not Permitted  None  Deduction  Not 
Permitted 
Spain  Deduction Permitted if the 
journey is classified as a 
business trip for Corporate 
Income Tax purposes
2 
Full tax invoice required  Deduction Not 
Permitted 
Sweden Deduction  Permitted  Full  Tax Invoice required under Tax 
Law; in practice a travel ticket, 
(showing the amount of tax and the 
VAT identification number of the 
operator ) is accepted 
Deduction Permitted 
United Kingdom  Deduction Permitted, but most 
transport taxed at a zero-rate 
Simplified tax invoice for 
transactions below £100 in value 
(otherwise full Tax Invoice required) 
Deduction Permitted 
Source: KPMG International VAT Network 
Notes 
1.  This is not clearly defined in law, but would include, for instance, transport purchased for resale. 
2.  There is no clear definition of “business trip” under Corporate Income Tax law but, broadly, it must be 
demonstrable that the trip has a purpose in generating income for the company. European Commission 
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Currently, tax incurred on business travel is not eligible for deduction in Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal. Elsewhere, those Member States which tax 
passenger transport services permit deduction. In addition, Member States impose 
differing requirements for documentary evidence to support deduction. In certain 
circumstances, the travel ticket is sufficient whereas in other cases a full tax invoice is 
required. 
In those Member States which permit tax deduction on business travel, most (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany and Sweden), allow the travel ticket to serve as the 
appropriate evidence to support tax deduction for air travel. However, others 
(Luxembourg , the Netherlands and Spain), require the business traveller to obtain a full 
tax invoice from the transport provider.  For rail travel, the position is slightly different. 
Those Member States, with the addition of the Netherlands, which allow the air ticket to 
be treated as evidence to support tax deduction for business travellers also permit the rail 
ticket to be so used. However, these arrangements apply only for domestic travel. For 
cross-border journeys, business travellers must approach the railway operators for a tax 
certificate which details each operator’s share of the ticketing income. This document 
enables the customer to calculate the amount of tax deductible in each Member State. 
For example, for a rail journey from Brussels to Frankfurt, the customer will be charged 
Belgian VAT on the Belgian leg of the journey and German VAT on the German leg of 
the journey. However, the customer will receive a single ticket, priced in the single 
currency, for the whole of the journey. To qualify for a tax deduction, the traveller must 
contact the Belgian and German railway authorities respectively and obtain a tax 
certificate, from each, which can be used subsequently for input VAT deduction 
purposes. The incidence of businesses requesting such information is not thought to be 
widespread.
106 
Although business customers may also seek similar tax certificates from coach operators, 
there is no evidence that they do so on a regular basis.
107  Intra-EU maritime and air 
transport remains principally exempt (with refund) from VAT so the tax deduction issues, 
in a cross-border context, do not arise. 
For business travellers, the cost of tax deduction is twofold. First, in securing the proper 
documentation to enable a deduction claim to be entered; because of difficulties in 
arranging the relevant documentation for cross-border journeys, many businesses forego 
the opportunity for input VAT deduction.
108  Second, the cost of the VAT charge in those 
Member States which do not allow input VAT deduction for business travel. 
4.6.1  Distortions due to variations in VAT deductibility for business travel 
From an economic perspective, variations in the right to deduct VAT are a form of 
competitive distortion because travel costs in those States that allow full deductibility of 
VAT are likely to be lower, reducing costs to business and giving a competitive 
advantage.  The area where the level of distortion is higher is in the case of the 
consumption of motor fuel. The rate of VAT levied on fuel is the standard rate and this, 
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allied to the non-deductibility of input VAT on fuel in some Member States, means that 
some businesses pay up to 25% more for their fuel than others. 
The overall effect of variation in deductibility is likely to be small, however, as 
transport costs form only a small proportion of total costs. One official estimate
109 
suggests that transport costs represents no more than 5–10% of an average business’s cost 
structure so the VAT costs for passenger transport purposes, even taking fuel VAT costs 
into account is likely to have little effect on the ability of most businesses to compete. 
In terms of competitive distortions between modes of transport for international journeys 
where different rates of VAT apply, the extent of the impact of deductibility will depend 
on: 
  the significance of business travel on any particular segment, and 
  the specific route, in terms of the deductibility rules in the origin and destination 
countries. 
In the quantitative assessment of the distortions that follows those two parameters have 
been taken as much as possible into account.  Furthermore, an adjustment has also been 
made about the extent to which business reclaims VAT on international journeys, even 
where VAT is deductible, in view of the practical difficulties mentioned above. 
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4.7  Quantification of the economic distortions of current VAT system 
Taking all of the above together, what are the quantifiable distortions of the current VAT 
system now and in the future? 
The main forms of market distortion can be defined in terms of: 
  price due to (a) variations in tax rates, tax deductibility rates and other tax treatment, 
and (b) variations in the cost conditions faced by different operators due to 
government support; 
  the regulatory environment and extent of subsidies; and 
  other distortions, such as externalities not reflected in the price charged to the 
consumer. 
Clearly, market distortions can also occur in other parts of the regulatory and financial 
regimes of Member States, such as those caused by preferential treatment with respect to 
financing and funding of investment.  In some cases, these are likely to have a large 
impact on the operation of the transport market.  
The objective of this section is to quantify the economic impact of the distortions in 
demand for passenger transport which arise as a result of varying VAT treatment of 
modes of transport (i.e. as a result of price differences due to (a) above).  In order to 
achieve this, it is important to treat all other factors affecting the cost conditions faced by 
operators as given and constant; this is a strong assumption but is necessary in order to 
enable the analysis to provide a quantitative assessment of the tax created distortions 
alone.   
Any assessment of other distortions can then be compared or balanced against the 
quantitative assessment of the tax created distortions. Our assessment of these other 
distortions, primarily the regulatory environment, the characteristics of particular modes 
and environmental distortions are discussed in Section 4.8. 
4.7.1  The relevant transport sub-segments 
The passenger transport segments where there may be a competitive economic impact 
from VAT created distortions are segments where more than one mode competes and 
there are differences in the VAT rates between modes and countries. These are 
  medium distance segment, current HSR routes where rail is positively taxed today, for 
business and leisure,  
  medium-distance segment, future HSR routes where rail is positively taxed today and 
air is zero VAT rated, for business and leisure,  
  medium-distance segment, overnight rail services which are positively taxed today, for 
business, and  
  long distance segment, where rail and coach face positive taxes and air is zero VAT 
rated and air competes with rail (conventional/HSR) and coach for the (very) price 
sensitive leisure market. European Commission 
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For each of these sub-segments, the following steps are undertaken in order to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the distortions: 
  first, assumptions are made about the extent to which any differences in VAT 
treatment between modes are passed on to prices, 
  second, assumptions are made about the share of trips which is business and VAT 
deductible, 
  third, a series of cross-price elasticities are applied, using current estimates of 
elasticities that reflect closely the characteristics of the routes examined, 
  fourth, a quantitative estimate of the ‘diversion’ or ‘transfer’ of demand for trips from 
rail (and coach in the long distance leisure market)  to air as a result of higher taxation 
is made. 
The complexity of the passenger transport markets implies that a range of estimates are 
produced; this illustrates the relative significance of the assumptions underlying the 
results. Estimates of the distortions for each of the sub-segments mentioned above are 
presented in detail below. 
4.7.2  Current and future HSR routes 
Seven Member States levy VAT on intra-EU rail transport at a positive rate and these 
rates vary in line with national standard rates of VAT. Table 4.8 summarises the current 
position. 
Table 4.8: VAT Treatment of domestic legs of intra-EU journeys by rail and coach 
Outside the 
scope of VAT 
VAT exempt with credit 
or levied at 0% 
VAT levied in theory but 
not enforced in practice 




























Source: See table 4.3 
Notes  
1.  Tourist bus services are taxed at 25%. 
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4.7.3  Assumptions underlying the quantitative estimates 
In order to quantify the effects of the different VAT rates, it is necessary to make a 
number of assumptions
112. These are as follows: 
Assumption 1: the extent to which any VAT charge is passed on to the final price paid by 
the passenger. From the point of view of the individual operators, the extent to which any 
tax costs will be passed on to consumers will depend on their cost structure (see section 
4.2) and the degree of competition that they face. The flatter their (average) costs 
structures and the more competition that exists in the market, the less scope there will be 
for absorption of tax costs by the operator and the higher will be the degree of pass 
through.  
In what follows three scenarios are presented, 
  a perfectly competitive case where all the costs arising from the VAT charge are 
passed through; 
  an imperfect competitive case where only 50% of these costs are passed through; and  
  a central scenario with 60% to 90% of costs passed through, with the exact amount 
determined by the extent of competition on the particular route. 
Assumption 2: the percentages of passengers that are travelling for business and non-
business reasons. For many business passengers, it is possible to reclaim input VAT from 
the price of a ticket used for business purposes. For these travellers the real cost of a 
ticket is thus the same regardless of the rate of VAT charged. However, it is also the case 
that in countries where businesses can deduct input VAT from business travel, there are 
certain sectors which are already exempt from VAT and thus do not have a right of 
deduction.  Furthermore, in some countries business travellers do not have the right to 
reclaim VAT whatever their VAT status. These variations mean that for any particular 
journey the number of travellers that are affected by differential rates of VAT will vary. 
For example, an international rail journey commencing or terminating in France will 
attract 5.5% VAT on that part of the journey within France (save for exemptions, see 
Appendix 3.2). As business passengers cannot reclaim the VAT, all passengers will pay 
the full, VAT-inclusive, price. On the other hand, for an international rail journey 
commencing or terminating in the Netherlands, only non-business travellers and business 
travellers in the sectors which are VAT-exempt will be affected. Thus a significant 
number of (business) travellers will be able to reclaim VAT and will therefore be 
unaffected by the difference in VAT treatment between rail and air
113.  This example also 
applies to coach travel which is significant in the long distance leisure segment only. 
The proportion of business passengers is assumed to range between 20% and 30%
114 and 
reflects the amount of leisure passengers, particularly tourists, that a route is likely to 
attract. For business travellers who have the right to deduct VAT, the assumption is made 
that 50% of business travellers do not enter a claim for VAT incurred on the journey. 
                                                      
112 The objective is to provide an upper and lower limit of the tax created distortions and we have therefore 
made the same assumptions across all routes examined. 
113 In practice, as already indicated not all business passengers will reclaim their VAT because of the 
administrative issues involved. 
114 This assumption is consistent with the business–non-business split shown in Table 3.2. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




This reflects an estimate of the size of the VAT-exempt sector and an additional 
allowance for the disincentive effect of complicated deductibility procedures. 
Assumption 3: assumptions about cross-elasticities of demand between the modes. A 
cross-elasticity of demand measures the impact of a price increase in one mode of 
transport on the demand for another mode of transport. As mentioned earlier, studies have 
found that the average cross-elasticity of demand between rail and air transport is about  
80% with estimates ranging from 50% to 150%. A cross-elasticity of demand of 80% 
between rail and air will mean that a 10% increase in rail fares will cause, all other things 
being equal, a 8% switch in the demand for transport away from rail towards air. These 
three values of cross-elasticities 50%, 80% and 150% are used in the modelling to 
produce a high, low and central scenario and represents the full range of possible 
outcomes. The high and low values of cross-elasticity of demand between coach and air 
transport used in calculating the distortions in the long distance leisure market are 50% 
and 150% respectively. 
4.7.4  VAT related distortions in the HSR segment
115 
Table 4.9 sets out the central scenario estimates of the distortions that arise from the 
existing VAT system, on the current and future routes identified under the HSR 
segment
116. In order to illustrate their calculation, the London–Brussels figures are 
discussed below in more detail. In addition, Table 4.10 shows the worst (first four 
columns) and best (last four columns) case estimates of the existing distortions. These 
two extremes have been produced by varying the assumptions about pass-through of 
VAT costs to fares, and the assumptions of price-elasticity for rail and for the cross-
elasticity of demand between air and rail. 
Table 4.9 shows that in the current intra-EU HSR segment, it is estimated that, as a 
result of the VAT difference, 15,300 passengers are currently travelling by air rather 
than rail and that 3,825 passengers are not travelling at all. By 2005, the estimates 
suggest that the HSR segment might have around 115,915 fewer passengers if the 
existing VAT induced distortions continued; this consists of 92,732 who have shifted to 
air travel and 23,183 who are not travelling at all.  In order to put these figures in 
perspective, the total size of the current HSR segment has been estimated at 10 million 
trips currently, and 32 million trips in 2005; the distortions represent, therefore about 
0.5% of the future HSR segment. 
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Table 4.9: VAT-related distortions in the HSR segment 
 Central  Scenario
1 










% of HSR 
traffic 
















HSR segment in 1994             
London–Brussels 1.3%  15,300 1.0% 0.4%  3,82 0.3%  0.1% 
London–Paris  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 0  0.1%  0.0% 
Total   15,300 0.4%  0.2%  3825  0.1%  0.0% 
Grand Total
 2   19,125 0.5%  0.2%       
              
HSR segment in 2005               
London–Brussels 1.3%  15,701 0.3% 0.3%  3,92 0.1%  0.1% 
London–Paris  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 
London–Amsterdam 1.3%  10,248 0.5% 0.3%  2,56 0.1%  0.1% 
London–Koln 4.1%  12,086 1.4%  1.0% 3,02 0.4%  0.2% 
London–Frankfurt 4.9%  39,479 2.6% 1.6%  9,87 0.7%  0.4% 
Stockholm–Copenhagen 0.0%  0  0.0% 0.0%  0    0.0%  0.0% 
Gothenburg–Copenhagen 0.0%  0  0.0% 0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
Paris–Brussels 1.3%  1,133 0.2% 0.2%  283  0.0%  0.0% 
Paris–Amsterdam 2.7%  6,131 0.5% 0.4%  1,53 0.1%  0.1% 
Paris –Koln  3.8%  3,288 0.8% 0.6%  822  0.2%  0.2% 
Rome–Munich 2.2%  1,957 1.2% 0.7%  489  0.3%  0.2% 
Paris–Milan  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 
Luxembourg–Strasbourg  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 0  0.0%  0.0% 
Brussels–Amsterdam 3.1% 1,693 0.4% 0.4%  423  0.1%  0.1% 
Amsterdam–Koln 3.7%  1,016 0.5% 0.4%  254  0.1%  0.1% 
Total       92,732 0.4%  0.3%  23,183 0.1% 0.1% 
Grand Total 
2    115,915 0.5%  0.4%      
Source: KPMG analysis 
Note: 
1 Central Scenario assumes a cross-elasticity of demand between rail and air of 80% and a pass-
through between VAT costs and fares between 60%-90% dependent on the amount of competition on a 
particular route 
2 Combined total of passengers not travelling and those who have switched to air. European Commission 
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Table 4.10 shows that in the current intra-EU HSR segment, the worst case estimates 
could mean that as many as 40,500 passengers are currently travelling by air rather 
than rail as a result of the VAT difference, and that 13,500 passengers are not 
travelling at all. The best case estimate could be as low as 6,000 and 600 respectively. 
By 2005, the estimates suggest that the HSR segment might have anywhere between 
36,203 and 295,900 fewer passengers if the existing VAT induced distortions 
continued; the distortions represent a range of 0.2% to 1.3% of the future HSR 
segment. 
In terms of the routes most affected there are clearly routes connecting the high VAT rate 
countries (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) with a relatively high proportion of the trip 
undertaken in the high VAT rate country;  these are: Amsterdam–Koln Paris–Koln, 
London–Frankfurt, London–Koln and Brussels–Amsterdam. 
To aid understanding of the figures in the first column, consider the worst case distortion 
for London–Brussels in the current 1994 market. It is necessary to begin by estimating 
the effective rate of VAT for each journey. Recall that VAT is charged at national rates 
on that part of the journey that takes place within national borders. So for London–
Brussels for example, the UK charges 0% VAT on international rail, while Belgium 
charges 6%. But approximately 33% of the journey takes place in the UK, 33% in France 
where no tax is charged on transit traffic, and 33% in Belgium. Therefore the VAT 
charged on a rail ticket between London and Brussels is about 2.0% (one third of the full 
6% VAT rate in Belgium). This compares to a zero VAT rate on air travel over the same 
route. 
Continuing with this example, it is assumed that 70% of the passengers are non-business 
and have to pay the full VAT inclusive price for their travel. Of the remaining 30%, by 
assumption 2 above, only half do in fact reclaim VAT.  In total, therefore, some 85% of 
passengers are unable to reclaim VAT and are affected by the distortion. When full pass 
through is assumed between VAT costs and final ticket prices, this means that the VAT 
distortion is 1.7% of the rail ticket price
117.  This is then the “VAT effective price 
distortion (% of rail price)” appearing in the first and fourth columns. 
By applying estimates of cross-elasticities of demand between air and rail, to these 
estimates of the effective percentage price distortions, it is possible to derive estimates of 
the volumes of passengers that are encouraged to shift from rail to air as a result. 
In terms of the impact of the distortion on the operators, clearly the most affected rail 
operators are the ones operating on the London–Brussels route currently;  in the 
future, the German and the Dutch rail operators will also be affected.  The “winners”, 
are obviously the air operators of the countries affected;  it is important to note, 
however, that the relative significance of intra-EU travel is greater for British Midland 
(which flies only on intra-EU routes) and Sabena/KLM (which fly no domestic routes 
(see figure 2.9)), compared to BA, Air France and Lufthansa. 
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Table 4.10: Best and worst case estimates of VAT-related distortions in the HSR 
segment. 
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HSR segment in 1994    Passenger Switching   Passenger  Switching 
London–Brussels 1.8%  40,500 2.7%  1.1% 0.8%  6,000  0.4%  0.2% 
London–Paris 0.0%  0 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
Total   40,500 1.0%  0.4%    6,000  0.1%  0.1% 
HSR segment in 2005               
London–Brussels 1.8%  41,561 0.9%  0.7% 0.8%  6,157  0.1%  0.1% 
London–Paris 0.0%  0 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
London–Amsterdam 2.7%  22,606 1.0%  0.7% 1.2%  3,349  0.2%  0.1% 
London–Koln 4.9%  26,661 3.1%  2.2% 2.2%  3,950  0.5%  0.3% 
London–Frankfurt 5.8%  87,086 5.8%  3.5% 2.6%  12,902  0.9%  0.5% 
Stockholm–Copenhagen 0.0%  0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0  0.0% 0.0% 
Gothenburg–Copenhagen 0.0%  0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0  0.0% 0.0% 
Paris–Brussels 2.3%  3,737 0.6% 0.5% 1.0%  557  0.1% 0.1% 
Paris–Amsterdam 3.8% 16,180 1.4%  1.1%  1.7%  2,413  0.2%  0.2% 
Paris –Koln  5.4%  8,675 2.0%  1.6% 2.4%  1,294  0.3%  0.2% 
Rome–Munich 3.8%  6,456 3.8%  2.3% 1.7%  963  0.6%  0.3% 
Paris–Milan 0.0%  0 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
Luxembourg–Strasbourg 0.0%  0 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
Brussels–Amsterdam 5.4% 5,601 1.4% 1.2% 2.4%  830  0.2% 0.2% 
Amsterdam–Koln 6.6%  3,361 1.8% 1.5% 2.9%  498  0.3% 0.2% 
Total of above      221,925 1.0%  0.7%    32,912  0.1%  0.1% 
    Passengers not travelling    Passengers not travelling 
HSR segment in 1994    13,500  0.3%  0.1%    600  0.0%  0.0% 
HSR segment in 2005    73,975  0.3%  0.2%    3,291  0.0%  0.0% 
    Total switching/not travelling Total switching/not travelling 
HSR segment in 1994    54,000 1.3%  0.5%    6,600  0.2%  0.1% 
HSR segment in 2005      295,900 1.3%  1.0%    36,203  0.2%  0.1% 
Source: KPMG analysis 
Note: The “best” case estimates assume a 50% pass-through between VAT costs and fares, a 10% increase 
in the estimate of the business share, an own price elasticity of -60% and a cross-elasticity of demand 
between air and rail of +50%. The “worst” case estimates assume a 100% pass-through between VAT costs 
and fares, a 10% decrease in the estimate of the business share, an own price elasticity of demand of -200% 
and a cross-elasticity of demand between rail and air of +150%. European Commission 
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4.7.5  Distortions related to VAT deductibility in the HSR segment 
To illustrate the relative significance of the different rules of deductibility of input VAT, 
two alternative scenarios regarding the ability of business travellers to reclaim VAT have 
been examined in the HSR segment.  In the first case, it was assumed that all business 
passengers can reclaim VAT so that only non-business travellers are affected by the VAT 
distortion.  In the second case, it was assumed that no business travellers can reclaim 
VAT, so that all business travellers are affected by the VAT distortion. 
Where all business travellers can reclaim VAT, the calculations show that, in the worst 
case scenario, some 4,500 fewer passengers (or just 0.1% of the current HSR segment) 
would switch to air, compared to the current situation.  In the future, the calculations 
suggest about 30,100 fewer (or just 0.1% of the future HSR segment) passengers would 
switch from rail to air.  If no business can reclaim VAT so that all passengers are equally 
affected by the VAT distortion then the exact opposite occurs with 6,000 and 30,100 
more passengers switching to air in the current and future markets respectively under the 
worst case scenario. 
In terms of passengers who have decided not to travel as a result of the existing distortion, 
calculations show that under the worst case scenario and where all business travellers can 
reclaim VAT some 1,500 fewer passengers (less than 0.1% of the current HSR segment) 
would decide not to travel compared to the current situation. In the future, this rises to 
7,536 fewer passengers (less than 0.1% of the future HSR segment) who decide against 
travelling. In the alternative scenario where no business can reclaim VAT the opposite 
result occurs again with 1,500 and 7,536 more passengers induced not to travel in the 
worst case scenario. 
These figures therefore suggest that quantitatively, the existence of different rules in 
terms of the ability of businesses to reclaim VAT has a relatively small effect on 
demand for travel;  harmonisation of the rules (either so that all VAT can be claimed 
back or no VAT can be claimed back) would have a very modest impact on demand, in 
the order of ±0.1% of the current or future HSR segments. 
4.7.6  VAT related distortions in the long distance intra-EU leisure segment 
The long distance leisure market open to competition, derived in Chapter 3, is estimated 
to be in the region of 11½ million passengers. In terms of the modal shares, the air market 
is the largest with 8 million passengers, while the rail and coach market accounts for 1.8 
and 1.6 million passengers respectively.  
Under the existing VAT system, best and worst case estimates for the level of VAT 
distortion in this market are shown in Table 4.11. The cross-elasticities of demand used in 
the analysis between rail and air range from 30% to 100%, with an average value of 50%. 
These are lower than the values used in the HSR distortion analysis, reflecting the lower 
substitution between modes in longer distance markets. For coach travel, cross-elasticities 
with air travel are assumed to be slightly higher, similar to the values in Table 4.1, 
ranging from 50% to 150% with an expected value of  80%. 
As an illustration of the calculation, consider the segment, Germany to or from Spain,  
which has been estimated to have a competitive market in the region of 638,000 trips  
consisting of 589,000 air and 157,000 rail/coach trips. The derivation of the relevant European Commission 
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market open to competition in the long distance leisure market is described in Appendix 
2. In short, the relevant market consists of all long distance coach and second class rail 
trips, with the exception of Greece, Sweden and Ireland which has an insignificant 
amount of demand, and air trips by the (very) price sensitive group, consisting of 
pensioners and the young who have time available to make switching to a slower mode a 
distinct possibility. 
Next, recall that rail and coach travel attract VAT rates of 15% in Germany, 0% in France 
and 7% in Spain. Assuming that for Germany-Spain journeys, 30% takes place in 
Germany, 40% in France and 30% in Spain, the effective VAT rate becomes 6.6%. 
Furthermore, as the market is made up entirely of leisure travellers, VAT cannot be 
reclaimed and this figure becomes the ‘VAT effective price distortion (% of rail/coach 
price)’. The volume of passengers who have shifted to air travel as a result of this VAT 
distortions can then be estimated by applying cross-elasticities of demand between the air 
and rail/coach market  
Table 4.11 shows that in the current intra-EU long-distance leisure segment, the worst 
case estimates could mean that around 191,958 fewer passengers exist in the rail/coach 
segment as a result of the VAT difference; this consists of 145,563 passengers who 
have switched to air and 46,395 passengers who are not travelling at all. The best case 
estimate could mean that there are only 29,113 fewer passengers in the rail/coach 
segment. These total figures represent a range of 0.3% to 1.7% of the long distance 
leisure segment, or 0.8% to 5.5% of the rail/coach segment. 
 European Commission 
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Table 4.11: VAT-related distortions in the long distance leisure market. 
    Worst case    Best case 






























% of   
rail/coach 
traffic 
% of  
total 
traffic  
    Passengers switching    Passengers switching 
Austria-Spain 4.1%  320  4.1%  0.2% 2.1%  48  0.6%  0.0% 
Austria-UK 9.2%  9,083  10.2%  3.7% 4.6%  1,409  1.6%  0.6% 
Belgium-Spain 4.0%  8,159  5.8%  2.7% 2.0%  1,349  1.0%  0.4% 
Denmark-Spain 6.0%  5,417  8.9% 3.9% 3.0%  902  1.5%  0.7% 
France-Ireland 0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
France-Portugal 2.8%  13,482  3.5% 1.8% 1.4%  2,150  0.6%  0.3% 
France-Spain 3.8%  35,282  4.2%  1.9% 1.9%  5,486  0.7%  0.3% 
France-UK 0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
Germany-Portugal 4.5%  1,326  6.2% 0.7% 2.3%  217  1.0%  0.1% 
Germany-Spain 6.6%  7,756  8.3% 0.6% 3.3%  1243  1.3%  0.1% 
Germany-UK 8.4%  30,999  10.9%  2.7% 4.2%  5001  1.8%  0.4% 
Italy-Netherlands 7.9%  9,027  9.8% 3.4% 4.0%  1443  1.6%  0.5% 
Italy-Spain 2.5%  4,363  3.1%  1.3% 1.2%  701  0.5%  0.2% 
Italy-UK 0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
Netherlands-Spain 4.3%  2,403  5.7% 0.8% 2.1%  390  0.9%  0.1% 
Portugal-UK 2.3%  689  3.4%  0.3% 1.1%  115  0.6%  0.0% 
Spain-UK 2.5%  4,189  3.6%  0.4% 1.2%  695  0.6%  0.1% 
Rest of EU  4.0%  13,072  4.7% 1.6% 2.0%  2050  0.7%  0.1% 
Sub Total of above    145,563 4.2% 1.3%    23,198 0.5%  0.2% 
   Passengers not travelling    Passengers not travelling 
Sub  Total   46,395  1.3%  0.4%   5915  0.2%  0.1% 
   Total switching/not travelling   Total switching/not travelling 
Grand Total    191,958 5.5%  1.7%    29,113  0.8%  0.3% 
Source: KPMG analysis 
Note: Best case estimates assume a 50% pass-through between VAT costs and fares, a cross-elasticity of 
demand between air and rail of +30%, and between air and coach of +50%. The worst case estimates 
assume a 100% pass-through between VAT costs and fare, a cross-elasticity of demand between air and rail 
of +100%, and between air and coach of +150% European Commission 
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4.7.7  VAT related distortions for overnight rail services 
Recall from Chapter 3 that the number of passengers open to competition in the 
air/overnight rail  segment is estimated at 1.5 million, consisting of 0.2 million overnight 
rail passenger trips while the remainder is from scheduled air. Table 4.12 gives a brief 
summary of the distortions that arise under the existing VAT regime for a best and worst 
case scenario. The same assumptions with respect to pass-through of VAT costs to fares, 
proportion of VAT reclaimed, price-elasticity and cross-elasticity of demand as in the 
HSR analysis above have been used in this analysis. 
Table 4.12: Best and worst case estimates of VAT-related distortions in the 
overnight rail segment. 




































Austria-France 3.2%  643 3.2%  1.5%  1.6%  96  0.5%  0.2% 
Austria-Netherlands 4.0% 447 4.0% 1.5%  2.0%  67  0.6%  0.2% 
Belgium-France 0.6%  62 0.6%  0.2%  0.3% 9  0.1%  0.0% 
France-Germany 2.0%  181 2.0%  0.3%  1.0%  27  0.3%  0.0% 
France-Italy 0.0%  0 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0  0.0%  0.0% 
France-Netherlands 1.2% 142 1.2%  0.2%  0.6%  21  0.2%  0.0% 
Germany-Italy 2.7%  741 2.7%  0.4% 1.4%  111  0.4% 0.1% 
Germany-Sweden 3.9%  469 3.9%  0.8%  2.0% 70  0.6%  0.1% 
Rest of EU  2.2%  1194 2.2%  0.3%  1.1%  179  0.3%  0.0% 
Total (switching)  2.2%  3879 1.8% 0.3% 1.1%  582  0.3% 0.0% 
    Passengers not travelling    Passengers not travelling 
Total (generated)    1164  0.5%  0.1%    194  0.1%  0.0% 
    Total switching/not travelling Total switching/not travelling 
Grand Total    5043 2.3%  0.3%    776  0.4%  0.1% 
Source: KPMG analysis 
Table 4.12 shows that in the current intra-EU overnight rail segment, the effect of the 
existing VAT induced distortions is between 776 and 5,043 fewer passengers in the 
segment. These figures representing between 0.4% and 2.3% of the overnight rail 
segment, but are less than 0.1% of the overall medium-distance intra-EU market. European Commission 
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4.8  The impact of the regulation, externalities and other factors. 
This section builds on the analysis of the preceding section, by examining other factors 
which affect modal competition and market distortion. In this respect we examined the 
following : 
  other non-VAT related distortions based on the advantages and disadvantages of 
particular modes, such as: 
-  the regulatory environment and extent of subsidies; 
-  externalities not fully reflected in the price charged to the consumer 
-  other factors dependent on particular modal characteristics such as ticketing, 
employee efficiency etc; 
  alternative business strategies where operators, instead of passing the VAT increase 
onto customers,  modify their pricing structure; and  
  the implications for the VAT induced distortions. 
4.8.1  Distortions due to the regulatory environment 
There are a number of regulatory and other factors which will influence, albeit indirectly, 
the choice of transport mode (see Section 3.2 for a fuller discussion) and hence influence 
the level of distortion with respect to modal competition.  Some of the most important 
factors are summarised below: 
  the level of market regulations. Many Member States apply controls on the availability 
of scheduled coach services. This means that, all other things equal, coach travel is at 
a competitive disadvantage compared to other modes and that any VAT increase 
would produce a greater shift in demand away from coach than might otherwise have 
been the case. In addition, for all modes many Member States favour domestic 
operators over foreign operators in areas such as access to infrastructure etc. and using 
safety or technical rules to create barriers to entry for competitors; 
  the extent of subsidies in the market. These are most significant in the rail market 
where many Member States use them to maintain essential services, to promote 
economic development in certain areas or to achieve a wider social objective. It is 
clear that much of the subsidies would continued to be paid by Member States even 
under a new VAT regime, thus creating an artificial advantage over other modes; 
  the availability of infrastructure, illustrated in capacity problems such as congestion. 
This is most problematic in the air market where the lack of current capacity at many 
airports has meant that new entrant airlines cannot easily obtain departure slots. 
Furthermore, the signs are that these airports may also not be able to deliver this 
necessary capacity in the future. This will limit the extent to which air would be able 
to service increased demand as a result of any changes in rail and coach travel market 
such as VAT; 
  non cost factors such as the opportunity to maintain work productivity. This means 
that certain slower modes have an enhanced competitive position such as rail 
compared to air; European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




  ticketing issues where the process is standardised for air travel, but not so for other 
modes. Thus air travel will have a competitive advantage over the other modes. This 
will be partially offset by the fact that coach and rail are more active in the provision 
of railcards, unlimited travel passes and discount travel and will therefore have an 
advantage in the (very) price sensitive leisure segment; and 
  the extent of state ownership. These companies are unlikely to be able to reduce costs 
in the same way as private operators due to factors such as inflexible work force or 
more rigid investment criteria preventing cost savings through wage reductions and 
through the purchase of new capital equipment respectively. In these situations, the 
operator might pass on the VAT full levy to the customer in which case the distortive 
effect is more likely to occur than in the case where all the VAT is absorbed by the 
operator. 
In addition, in a report by Cranfield University
118 the analysis of the disparity between air 
fares on similar length routes air market identified a number of other important factors. 
For example, cross-border fares were found to more expensive than those levied on 
domestic routes of similar distance (especially for fully flexible fares) even though 
deregulation and competition is greater in the international air market than in the 
domestic market. The explanations given for these findings are: 
  regulatory control differs between the intra-EU and domestic markets. EU 
liberalisation has caused fares to fall in the intra-EU market whereas in the domestic 
market price controls has produced much lower fares as governments follow other 
social and regional economic objectives. Cross-subsidising has been a major part of 
this strategy. This is where an operator artificially lowers fares in the domestic market, 
with profits from international services. This can be observed in practice in the Italian 
market, where fare per kilometre is lower in the domestic market than in the 
international market, despite the domestic market attracting a 10% VAT levy. 
Furthermore, the condition for Air Inter, Alitalia and Iberia to retain monopoly status 
is that they operate loss-making domestic services; 
  the effect of rail competition on domestic services. In France and Germany for 
example, some routes are highly efficient and act as a substitute for air travel. 
Furthermore, subsidies often mean rail has significantly lower fares. However, for 
intra-EU travel competition is much less due to the poor integration of national rail 
networks. Among one of the major exceptions is the London-Paris Channel Tunnel 
route where rail does have a significant impact on the level of passenger traffic; and  
  carriers operating on intra-EU routes incur higher costs such as catering, airline lounge 
facilities and airport user charges which are generally much larger in the international 
market. 
Finally, in March 1997, there was a re-introduction in the United States of a 10% federal 
levy on domestic journeys. However, as this is a sales tax it is applied directly to 
customers and does not enter the decision making process of operators. Although this tax 
does not currently apply to domestic legs of international journeys it may do so in the 
near future. The US congress is expected to reach a decision in late 1997 with regard to 
this issue.  
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In this situation, EU operators will also be subject to the tax and issues of unequal 
enforcement which run parallel to those in the EU market may arise. At present, they do 
not as the sales tax applies to the domestic market only; a segment in which EU operators 
have only a marginal presence. This may change with the EU-US open skies agreement in 
the future 
4.8.2  Distortions due to the environmental externalities 
The size of the other distortions, particularly in the case of environmental externalities, 
are also quite significant. For example, it has been estimated that the external costs of 
land transport account for up to 5% of GDP (consisting mainly of air pollution 0.4%, 
noise 0.2%, accidents 1.5% and congestion 2.0%). Estimates suggest that 90% of these 
costs are related to road transport.  
In the case of air transport, less information is known, but it is widely accepted that it is 
more environmentally damaging than rail and coach travel. It could also be argued that air 
transport has an competitive advantage over modes as the externalities are not reflected in 
either the price mechanism or the VAT system where air transport currently benefits from 
zero VAT rates in a number of Member States. 
Those countering this argument tend to state these costs are fully addressed by other 
forms of taxation, such as fuel taxes, departure taxes (paid by customers), landing charges 
(in the form of fines for excess noise) and access costs paid by operators for core 
infrastructure such as airports and air traffic control. The impact of these charges, 
however, remains unclear. For example, most airports have noise limits (particularly near 
residential areas) which affects airlines’ costs, as it takes longer to reach optimum 
cruising height, but a report by the OECD
119 concluded that the overall efficiency of these 
charges on the reduction of noise was low and that they did not influence the choice of 
aircraft. However, a report on the situation in Germany
120 suggested that some reductions 
in noise have been achieved. These issues have also been addressed in a recent report
121 
which attempts to develop a coherent plan for airport charges within the EU to ensure the 
internalisation of all external costs, such as noise, pollution and congestion. 
4.8.3  The importance of other business strategies 
Taxation has an effect on fares with an increase in the rate of taxation accompanied by an 
increase in fares. However, the exact magnitude of any rise would be dependent on a 
number of other factors, most notably the level of competition and the extent to which 
other business strategies are followed. The following examples provide an illustration of 
how competition effects fares: 
  fares on the Berlin-Frankfurt route are between 20% to 40%
122  (depending on ticket 
type) greater than on the Berlin-Munich route even though distances are 
approximately equal and  both routes are subject to the same regime. The main reason 
for these differentials is the level of competition which is considerably higher on the 
Munich route where both Lufthansa and British Airways compete heavily.  
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  on the Brussels-Copenhagen route the entry of Virgin Express into the market caused 
fares to fall by up to two-thirds which is far in excess of any impact that the level of 
taxation is likely to have. These effects are likely to become more widespread as low-
cost operators enter the market more frequently; the particular markets where this 
happens is described previously  in detail in Chapter 3. 
  leisure fares in real terms on the Berlin-Frankfurt route before German unification are 
approximately the same as fares (including VAT) after unification, whereas the 
business fares have increased by nearly 40%
123. This is an important finding as, after 
unification, the journey was subject to a domestic VAT rate of 15%. Thus, to remain 
competitive, the full VAT rate has not been passed on to the customer but part 
absorbed by the operator and part passed onto the business traveller who is less price 
sensitive and has the opportunity to reclaim VAT. 
The above examples show that the level of competition is clearly important in 
determining air fares with the level of fares varying by up to 40% according to the extent 
of competition on a particular route. Thus, the impact of VAT will be less important than 
competition and their will be considerable scope of operators use alternative strategies 
such as absorbing the VAT increase or changing fares in a particular sub-sector of the 
market rather than passing it onto consumers. 
Implications for the VAT induced distortions 
In terms of the implications of future developments, with respect to liberalisation and the 
regulatory environment on the VAT induced distortions, it is expected that the following 
are the most significant: 
  regulatory bodies, at the both the regional and international level will continue to 
respond to concerns about the environmental by the further internalisation of external 
costs. Any resulted charges will be directed more at road uses with a resultant 
potential benefit for rail and coach travel as consumers shift away from the car. 
  in the air market, the third package European liberalisation measures, is now more 
effectively impacting the industry; and 
  in the rail sector the  community’s railway policy implies a gradual liberalisation. 
The forecasts and the modelling exercise reflect as many of these characteristics of the 
transport market as possible. For example: 
  a change in the regulation or the supply side characteristics of the market (determined 
by factors such as infrastructure availability, congestion etc.) is reflected in the high 
and low values of the own-price and cross-price elasticities used; and  
  the extent of alternative business strategies is reflected in the differing pass through 
rates used; 
To summarise, the impact of VAT is relatively less important than other issues such as 
the level of competition present in markets and the extent of regulatory control. In 
addition, there is the possibility of operators undertaking alternative business strategies 
instead of passing the VAT onto consumers. 
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4.9  Conclusions 
Taxation, by leading to higher prices, leads to lower demand for trips;  the extent of the 
reduction depends on how sensitive demand for trips is to price.  Demand for business 
travel is less price-sensitive and, therefore, would fall less than leisure travel for any 
given increase in VAT. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 has shown that different modes of passenger transport compete 
at different distances.  In terms of the competitive impact of different VAT treatment of 
different modes, the preceding analysis has shown that it is possible to tax different 
modes differently without adverse competitive impacts as long as they do not compete in 
the same market. 
Current domestic VAT systems 
In the majority of Member States there is no VAT-induced distortion of competition 
between transport modes in the domestic market because the same VAT rate is applied to 
each. 
Current intra-EU VAT systems 
Six Member States (including Germany and France) have variations in the VAT rates 
between modes for intra-EU travel.  The most significant distortion is between rail and air 
travel with higher VAT rates levied on domestic legs of international journeys by rail and 
coach than by air in five Member States. 
The main justification for different VAT treatment for air and rail/coach for international 
journeys is the complexity of international passenger transport including the difficulties 
of applying any distance-based rules;  in particular the risk of creating a competitive 
disadvantage for national airline operators vis-à-vis other EU and international operators.  
This was not expected to create any significant distortions as international rail journeys 
are a very small proportion of total, and air was considered to compete with rail/coach in 
a relatively small sub-segment of the market. 
Business travel – deductibility of VAT 
The imposition of VAT will not affect demand for business travel if the business is able 
to recover the VAT.  The extent to which the imposition of VAT will affect demand for 
business travel is, therefore, dependent upon whether the VAT can be recovered by the 
business.  Six Member States do not permit deduction of tax incurred on business travel.  
Even in those Member States where the tax is deductible in principle, many businesses do 
not do so because of the requirement to obtain documentation; which can be burdensome, 
or because their particular business activities do not give rise to a right to deduct VAT. 
Variations in the rights of business travellers to reclaim VAT do not in themselves give 
rise to competitive distortions as the variation is between Member States rather than 
between modes. Variation in the procedures for reclaiming VAT also do not in 
themselves give rise to a distortion but will affect the overall impact of the distortion by 
discouraging business from reclaiming their VAT so that they in fact make their travel 
decisions on the basis of the full VAT-inclusive fares. 
However, these variations have an impact on the number of travellers who are affected by 
any VAT-induced distortion and therefore the overall size of any mode-transfer that 
occurs. European Commission 
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In terms of the quantitative significance of the competitive distortions arising from the 
existence of different rules relating to the deductibility of input VAT, the analysis on the 
HSR routes suggests that even in the worst case scenario these are very modest.  In view 
of the fact that the HSR segment covers the vast majority of journeys where business 
travellers have  choice between alternative modes of transport (excluding the car), the 
results for the whole of the intra-EU business passenger transport segment will be bigger 
but of a very similar magnitude. 
Distortions arising from the current VAT system 
The analysis shows that the passenger transport segments, where there may be a 
competitive economic impact from VAT created distortions, are the HSR (current and 
future networks), overnight rail and long-distance leisure segments. 
In the current intra-EU HSR segment, the central estimate could mean that the HSR 
segment might have around 19,125 (0.5% of current HSR traffic) fewer passengers as a 
result of the VAT difference. The high and low estimates range from 54,000 and 6,600 
fewer passengers respectively. The exact figure depends on the extent to which VAT gets 
passed on to higher prices and the magnitude of the sensitivity of demand for air travel to 
changes in prices of rail travel.  It is estimated that there are no distortions between HSR 
and coach travel. 
By 2005, the estimates suggest that HSR might have anywhere between 36,203 and 
295,900 fewer passengers if the existing VAT-induced distortion was not removed. This 
distortion represents up to 1.3% of HSR traffic, although the estimates are more modest 
in terms of the overall medium-distance intra-EU market (estimated to be around 55 
million trips and growing to 91 million in 2005). 
In addition, conventional rail also experiences distortions, particular with respect to 
overnight rail services. However this is a very small market and therefore, the magnitude 
of the distortion is very low, with at most only 5,000 fewer overnight rail passengers in 
the segment as a result of the VAT difference. 
In the long-distance leisure segment the scale of the distortion is much greater since the 
segment is more price-sensitive and no passengers can reclaim VAT. Estimates suggest 
that in the current market, between 29,100 (0.8% of the rail/coach segment) and 192,000 
(5.5% of the rail/coach segment) are currently not travelling in the rail/coach segment; 
these figures consist of passengers who have either diverted to air mode or who have 
decided not to travel. 
Distortions arising from practical differences in the implementation of the VAT system 
Many Member States do not implement the legislative provisions relating to passenger 
transport services carried out within domestic territory in a uniform manner.  This results 
in distortions which, in general, impact unfairly on the domestic operators because the 
obligations of non-domestic transport operators are not being observed. 
For journeys with a stop-over within a Member State of the EU the possibility arises of 
different VAT treatment between the operators of that Member State and other operators.  
These discrepancies have implications for the competitive position of different operators 
within the same mode. 
In those countries where the positive VAT rate is applied in practice on the domestic leg 
of an air journey, demand for air passenger transport would favour a direct trip rather than 
a stop-over trip. European Commission 
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Also, where the domestic leg of an international air journey is not taxed in practice (e.g. 
France), an additional distortion is introduced between air and rail in the domestic market. 
This is likely to be occur where there is an important HSR network which competes with 
air. Obviously, such a distortion will become more significant as the HSR network 
develops in the future. 
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5 Options for change in the intra-EU passenger 
transport market: harmonised VAT rate/multi VAT 
rates 
5.1  Introduction 
The key findings emerging from the analysis so far and the following: 
  the application of different levels of VAT across modes of transport causes 
competitive distortions only to the extent that different modes competing with each 
other are treated differently for VAT purposes. The segmentation of the EU passenger 
transport market has revealed that this is potentially the case in three sub-segments: 
the intra-EU medium-distance HSR segment (where air competes with HSR for leisure 
and business), the intra-EU medium-distance overnight rail segment (where air 
competes with rail for business) and the long-distance intra-EU segment (where air 
competes with rail and coach, mainly for leisure); 
  the key VAT-related distortions under the present taxation system are created through 
positive VAT rates for intra-EU rail (and coach) journeys, in some Member States, 
compared with VAT exemptions for air.  A quantitative assessment of the impact of 
this distortion in the medium-distance HSR segment revealed that it could be 
significant for HSR operators as around 1% of demand for HSR trips could be 
diverted to air
124. The assessment also showed, however, that the distortion is 
relatively insignificant when compared to the overall size of the medium-distance 
market; 
  the quantitative assessment of competitive distortions arising from different rules on 
the right of business travellers to reclaim VAT has revealed that any such impact is 
negligible (see Chapter 4); and 
  intra-EU travel forms a substantial proportion of EU air operators’ business.  Intra-EU 
travel, on the other hand, represents a very small proportion of the rail operators’ total 
turnover. 
This section explores how each of the four, alternative taxation options would work in 
practice for intra-EU travel only under a harmonised and multi-VAT rate scenario. 
Domestic and international issues are discussed in Chapter 6.  For each of these options, 
the discussion is organised as follows: 
  first, a discussion of some general issues specific to the taxation option, but applicable 
to both the harmonised and multi-VAT rate scenario such as  
-  definition options; 
-  modal specific issues; 
-  tax deduction issues for purchasers; 
  second, an analysis of the effects of a positive VAT rate harmonised across the modes 
with respect to the: 
                                                      
124 Recall that this is one of the two segments only and that the figures refer to an evaluation of distortions 
created solely as a result of different VAT treatment. European Commission 
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-  practical impact; 
-  economic impact; 
-  fiscal impact; 
  third, an analysis of the effects under the present, multi VAT rate arrangements with 
respect to the practical, economic and fiscal impact. 
In determining the scope of any new taxation system for transport services supplied 
within the EU, it is important that operators and fiscal authorities have clear definitions 
within which to work.  The following sections explore the various options available and 
build on many of the issues originally identified within the Council Directive Proposal 
COM (1992) 416 (“the 1992 Proposal”).  These sections also recognise the contents of 
COM 328 (96), “A Common System of VAT – A programme for the Single Market” 
(“The 1996 Working Programme”), a document which outlines the Commission’s plans 
for the future EU VAT system.  Prior to the 1992 and 1996 documents, the Commission 
submitted or intended to submit to the Council a proposal for the VAT treatment of 
passenger transport (including international transport) for the second Directive of 1968 
and the Sixth Directive of 1977. 
First of all, however, some general issues are discussed about the overall effects of a new 
taxation system. 
5.2  Scope and basis of taxation 
The current taxation system enables a Member State to tax all passenger transport 
services carried out within its borders, but only to the extent of the distance physically 
travelled within those borders.  This concept has led to the need for operators to segment 
their ticketing revenues and, in certain instances, to account for tax to a number of 
different fiscal authorities.  Purchasers of travel services have as a consequence incurred a 
multi-jurisdiction VAT charge within a single ticket price. 
Chapter 4 outlined the technical difficulties inherent within the current system.  In 
summary, these included:  
  different VAT treatment according to mode;  
  inconsistent enforcement of VAT legislation according to origin of operator; and  
  difficulties in securing a refund of VAT for business customers.   
It is important that any new taxation system provides certainty, impacts fairly on all 
transport operators (irrespective of their origin), is easier for operators and purchasers in 
terms of compliance, and is efficient to administer for EU fiscal authorities.  These aims 
are consistent with those set out within the 1992 and 1996 Documents. 
The 1992 Proposal, which envisaged a move to a “place of departure” taxation system, 
anticipated that travel to or from a third country would not be taxed (save for certain 
journeys commencing or terminating within 30 kilometres of the external EU border).  
This represented a fundamental move away from the principle of taxation according to 
distance travelled and, in consequence, from the concept of segmentation of ticketing 
revenues for journeys which include more than one Member State. 
The 1996 Working Programme envisages a move towards a “single place of taxation for 
operators” with businesses carrying out transactions within the EU being registered for European Commission 
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VAT in their “home” Member State.  As a result, all transactions performed within the 
EU would be subject to VAT at the appropriate rate in force in the operator’s home 
country; similarly, the operator would be entitled to deduct VAT incurred in its home and 
other Member States on its “domestic” VAT return.  Such a system would, however, need 
to ensure that non-EU operators were brought within the scope of EU VAT (if performing 
taxable transactions within the EU) on the same basis as EU-domiciled operators. 
5.3  Place of taxation options: the departure option 
This section explores the impact of the departure option in, respectively, a harmonised 
and multi VAT rate scenario.  
The section is organised as follows: 
  first, a discussion of some general issues which apply to both the harmonised and 
multi-VAT rate scenario. 
  second, a discussion of the impact under a 
-  harmonised VAT rate scenario; and  
-  multi-VAT rate scenario. 
The departure option, in a harmonised VAT rate scenario, would mean that operators 
would be subject to a VAT charge, on ticketing revenue, for all domestic and intra-EU 
journeys. 
Under the multi-VAT scenario, operators would be subject to a VAT charge, on ticketing 
revenue, for journeys which commenced in those Member States which currently apply a 
positive rate of VAT to passenger transport.  Effectively, the VAT treatment of domestic 
passenger transport services (within a single Member State) would be unchanged.   
However, for journeys departing from a Member State which introduces a positive rate of 
VAT on domestic passenger transport, this option could result in a VAT charge falling 
due on the whole of that journey where the journey terminates in another Member State. 
5.3.1  Definition options 
The departure point could be defined as the place where the principal service begins 
(excluding any “feeder” services which transport the traveller to the place of principal 
departure).  This approach would be consistent with the place of departure definition 
contained within the 1992 Proposal.  If it is decided to tax “intra-EU legs” of international 
journeys, the place of departure for inbound journeys could be defined as the external EU 
frontier. 
In circumstances where operators issue “through” tickets (which involve the passenger 
travelling with a number of transport operators using a ticket issued by a single operator), 
one option would be to define the “place of departure” as the place of first departure (as 
shown on the traveller’s ticket).  This approach would apply irrespective of the fact that a 
number of different transport operators might be involved in the transportation of the 
passenger.  This treatment would mirror industry practice and simplify tax accounting. 
As far as non-EU operators providing passenger transport services within the EU are 
concerned, a mechanism will need to be put into place to ensure that such operators bring 
VAT due to account.  In this context, operators could be required to appoint their European Commission 
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handling agent (or another intermediary) as their tax representative in each Member State 
from which their services depart. 
5.3.1.1  Documentation Issues 
Whichever definition is adopted, operators’ accounting and ticketing systems will have to 
identify the place of departure for each journey.  This will facilitate operator’s VAT 
accounting, fiscal authority verification and input VAT deduction/refund for business 
customers.  It is understood that, in general, operators’ systems are geared to producing 
this information and showing the place of departure on the face of the traveller’s ticket.  
The information on the traveller’s ticket should, therefore, enable business customers to 
enter VAT deduction or refund claims with relative ease.  Although operators’ systems 
may not be able to itemise the VAT charge, separately, on the ticket, the detail shown 
should be sufficient for the purposes of the customers’ VAT accounting. 
5.3.1.2  Return Journeys 
The 1992 Proposal considered the treatment of return journeys (where the traveller buys a 
single ticket, for a single price, for both the outbound and return leg of his trip).  The 
Proposal concluded that such return journeys would generally be considered as two 
separate supplies. 
Under the departure option, a VAT charge would arise in two separate Member States for 
every intra-EU journey.  Operators would, therefore, be required to segment ticketing 
revenues for VAT accounting purposes; since the ticket would have been priced in a 
single currency, there would also be currency conversion issues to address.  In addition, 
business customers would have incurred a VAT charge in two jurisdictions and might 
need to use the same document (the travel ticket) as evidence to support input VAT 
deduction in two different Member States. 
5.3.1.3  Round Trips 
Increasingly, transport operators are offering their customers the facility to travel on 
“round trips” on a single ticket (for a single price).  For example, customers may make 
the following journey on a single ticket: London-Paris, Paris-Vienna, Vienna-Manchester. 
The effect of treating each journey as a separate supply, under the departure option, 
would mean that operators would be required to segment ticketing revenues into three and 
account for local VAT in three Member States.  Since business customers would have 
suffered a VAT charge in three jurisdictions, they may be faced with having to lodge an 
EU Eighth or Thirteenth Directive claim in each of these countries. 
5.3.1.4  Stopovers 
Stop overs occur most commonly in the airline sector but can also arise in the long 
distance sea and road markets.  Typically, a passenger would purchase a single ticket at a 
fixed price, but the terms of the ticket would enable the traveller to “stopover” for one or 
more nights at an immediate destination.  For example, flight from Lisbon to Helsinki 
may stopover in Frankfurt, enabling the traveller to break his journey there. 
If both legs of the journey were treated as separate supplies for VAT purposes, under the 
departure option, the operator would again need to account for VAT in two Member European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




States out of the revenue earned from a single ticket.  Further, EU Eighth and Thirteenth 
Directive claims would be made more difficult for purchasers of travel services. 
5.3.2  Modal Specific Issues 
5.3.2.1  Airlines 
It is understood that most, if not all, airlines which currently operate within the EU are 
registered for VAT purposes in those Member States from where they operate flights.  
Currently, because of the widespread exemptions extended to domestic, intra-EU and 
international passenger air transport, airlines enjoy a net refund of VAT paid on local 
expenditure. 
Airline ticketing is standardised on a worldwide basis.  A number of computerised 
databases are in use and, before a seat can be booked, a travel agent must access the 
appropriate reservation system to determine whether a seat on the desired flight is 
available.  The standardisation of airline ticketing would enable VAT to be brought to 
account on those flights which are designated as liable to VAT.  Flight tariffs are set by 
the airlines themselves and it should a relatively straightforward task for them to set VAT 
inclusive tariffs for those flights upon which VAT is chargeable. 
There are, however, certain arrangements, common to the airline industry, which must be 
addressed before any new VAT system could be implemented.  The main issues concern 
transferability of tickets, through ticketing, the treatment of transit and stopover 
passengers, the impact on the IATA clearing house system and, finally, the position of 
non-EU carriers. 
The sophistication of the various computerised reservation systems within the airline 
industry enable tickets to be issued by agents anywhere in the world for any route in the 
world.  Accordingly, it is possible for a traveller to purchase a ticket from Milan to 
Madrid at a travel agent’s shop in New York.  Further, the ticket can be issued in the 
name of the carrier which does not actually operate the route in question.  In these 
circumstances, the responsibility for carrying the passenger will transfer to another 
operator. 
Where the issuing carrier is not the uplifting carrier, a financial settlement will take place 
between the two airlines.  However, the amount of the settlement will not always 
correspond with the original price of the ticket (billed to the traveller).  All airlines have 
entered into bi-lateral agreements with each other and these agreements fix the level of 
remuneration in circumstances where the issuing carrier is not the uplifting carrier.   
Similarly, in circumstances where a passenger purchases a through ticket for a single 
price but changes airlines en route, the settlement is also determined by agreement 
between the two airlines concerned. 
Finally, customers may transfer from one flight to another without any adjustment in their 
ticket price.  For example, a passenger who has bought a British Airways ticket from 
London to Brussels could arrange a transfer to Sabena for no additional consideration.  
Although the passenger may have paid £300 (UK Sterling) to British Airways, the 
amount British Airways pays Sebana in settlement could either be above or below this 
figure is totally dependent on the bi-lateral agreement between the parties. European Commission 
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Financial settlement of these transactions (known as “interline” transactions) is effected 
through the IATA clearing house system.  The IATA system does not, however, store 
data; merely acts as a post-box, receiving and distributing invoices issued, usually on a 
monthly basis, by the participating airlines.  Settlements via the IATA system have 
historically been on a tax exclusive basis since the clearing house procedures are not 
designed to cope with tax on the transactions which they process.  However, it is 
understood that a number of airlines have unofficially agreed that charges for passenger 
taxes may be passed through the system. 
To date, the airline industry has not defined clear rules for transit passengers.  Because 
standard air tickets are generally valid for one year, it is possible that passengers may stop 
over, within an intermediate country, for a period of days, weeks or even months before 
continuing their journey to their ultimate destination.  The airline industry does not, 
however, keep detailed records of stopover durations and, as a result, may find it difficult 
to begin to do so for VAT purposes.  However, the experience of a major German airline 
suggests that breaks in journeys are becoming more widespread. 
For VAT purposes, a structure which recognised the issuing airline as principal is likely 
to be workable (although this structure will not strictly mirror the contractual position 
which deems each uplifting carrier involved to be a separate principal).  Subsequent 
settlement between uplifting airlines (involved at a later stage in the transportation in the 
passenger) could either be subject to VAT under the normal rules or, alternatively, the 
airline receiving the service could be permitted to account for the tax itself if it is VAT 
registered within the EU.  However, this would be dependant on the retention of the “tax 
shift” mechanism within the provisions of the  EU Sixth Directive. 
Under the departure option, it is clear that there will be a distribution of taxation revenues 
across a range of Member States, particularly if return journeys, stopovers, round trips 
and, possibly, transit journeys are treated as separate supplies for VAT purposes.  Further, 
the commercial nature of the airline industry (principally the “issuing airline” and 
“uplifting airline” arrangements), would also mean a more even distribution of taxation 
revenues across EU Member States. 
However, the departure option, for airlines, could be difficult to implement in terms of the 
capability of the airlines’ accounting and ticketing systems to segment VAT revenues, 
sometimes on a single ticket, across one or more EU Member States.  Precise VAT 
accounting, in this context, is likely to be achievable only by use of the IATA clearing 
house system (through which financial settlement, between airlines, is made).  VAT 
accounting as far as stopovers and transit passengers are concerned would be more 
difficult if those passengers did not change airline en route.  In these circumstances, 
special accounting arrangements would need to be made which were possibly similar to 
those adopted by a major German airline for stopovers within Germany. 
5.3.2.2  Rail 
The sophistication of the COTIF system and the legal relationship between all of the 
European Railway Operators would, in theory, facilitate the adoption of the departure 
option in the rail industry.  At present, a railway operator only acts as legal principal to 
the extent of the journey travelled within the territorial borders of its country.  This 
arrangement applies irrespective of the length of the journey and the number of countries 
through which the train passes.  On a journey on a single train through five Member 
States, therefore, the traveller technically contracts with five different railway operators European Commission 
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(with ticketing revenue re-patriated between the various operators involved through the 
COTIF system). 
In the rail industry, one option would be to define the “place of departure” as the first 
point through which the train travelled in each EU Member State.  This arrangement 
would mirror the contractual position and enable train operators to account for VAT 
relatively easily on their share of ticketing income.  Because the railway track is a fixed 
feature, the intra-railway charge, under the COTIF system, is dependent upon kilometres 
travelled on railway track within each Member State. This enables a precise distribution 
of ticketing revenues amongst the operators involved. 
However, a system under which the ticketing operator acted as principal for VAT 
purposes (for the whole of the journey) should also be workable.  This arrangement 
would mean that VAT would be payable in the Member State of first departure (on the 
full ticket price) by the operator involved.  Subsequent settlement between the other 
participating train operators, under the COTIF system, could either be dealt with by use 
of the “tax shift” mechanism or, alternatively, by a VAT charge at source.  Under the 
second option,  the ticketing operator would be required to lodge an EU Eighth Directive 
claim to recover the VAT paid to train operators in other Member States.  It is understood 
that the COTIF system would facilitate either structure. 
5.3.2.3  Road 
Co-operative agreements and joint ventures and becoming increasingly commonplace 
within the EU, for coach and bus operators. A ticket for a journey across the EU would 
typically be sold as principal by the coach operator residing in the Member State of first 
departure (which, usually, is the country in which the ticket is sold).  However, the return 
journey would typically be performed by a coach operator in the country of arrival of the 
outbound trip.  Although the coach operators do not have a clearing house system like 
that of the airlines and railway operators, there is a mechanism (usually a “revenue 
sharing” agreement) which re-patriates the revenues between the participants concerned. 
The contractual position usually involves the ticketing operator contracting with the 
customer as principal.  Other coach operators involved in the transportation of the 
passenger typically contract with the ticketing operator and financial settlement between 
the operators is made directly (and not through any third party clearing house mechanism 
as noted above).   
For major European operators (and routes), formal contractual agreements are in place 
between the operators participating in the co-operative arrangements and joint ventures.  
Under the departure option, the ticketing operator would be required to account for VAT 
at the rate in force in the country of first departure (which is usually the country in which 
the ticket is sold).  However, if the return journey is to be treated as a separate supply, the 
ticketing operator would be required to register for VAT in that country.  Since this 
operator is unlikely to be established in that country, an additional cost may arise for that 
operator by way of a requirement to appoint a fiscal representative to account for VAT on 
the operator’s behalf. 
For transactions between the ticketing operating and the sub-contracting operator, VAT 
could be brought to account (by the ticketing operator) under the “tax shift” mechanism 
or, alternatively a VAT charge could be made, at source, by the sub-contracting operator. 
In the latter case, the ticketing operator may be required to lodge an EU Eighth Directive European Commission 
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refund claim to recover the VAT paid, unless the ticketing operator is VAT registered in 
the country of the sub-contracting operator. 
5.3.2.4  Maritime 
The EU shipping and ferry industry issues “cumulative” tickets which enable the 
customer to stopover during the course of a particular journey for upto three nights.  For 
example, for a journey from Dublin to Hamburg, the passenger may legitimately break 
his or his journey in Zebrugge for upto three nights. 
Under the departure option, treating return tickets as a single supply could lead to a 
distortion in taxation revenue distribution.  This is particularly so as far as cross-channel 
traffic is concerned since some 70% of cross-channel passengers originate in the UK.  
Treating return tickets as a single supply for VAT purposes, therefore, would lead to a 
distortion of taxation revenues between the UK and France. 
The industry does not operate a standardised reservation or ticketing system nor a 
centralised clearing house. The industry, as a whole, is far less integrated than the rail and 
airline industries and route sharing arrangements are not common place.  The departure 
option, within the maritime industry, would be relatively simple to implement, therefore, 
particularly since the ticketing operator is almost invariably the carrying operator.  As 
such, there will be fewer inter-operator issues to address and VAT accounting should be 
far simpler as a result.   
Further, the major EU shipping and ferry operators are generally VAT registered in all 
EU Member States to/from they operate services.  This is to enable the operators to 
recover VAT paid on local expenditure and, in certain circumstances, to account for VAT 
on services provided in that Member State.  The introduction of the departure option, 
therefore, should not add significantly to the EU ferry and shipping industry compliance 
costs. 
5.3.3  Tax Deduction: purchasers 
If return journeys are treated as being supplied in the original country of departure, it is 
likely that a business traveller would be established in that country (since the travel ticket 
is likely to have been purchased in that country).  In such circumstances, the cost of tax 
deduction (if the Member State in question permits tax deduction for business travel) is 
likely to be low.  On the basis that the travel ticket serves as the evidence to support tax 
deduction (or refund), the additional cost would be negligible. 
Where the traveller incurs a VAT charge outside his home Member State, the position 
may be more complicated.  For business customers registered for VAT elsewhere in the 
EU, Eighth Directive Claims will need to be lodged (at least until the concept of “single 
place of taxation for operators” becomes reality).  The customer will need to finance the 
cost of the VAT incurred until the refund claim is paid.  Similarly, business customers 
based outside the EU will continue to have to lodge Thirteenth Directive refund claims 
(and, once again, finance the cost in the short to medium term).  Overall, the departure 
option is likely to increase the incidence of EU Eighth Directive claims noticeably and 
the incidence of EU Thirteenth Directive claims significantly (in comparison with the 
present arrangements). European Commission 
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As detailed above, where a single document embraces a VAT charge in two Member 
States (but in a single currency), there will be important tax deduction (or refund) issues 
to address.  Further, because of the ticketing arrangements which operate in the airline 
industry, a traveller’s ticket may embrace supplies from more than one airline (if each 
individual carrier acts as principal for VAT purposes) and a VAT charge in more than one 
Member State.  It should be noted overall, however, that it is estimated that no more than 
50% of business customers actually lodge EU Eighth and Thirteenth Directive refund 
claims. 
5.3.4  Harmonised VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the departure option 
under a harmonised rate scenario.  
5.3.4.1  Practical example 
For a rail journey from Denmark to Austria, Danish VAT would apply to the full ticket 
price.  Similarly, for a rail journey from Austria to Denmark, Austrian VAT would apply 
to the full ticket price. Where the traveller purchased a return ticket for a single price, the 
operator would need to apportion its ticket revenue and account for VAT in both Member 
States (on the basis that return journeys constituted separate supplies for VAT purposes).  
5.3.4.2  Economic impact and route specific examples 
To the extent that competitive distortions exist in the current transport market between 
modes due to different tax treatment, then harmonisation of rates will eliminate them.  
Equally, such a conclusion applies to different treatment of modes between countries. In 
the case where no distortions exist due to very limited or non-existent competition 
between modes and countries, harmonised rates will not introduce any new competitive 
distortions. 
Harmonisation of VAT rates across modes and countries would remove also the potential 
problem associated with defining the place of departure for journeys with stopovers (or 
changes of operator or mode) as the same rate of VAT would be charged irrespective of 
whether the journey counts as one or two trips. The sections below presents some 
examples of this option and discusses the findings from the route and fiscal modelling. A 
more detailed analysis of the case studies and the fiscal impact modelling is presented in 
Appendix 5.1 and 5.3 respectively. 
The London–Brussels route passes through Belgium, (potentially) France and the UK, 
and of these countries only Belgium charges a positive rate of  VAT (6%) on rail and 
coach passenger transport for intra-EU travel. Under the current system, VAT is levied 
according to distance travelled resulting in an effective
125 rate of VAT on road and rail 
transport of 2%.  
Harmonisation of VAT, which is assumed to occur at a rate of 8%
126, will therefore 
produce price rises for all modes of transport, accompanied by falling volumes of traffic. 
However, while all prices rise, the existing asymmetric treatment of different modes, 
                                                      
125 The effective rate is the distance-weighted VAT rate. 
126 The effects are reported for other values of the harmonised VAT rate at the end of this chapter. European Commission 
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means that harmonisation produces changes in relative prices across the modes. This 
result is due to the fact that all operators now face cost increases.  Air and sea operators 
face increases of 8% and rail and road operators face increases of 6%. As a result of these 
price rises, operators’ costs increase, resulting in a fall in demand volumes of 2.5%. For 
specific modes, the relative price effects mean that rail and air increase their market share 
slightly at the expense of the other two modes. In terms of VAT revenues collected, as 
each fiscal authority is now collecting VAT from all the trips, revenues increase 
dramatically and are split two ways between Belgium and the UK. 
To assess the true impact, the net gains/losses that arise are determined by subtracting the 
increase in VAT liabilities from any increase in gross turnover. Under a harmonised rate, 
the price increases are sufficient to generate additional gross turnover for the route as a 
whole, despite falling demand volumes. However, this increase in turnover is far from 
sufficient to outweigh the very large increase in VAT receipts generated under all the 
options and, taken together, the route operators incur net losses equivalent to around 5% 
of gross turnover, with all modes sharing this loss.  
Further, although these losses are small in relation to total gross turnover, if it is 
assumed that profits account for 5–10% of gross turnover, such a loss begins to look 
much more significant.  
For the Frankfurt–Amsterdam route, the effect of moving to the departure option with 
harmonised rates, is that rail travel increases its share by 1.6% at the expense of air. This 
is in contrast to the London–Brussels market where both modes increased their share at 
the expense of coach and road. As a result, the gross turnover on this route suffers by 2%, 
less than half the fall in the London–Brussels market. 
Bringing these two examples together, the impact of harmonisation on the net losses (or 
gains) will depend on the distinguishing features of a particular route. In particular, the 
impact will be determined by four key factors. These are: 
  starting  rates of VAT.  On the Frankfurt-Amsterdam route, rail/coach travel have rates 
of 15% and 6% for Germany and the Netherlands respectively and therefore the 
effective rate for the journey is 12%. Under a 8% harmonised rate, the effective VAT 
rate will fall causing lower fares and more demand for these modes. By contrast on the 
London-Brussels route, which has a 6% rate in Belgium and an effective rate of 2% 
for the journey, demand falls for rail and coach travel; 
  the differences in VAT rates for rail/coach and air travel. This will affect the level of 
switching between modes; 
  the business share.  On the Frankfurt–Amsterdam route this is much lower and 
therefore the overall price sensitivity of the market is higher; and  
  the level of competition between modes. In the London-Brussels market, HSR 
competes with air, but this does not exist currently on the Amsterdam-Frankfurt route 
which means there is greater degree of mode switching.  
The above points are reinforced for other routes, namely Copenhagen-Gothenburg, 
Helsinki-Stockholm, Patras-Brindisi. Currently all modes face zero rates of VAT and 
therefore, under a 8% harmonised VAT there are large increase in prices. Further, leisure 
travel dominates the markets which causes greater changes in demand for a given change 
in fares. A summary of the results is: 
  a fall in demand ranging from 6.1% to 7.2% on each route; and  European Commission 
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  a net loss of between 6.0% and 8.1% of gross turnover. 
In addition, on the Frankfurt-Barcelona route the effects experienced are broadly similar 
since a vast proportion  (over 95%) of passengers are leisure passengers. The magnitude 
of the changes is, however, slightly less since some of the competing modes (rail and 
coach) are currently taxed in both Spain and Germany. 
For domestic routes, the effect of harmonisation will be determined by the difference 
between the current VAT rates and the harmonised rate. For example, Germany applies a 
rate of 15% on all (non-urban) passenger transport within its territory. Thus 
harmonisation at 8% will result in a fall in the burden of tax and hence an increase in 
demand for all modes. There may however, be changes in mode shares due to the 
different own-price elasticities involved (the fiscal impact of a harmonised VAT rate in 
the domestic market is presented in Appendix 6.1). 
To summarise, the changes on demand volumes, shifts in market shares etc, are driven 
primarily by the initial taxation position of the modes and the choice of the harmonised 
rate, but they also depend on the particular characteristics of the route, such as: 
  the level of competition; 
  the proportion of business travel; and  
  the eligibility of users to reclaim VAT. 
A further question is the treatment of EU and non-EU operators.  For the purposes of our 
modelling, under the departure option we have assumed that non-EU operators would be 
required to collect and account for VAT. These issues related to the position of non-EU 
operators are covered in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
5.3.4.3  Fiscal impact 
This section provides a discussion of the fiscal impact, under a harmonised VAT rate 
scenario for intra-EU travel only. The analysis is presented in terms of key indicators 
such as demand volumes, gross turnover, VAT revenues collected and the net loss or gain 
experienced by the market. The model use the same methodology as the route case 
studies but deals with country to country movements and volumes instead. Thus, the 
issues and conclusions discussed in the above section also apply
127. A total of 225 routes 
(15 routes from each of the EU Member States) have been examined. The estimates 
provided in this section are rough approximations of the size of the impact and should be 
treated as an indication of the effects in terms of “winners and losers” rather than in 
absolute figures. 
Overall, the impact of a harmonised VAT rate of 8%, on each of the Member States is 
related to the level of turnover in their respective markets. It is also largely dependent on 
the size of the air sector which dominates passenger travel in the intra-EU market, 
accounting for a market share of 80% in volume terms and 92% in value terms. The 
effects are summarised below
128: 
                                                      
127 For example, the only difference between the UK-Belgium route and the London-Brussels route would be 
in the magnitude of market volume and value. Changes in air, rail and coach travel as a result of taxation 
changes would be identical in proportional terms.  
128 The methodology used in estimating these figures is given in Appendix 5.2 while a more detailed 
discussion of the fugues is presented in Appendix 5.3. European Commission 
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  an overall loss in passenger demand of 4.5% or 7.1 million trips, which ranges from 
3.3% to 5.7% according to the Member States; 
  an additional 2,990 million ECU, above the current 61 million ECU, of VAT revenues 
is raised by fiscal authorities; and  
  a net loss of 5.7% of gross turnover, or 2.3 billion ECU, which ranges from 5.4% to 
6.1% according to Member States. 
Thus, the economic variables and fiscal revenues are broadly equal in percentage terms 
since the air sector (which dominates) experiences VAT rises from 0% to 8% irrespective 
of departure country. The marginal differences between Member States that do occur are 
explained by differences in the factors indicated in the route case study section above. 
These are the starting rates of VAT, changes in relative prices of modes, and the 
particular attributes of travel from Member States such as the amount of leisure travel. 
Changes in relative prices will cause switching between modes. However, under the 
harmonised scenario, the magnitude of these changes is relatively insignificant in 
comparison to the overall situation (the rail and coach segment accounts for only 8% of 
the market in terms of gross turnover). The exact amount of mode switching is dependent 
on the current rate of VAT applied to rail and coach travel. In general terms the higher 
this current effective VAT rate faced by rail and coach operators, then the smaller the 
increase in their tax burden relative to air operators, and the greater the mode shift from 
air to rail and coach. Note that the demand for rail and coach travel may still fall if the 
increase in prices, as a result of an increase in the tax burden, outweighs the gain from the 
mode shift away from air travel. 
Another factor which must be taken into account is the different attributes of routes. This 
can be best explained with reference to journeys departing from Spain and Greece which 
have a proportionately large leisure sector. These travellers are more price-sensitive than 
business travellers which means that overall fare increases will produce a greater fall in 
passenger demand. This factor forces the fall in passenger demand to the top end of the 
range; our estimates suggest that for journeys departing Spain and Greece the fall in 
demand is 5.5% and 5.7% respectively. 
The combination of these effects is a reduction in passenger demand of 5.3%, 0.7% and 
5.5% for air, rail and coach travel respectively with a fall of 4.5% for the whole market. 
As for the gross turnover of the market, even though the demand in volume terms has 
fallen, in the air and rail market, this is not sufficient to outweigh the effect of the price 
increase and market turnover increases.  However, in the coach market the loss of 
passengers is greater, since coach travel is more price-sensitive, and gross market 
turnover falls very slightly. 
Under the harmonised VAT rates scenario, as already indicated, for intra-EU travel only 
the amount of VAT revenues raised by fiscal authorities is 3,049 million ECU (an 
additional 2,990 million ECU). This is significantly greater than the current situation 
where the amount of  revenues raised is relatively low, estimated at 0.1% of gross 
turnover or 61 million ECU since the rate is only applied to rail and coach travel. Most of 
this increase in VAT revenues collected is due to VAT on air travel increasing from 0% 
to 8%. The amount collected by rail and coach also increases since the effective VAT for 
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a majority of journeys increases as the 8% rate is now applied to the whole journey rather 
than only some countries applying VAT to part of a journey.  
The fiscal authorities of France, Germany and the UK collect the most VAT, accounting 
for half of VAT revenues collected by EU Member States. This reflects the large air 
market for these countries. This amount of VAT collected by countries is roughly in 
proportion to the amount of departing/arriving air travel. France, Germany and the UK 
raise 51% (or 1534 million ECU) of total VAT revenues collected by EU Member States 
while accounting for 50% of the departure/arrival air travel market. 
By comparing the increase in gross turnover with the increase in VAT revenues a 
measure of the change in market profitability can be derived. Overall, profitability falls 
by an amount equivalent to 5.7% of turnover. This is consistent across Member states, 
similar to other economic variables, with net losses ranging from 5.4% to 6.1%. 
In summary, the fiscal impact, under a harmonised VAT rate, is determined almost 
entirely by the air market, with the rail and coach segments being relatively less 
significant. In the air sector, intra-EU passenger demand falls by 5.3% and market 
profitability by an amount equivalent to 5.9% of gross turnover. The fiscal authorities 
of the France, Germany and the UK collect half of all revenues. 
 European Commission 
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5.3.5  Multi VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the departure option 
under a multi-rate scenario.  
5.3.5.1  Practical example 
For a coach journey from Germany to Ireland, German VAT would apply to the full 
ticket price whereas, at present, German VAT applies only to the segment of the journey 
which takes place within German territory.  Conversely, the return trip (from Ireland to 
Germany) would not attract a VAT charge (since Ireland, currently, does not apply a 
positive rate of VAT to domestic coach transport). 
5.3.5.2  Economic impact and route specific examples 
For intra-EU and international journeys, a move to a departure option, without any 
change in the level of VAT, would produce situations where the effective rate of VAT 
increased, impacting on costs, prices and demand volumes.  
This is illustrated in the London-Brussels route where under the current system, VAT is 
paid on approximately one third of the journey, giving an effective rate of VAT of 2%. 
Under the departure option, any one way trip by rail or sea from Brussels would incur the 
full Belgian VAT rate of 6% on the price of the whole journey and the average price 
would rise. In addition, the increase in the effective VAT rate would put rail and coach 
operators at a further disadvantage compared to air and sea operators, if the latter 
remained exempt from VAT.  
Conversely, if the departure point is London, the whole of London–Brussels trip, 
regardless of the mode, is taxed at zero so the price falls.  Since the price rise for the 
Brussels–London leg is greater, the overall average price rises and demand volumes for 
the route fall by around 0.1%. It should be noted that competition is highest between air 
and rail on this route. In addition there is a change in the relative prices between modes, 
with air and sea operators benefiting as passengers switch to these modes from the more 
expensive modes.  
Despite the small change in demand, VAT receipts increase by 45% as half of all rail and 
road journeys incur VAT at 6% whereas previously all these journeys incurred an 
effective rate of 2%. However, the magnitude of the overall effect is relatively small with 
a net loss in the market of 0.2% of gross turnover. 
For domestic routes, the switch from the existing VAT regime to the departure option will 
not affect the market. There will be no change in the effective rate of VAT as the full 
VAT rate is already charged on the entire journey. This means that prices, demand, gross 
turnover and VAT receipts would all be unaffected. 
5.3.5.3  Fiscal impact 
Under the multi-VAT rate scenario, the fiscal impact of switching from the current 
distance based regime towards a departure option has only a small effect on the key 
statistics, since VAT in the air sector remains unchanged. Overall, fares for rail and coach 
travel are reduced under this regime resulting in: European Commission 
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  an increase in passenger demand by around 83,000 trips, an insignificant amount in 
terms of the whole market of 157.6 millions passenger trips.  
  revenues from VAT to the fiscal authorities, who introduce a levy, more than doubles 
with an increase from 61 million ECU to 114 million, or around 0.3% of gross 
turnover. 
  for the whole intra-EU segment, a net loss of 62 million ECU is experienced with the 
vast majority of the losses occurring in the rail market. 
For the fiscal authorities of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and 
Spain, who currently apply VAT (of 10%, 6%, 15%, 8%, 6% and 7% respectively)
129 on 
rail and coach travel there are two main effects identified. Using Germany as the 
illustrative example, these are: 
  for journeys originating from Germany there is generally an increase in the effective 
rate. For example, for rail or coach from Germany-Spain, a 15% VAT rate would be 
levied by Germany on the proportion of the journey within its territory (i.e. 
approximately one third of the market). By contrast, under the departure options a 
15% VAT rate is charged on departing trips only (i.e. one half of the market). Thus, 
the effective rate of tax obtained by the German fiscal authorities is greater; and 
  rail and coach trips transiting Germany do not face a levy by the German fiscal 
authorities. This acts to decrease the amount of revenues collected by them and offsets 
the increases in VAT revenue described in the example above. Examples of such 
movements are rail or coach travel between Scandinavia and any of the other EU 
Member States. 
However, while the German fiscal authorities loose revenues in the transit sector, the 
passengers themselves face a reduction in prices as the effective tax burden is reduced. 
This in fact occurs for all movements which transit Germany which currently has one of 
the highest VAT rates on transport (15%) of all Member States. 
For the other countries with positive rates of VAT on rail/coach travel, there is a similar 
reduction in demand and a similar increase in revenues collected. However, the 
magnitude of the gains is much smaller due to the lower rates of VAT currently applied. 
For  France  only a very small proportion of rail and coach travel is subject to VAT 
(transit journeys and most international routes are exempt) which means that the amount 
of VAT revenues raised is considerable lower.  It should also be noted that the French 
fiscal authorities do not loose revenues from the transit sector from the switch to the 
departure option as these journeys also faced zero (exempt) rates under the existing 
distance based option. 
For countries which do have a large transit sector and apply a VAT rate under the current 
distance base option, such as Austria
130, a larger proportion of the net gain in VAT 
revenues collected is offset by the loss of revenues previously collected from the transit 
sector (though, in practice, VAT revenues derived from Austrian transits is declining - see 
Chapter 4).  
                                                      
129 In addition, France applies a VAT rate of 5.5% on a few non-transit intra-EU routes and Denmark a 25% 
VAT rate on tourist bus services. 
130 Germany and Scandinavia to Italy and Greece are particularly significant movements which transit 
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For fiscal authorities of the Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden and the  UK, zero or exempt rates of VAT are applied therefore no 
VAT revenues or a negligible
131 amount are collected under the departure/arrival option, 
which is the same result as under the current regime.  
However, there will be a small increase in demand as the effective VAT on certain 
journeys will fall. These journeys would involve three or more countries with a positive 
rate of VAT being incurred in one or more of the transit countries. The effective rate 
would therefore fall under the new regime as the transit country would now no longer be 
able to apply a VAT rate to transit travel. This effect would be greater for countries on the 
periphery of the EU, as travel to and from these places is more likely to involve transit via 
other positive VAT rated countries. For example passenger demand to/from Portugal 
(transiting through Spain with a 7% rate) on the periphery of the EU increases by 0.7% 
whereas passenger demand to/from France only rises by 0.4%. 
The German fiscal authorities account for most of the revenues collected since Germany 
has one of the highest starting rate of VAT (15%) and one of the largest transport 
markets. A total of 59 million ECU, or 0.9% of gross turnover is collected in Germany 
which is much greater than the 39 million ECU raised under the current regime. In terms 
of the other variables gross turnover rises by 17 million ECU which produces a fall in 
passenger demand of 207,000 passengers, or 0.8% of the market. 
To summarise, the fiscal impact of a switch to the departure or arrival options under 
the current regime produces a marginal increase in the overall level of demand, with a 
very small shift towards rail and coach travel. Total demand changes by less than 1% 
in all cases (except for Luxembourg) with market profitability (net losses) changing by 
even less. VAT revenues increase for all positively taxed Member States and passenger 
demand decreases for all zero (or exempt) VAT rated Member States.  
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5.4  Place of taxation options: the arrival option 
This section explores the impact of the arrival option in a harmonised and multi VAT rate 
scenario.  
The adoption of the arrival option, in a harmonised VAT rate scenario, would result in a 
VAT charge falling due on all domestic and intra-EU journeys and, possibly, the EU legs 
of international journeys in the country of arrival.  Similarly, all domestic journeys would 
attract a VAT charge (including journeys within Member States which do not, currently, 
apply a positive rate of VAT to passenger transport services). 
The adoption of the arrival option, in a multi VAT rate scenario, would result in a VAT 
charge falling due on intra-EU journeys terminating in a Member State which currently 
apply a positive rate of VAT on domestic passenger transport.  The VAT treatment of 
journeys made within a single Member State would not change. 
5.4.1  Definition options 
The incidence of diverted journeys (caused by bad weather or other operational issues) 
within the airline and maritime industries means that the “place of arrival” could be 
defined as the place of planned arrival (as shown on the traveller’s ticket).  This approach 
should enable complications caused by diverted journeys to be avoided and for the VAT 
accounting to be simplified for the operators concerned.  In practice, VAT would be 
chargeable, in the Member State in which the journey was scheduled to end (or the final 
Member State through which the journey passed before leaving EU territory if it is 
decided to tax EU legs of journeys to or from non-EU countries).  The issues regarding 
return journeys, stopovers and round trips outlined within section 5.3 above will also be 
relevant under the arrival option. 
As far as non-EU operators are concerned, the potential for distortions of competition will 
need to be avoided through the introduction of a mechanism which ensures that such 
operators bring VAT due to account.  In respect of the arrival option, the comments at 
paragraph 5.3.1 above (for the departure option) are also relevant. 
5.4.1.1  Documentation Issues 
Whichever definition is adopted, operators will need to be able to identify, within their 
accounting and ticketing systems, the actual place of arrival for all journeys.  Despite 
reasonably sophisticated accounting systems in the airline and rail industries, this may be 
more difficult to achieve than the departure option (though not as difficult as, say, the 
customer option).  Fiscal authority audit assurance ( and the issue of clear documentation 
for business users) may not be as straightforward, therefore. 
Notwithstanding the above, most transport operators’ ticketing systems are able to record 
the place of arrival on the traveller’s ticket.  This will facilitate VAT refund or deduction 
claims by business customers.  Where operators’ systems are unable to itemise the VAT 
charge separately, the detail shown should be sufficient for the purposes of the customer’s 
VAT accounting. European Commission 
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5.4.2  Modal Specific Issues 
5.4.2.1  Airlines 
Under the arrival option, the issues facing the airline industry are similar to those outlined 
under the departure option above.  However, airlines typically operate “HUB” 
arrangements (for example, Laufhansa’s hub is Frankfurt, KLM’s hub is Amsterdam and 
Sabena’s hub is Brussels).  At these hubs, airlines operate full accounting functions; the 
hubs also represent the principal place of first departure of intra-EU flights for the airlines 
concerned.   These “hubs” (which are invariably located in the country in which the 
airline is legally incorporated) enable the airlines to carry out their tax, regulatory and 
statutory financial reporting complications in these countries.  Outside of these countries, 
the airlines, whilst typically operating a “branch structure”, do not have the same 
operational capability.  As such, the airlines will not be used to carrying out major tax 
accounting responsibilities outside their home country.  Under the OECD double tax 
agreements, airlines are required to account for corporation taxes in their home Member 
State only.   
The corollary to the above position is the fact that most, if not all, of the major scheduled 
airlines are VAT registered in the EU Member States to which they operate services.  
Under the arrival option, therefore, the additional cost of VAT accounting, at a positive 
rate, should not be particularly onerous.  The position is less straightforward for charter 
operators, however, since it is understood that many are not VAT registered outside their 
home Member State.  Instead, these operators typically engage local handling agents to 
supervise their affairs in the countries to which the airlines operate services. 
Under the arrival option, therefore, there is likely to be an increased VAT accounting 
requirement (and cost) for scheduled and non-scheduled operators in comparison with the 
departure option. 
5.4.2.2  Rail 
Because of the nature of the European rail industry, rail operators are not currently 
established for VAT and statutory purposes outside their home Member State.  Under the 
arrival option, there is likely to be a significant increase in the VAT accounting 
obligations placed upon national railway operators, if the operator issuing the ticket is 
required to act as principal for VAT purposes and to account for VAT in the country of 
final destination. 
Under the COTIF system, however, it would be possible for operators to implement a 
structure, under the arrival option, which mirrors the current legal arrangements.  Here, 
each individual operator would account for VAT upon the revenue it actually receives 
through the COTIF system (in respect of the distance travelled through the individual 
operator’s home country).  Under this structure, there would be successive places of 
arrival which would be defined as the external border of each individual Member State 
through which the train passes on its journey.  This arrangement would facilitate VAT 
accounting for the individual operators concerned and would not disturb the current VAT 
accounting arrangements (which operate smoothly through the COTIF system).  If this 
variation is adopted, there will be no requirement for VAT to be brought to account on 
charges made between individual operators through the COTIF system.  Instead, 
individual operators would merely account for VAT on the ticketing revenue they 
received. European Commission 
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5.4.2.3  Road 
Under the arrival option, the issues facing EU coach and bus operators will be similar to 
that outlined under the departure option above.  It is clear, however, that the ticketing 
operators are unlikely to have an establishment in the country of arrival (since their 
normal place of business will almost invariably be in the country of departure).  As such, 
there is likely to be an increased compliance burden placed upon these operators.   
However, under the joint venture and co-operative agreements the operators have entered 
into, it may be possible for ticketing operators to appoint the sub-contracting operators to 
act as the principal operator’s fiscal representative in the Member State of arrival. 
5.4.2.4  Maritime 
Because of the nature of the EU shipping and ferry industry, the impact of the arrival 
option should not be significant and the issues involved should be little different to those 
outlined within the departure option section above.  A relatively minor issue could 
surround the incidence of diverted traffic (due to bad weather).  In this context, it should 
be a relatively simple task to define the “place of arrival” as the place of planned arrival 
(rather than the place of actual arrival). 
As with the airline industry, however, the EU shipping and ferry operators do not 
typically operate a major accounting or administrative centre in the countries of arrival.  
Instead, these operators usually run a “branch” office in these countries.  As such, the 
implementation of the arrival option could lead to slightly increased costs for this 
industry.  However, these costs are not likely to be significant. 
5.4.3  Tax deduction: purchasers 
The issues for business travellers are likely to be similar to those arising under the 
departure option.  The incidence of EU Eighth Directive claims, in comparison with the 
departure option, is likely to be similar.  The same analysis applies to EU Thirteenth 
Directive claims. 
5.4.4  Harmonised VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the arrival option 
under a harmonised rate scenario.  
5.4.4.1  Practical example 
For a journey by coach from Belgium to Finland, Finnish VAT would fall due on the 
whole of the ticket price.  For a journey from Finland to Belgium, Belgian VAT would 
apply.  For return journeys sold on a single ticket, operators would, as for the departure 
option, be required to issue documents showing two Member States’ VAT and bring this 
tax to account in both countries. 
5.4.4.2  Economic and fiscal impact 
The issues arising under the arrival option are essentially the same as those discussed 
under the departure option; namely the implications of the exact definition of the place of European Commission 
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arrival and the competition between EU and non-EU operators.  In economic terms, the 
departure and arrival options are virtually indistinguishable. 
5.4.5  Multi VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the arrival option 
under a multi-VAT rate scenario.  
5.4.5.1  Practical example 
For a journey by sea from Sweden to Denmark, no VAT would fall due since Denmark 
exempts all scheduled passenger transport services within its territory.  However, for a 
journey in the opposite direction (one which commences in Denmark and terminates in 
Sweden), a Swedish VAT charge of 12% could apply to the whole of the journey. 
5.4.5.2  Economic and fiscal impact 
In economic and fiscal terms, the departure and arrival options are again virtually 
indistinguishable. The marginal differences that do occur while be on the fiscal side and 
will be dependent on the size of the market according to the direction of travel. However, 
in the absence of net migration from one country to another, most travellers will make a 
return journey, and the size of the market will be broadly similar in both directions. 
5.5  Place of taxation options: the operator option 
This section explores the impact of the Operator Option in, respectively, a harmonised 
and multi VAT rate scenario. 
The operator option, in a harmonised VAT rate scenario, would result in a VAT charge in 
the country in which the operator is established for VAT purposes.  For operators with no 
place of establishment within the EU, it is assumed that provisions would be introduced 
to ensure that these operators were brought within the scope of EU VAT as far as intra-
EU travel is concerned to ensure that they did not enjoy a competitive advantage over 
EU-based operators.  Unlike the departure and arrival options, the operator option would 
mean that individual legs of return journeys, sold on a single ticket for a single price, 
could not be subject to different VAT treatment. 
The operator option, in a multi-VAT rate scenario, would trigger a VAT charge in 
circumstances where the operator was established in a Member State which applied a 
positive rate of VAT to domestic passenger transport.  This option would also result in a 
VAT charge applying to domestic journeys in those Member States which currently do 
not currently tax passenger transport services, if the operator involved was established in 
a Member State which applied a positive VAT rate on such services.   
Conversely, a journey would not attract a VAT charge if the transport operator was 
established in a Member State which did not apply a positive rate of VAT on passenger 
transport services. Under this scenario, a VAT charge, on domestic and intra-EU 
journeys, would only apply where the operator was established in a Member State which 
introduced a positive rate of VAT on passenger transport services. European Commission 
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5.5.1  Definition options 
The 6th Directive
132 defines the place of establishment of the supplier as “the place where 
the supplier has established his business or has a fixed establishment from which the 
service is supplied or, in the absence of such a place of business or fixed establishment, 
the place where he has his permanent address or usually resides”.  If this option is 
adopted, it will be important that a clear definition of “place of establishment” is adopted.  
The current definition of Article 9(1) could lead to confusion amongst EU-based transport 
operators, particularly those with branch or representative offices in a number of Member 
States. 
Where operators have a series of establishments across the EU, it is possible that, under a 
multi-VAT rate system, scope for tax avoidance would arise.  Without clear definitions, 
operators could arrange their affairs so as to ensure that their place of taxation is their 
establishment which is sited in a Member State which either does not tax passenger 
transport services or which taxes it at the lowest rate of all the Member States in which 
the operator has establishments. 
The simplest approach and one which would minimise scope for tax avoidance whilst, at 
the same time, minimising the burden on operators and fiscal authorities alike, would be 
the adoption of a single establishment as the place of taxation for the whole of an 
operator’s economic activities. 
There are a number of options for determining the operator’s Member State of taxation 
including: 
  the country of legal incorporation;  
  the country in which the operator’s transport licence is held;  
  the country of principal accounting centre; or 
  for non-EU operators, the country in which the operator’s handling, travel or other 
agent is located. 
Further, it is essential that the territorial scope of taxation is defined clearly as discussed 
earlier in the departure and arrival options. In short, arrangements must be made so that 
non-EU operators which provide transport services within the intra-EU market are 
brought within the scope of EU VAT otherwise distortion of competition will arise. This 
may be problematic as many do not have a branch, or representative offices, within the 
EU. In this situation operators could be required to appoint their handling agent as their 
tax representative.   
In addition to defining the operator’s place of establishment, it will be necessary to 
formulate a clear definition of which journeys are subject to EU VAT.  EU operators 
would not be required to levy VAT on journeys which take place wholly outside EU 
territory but the taxation treatment of journeys which start or finish within the EU (having 
terminated or commenced in third countries) will need to be clear. 
Under the operator option, the distinction between return journeys, stopovers, transit 
passengers and round trips will no longer be important since the operator will be 
accounting for VAT in its “home” Member State in all circumstances. 
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5.5.1.1  Documentation Issues 
Under the operator option, VAT accounting, in terms of ticketing and fiscal authority 
audit assurance, would be made far simpler.  Operators would, however, need to be able 
to distinguish between routes which were and were not subject to VAT.  It is understood 
that, in general, operators’ systems are capable of this. 
However, in terms of the VAT-related information which is capable of being shown on 
the traveller’s ticket, it is not clear whether operators can easily indicate the country in 
which VAT will be chargeable.  Major software changes may be necessary to facilitate 
this.  Without the necessary information appearing on the travel ticket, customers’ VAT 
accounting would be made more difficult. 
5.5.2  Modal Specific Issues 
5.5.2.1  Airlines 
The operator option would accord with place where the airlines are located both for 
statutory licensing and accounting purposes.  This could either be the place where the 
operator is legally constituted or the place where it holds its aviation licence. 
As far as the ticketing and reservation systems are concerned, however, the systems will 
need to be capable of holding specific information regarding the place of establishment of 
the airline as fixed data.  This capability would be an absolute requirement given the 
nature of the worldwide airline industry and the fact that travellers may purchase tickets 
for any specific journey from any independent travel agent in the world.   
Assuming this potential obstacle can be overcome, however, the operator option should 
be relatively simple to implement for airlines, particularly if the ticketing operator is 
considered to be acting as principal for VAT purposes.  Subsequent settlements, between 
participating (“carrier”) airlines would be subject to VAT (where appropriate) with the 
consideration for these inter-airline transactions being determined by the agreed 
settlements made via the IATA clearing house system.  As outlined in the departure and 
arrival option sections above, VAT on these inter-airline settlements could either be 
charged at source (by the carrying airline) or could be subject to “tax shift” arrangements.  
In the former case, the incidence of EU Eighth and Thirteenth Directive refund claims, by 
ticketing airlines, is likely to increase (though by not as much as that which will occur 
under the departure and arrival options).  Under “tax shift” arrangements, there is likely 
to be little or no additional Eighth or Thirteenth Directive VAT refund claims by the 
ticketing operators. 
If, however, all of the “carrying” airlines involved in a particular journey are considered 
to be acting as principal for VAT purposes, the position is likely to be more complicated 
(but not significantly so).  Under the IATA clearing house systems procedures, it should 
be a relatively straightforward task for individual airlines to account for VAT in the 
appropriate Member State on their “share” of the ticketing revenue due to them under the 
bi-lateral agreements they have entered into with other airlines (the consideration for 
which is settled via the IATA clearing house system). European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




5.5.2.2  Rail 
The operator option, for the rail industry, will be relatively simple to implement, 
particularly if the ticketing operator acted as principal, for VAT purposes, for the whole 
of the journey.  However, legally, this is not the correct position since operators only act 
as principal for the leg of the journey travelled within their home EU Member State.  If 
the legal position is to be mirrored, therefore, each individual operator will need to 
account for VAT on the consideration receivable by it through the COTIF system.  If this 
arrangement is adopted, it will be a simple task for operators to account for VAT, in their 
home Member State, under the operator option. 
Where each individual operator accounts for VAT, as principal, on its share of the 
ticketing income, there would be no issues to address as far as transactions between 
participating operators are concerned.  However, if the ticketing operator is to act as 
principal for VAT purposes, the issues of VAT accounting on inter-operator charges (as 
set out in the departure and arrival options above) will need to be considered. 
5.5.2.3  Road 
The operator option is likely to simplify VAT accounting obligations for EU coach and 
bus operators compared to the departure and arrival options.  This arrangement would 
accord with the current arrangements the operators have in place for revenue sharing on 
intra-EU routes.  For example, a UK-based operator acts as principal for a return journey 
from London to Madrid (although the return leg would actually be operated by a Spanish 
concern).  Under these arrangements, the Spanish concern acts a sub-contractor (uplifting 
operator) to the principal contractor and the UK operator (the “issuing” or “ticketing” 
operator).  In general, EU coach operators do not operate branch or representative offices 
outside their home Member State and, in the vast majority of cases, ticketing revenue is 
also earned in the operator’s home Member State.  Given these circumstances, 
implementation of the operator option, for the EU bus and coach industry, is unlikely to 
cause undue difficulties.  Settlement for sub-contracted services could either be effected, 
for VAT purposes, through the operation of a “tax shift” mechanism or, alternatively, via 
a source VAT charge by the sub-contractor. 
5.5.2.4  Maritime 
The operator option is unlikely to present major difficulties to the EU shipping and ferry 
industry. Further, its implementation would facilitate VAT accounting as it would mirror 
the structure the transport operator has for statutory, financial and tax reporting.   
However, this option may lead to a distortion in revenues.  As outlined within the 
departure and arrival options section above, some 70% of cross-channel passengers 
purchase their tickets from UK-based ferry operators.  As such, it is likely that the VAT 
majority of taxation revenues for this major route would accrue to the UK authorities (at 
the expense of the French authorities). 
5.5.3  Tax Deduction: purchasers 
The adoption of the operator option may give rise to distortions of competition (and of 
VAT revenues) under a multi VAT rate scenario.  Because of the nature of the EU 
passenger transport industry, travellers can purchase tickets for any journey within the 
EU from any transport operator.  Accordingly, the purchase of a travel ticket from an European Commission 
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operator based in a country which does not apply a positive rate of VAT on passenger 
transport could mean that the traveller (irrespective of status) would enjoy a reduced VAT 
charge.  This “rate shopping” concept is likely to be exploited by business customers and 
private individuals alike as cross-border shopping (to take advantage of a wide 
differential in domestic VAT rates) has become common in areas adjoining the Denmark–
Germany border (and certain other EU border areas) for many years.  It is likely that the 
adoption of the operator option, in a multi VAT rate scenario, would give rise to similar 
distortions unless effective anti-avoidance provisions are introduced. 
Overall, the operator option is likely to reduce the incidence of EU Eighth Directive 
refund claims (in comparison with the departure and arrival options) since business 
travellers purchasing their travel ticket from a transport operator residing in the same EU 
Member State are unlikely to incur significant amounts of overseas VAT on intra-EU 
passenger transport services.  In this context, therefore, adoption of the operator option is 
likely to reduce the compliance costs for business travellers.   
The incidence of EU Thirteenth Directive claims is likely to be higher in comparison to 
Eighth Directive claims but lower in comparison with the level of EU Thirteenth 
Directive claims under the departure and arrival options. 
5.5.4  Harmonised VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the operator option 
under a harmonised rate scenario.  
Practical example  
For a sea crossing from Greece to Italy operated by a Spanish ferry company, a Spanish 
VAT charge would apply to both the outbound and the return leg of the journey.   
For sea crossings operated by non-EU providers (for example, by a ferry company based 
in Cyprus), an EU VAT charge would apply since the non-EU operator would be required 
to register and account for EU VAT.  The VAT chargeable could be dependent, for 
example, upon the Member State in which the Cypriot operator retained a handling, 
shipping or travel agent.  If the operator retained a handling agent in Greece, Greek VAT 
would apply with the Greek agent being directed, by the Greek fiscal authority, to 
account for the VAT payable on the ticketing revenues earned by the Cypriot operator for 
journeys carried out within the EU.  In these circumstances, the Cypriot operator would 
be required to advise the Greek intermediary of the revenues earned from intra-EU 
journeys. 
5.5.4.1  Economic impact and route specific examples 
Under harmonised rates, the effective rate of VAT is likely to change but the direction of 
that change and thus the impact on prices, demand volumes etc. would depend on which 
country is under examination and what rate is chosen as the harmonised rate. 
Under harmonised rates, the incentive for EU operators to relocate to zero or low rate 
VAT Member States disappears, as does the incentive to exploit cost advantages resulting 
from different VAT treatment. However, although EU transport operators from low rate 
countries will no longer face cost advantages over operators from high rate countries, 
advantages may exist for operators from other non-EU countries. European Commission 
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Generally, the economic effects of the operator option are equivalent to the departure/ 
arrival option with identical prices rises occurring under both options causing the same 
movements in demand, VAT revenues collected and market profitability.  
The situation where these two taxation options differ is when non-EU operators are 
present in the market and are treated differently to EU transport operators for intra-EU 
and domestic travel. This issue is critical, as significant competitive advantage could arise 
were non-EU operators not to be brought within the scope of VAT. An example of this is 
the Italy to Greece passenger shipping lanes, where nearly 30% of operators are estimated 
to be non-EU registered. These issues are addressed with reference to the specific route of 
Patras-Brindisi described below. 
For this route, where the non-EU sector is subject to the same regime as the EU sector, 
then VAT changes accompanied by fare changes cause a loss in demand of 8.0%, which 
is high in comparison to other routes due to the large price-sensitive leisure segment. 
Gross turnover in the total market falls by 0.4% and tax revenues collected increase by 
10,097 ECU. This reinforces the losses and fall in profitability occurs of 8.6% gross 
turnover. 
Although this analysis is helpful, it is possible that the non-EU sector will face a zero rate 
of VAT, through avoidance or if it is unequally applied. Even though this is the case for 
each taxation option, it is more problematic in the operator option. Against this 
background, two further scenarios have been analysed (a more detailed discussion 
between EU and non-EU operators is presented in Chapter 6): 
  First, where competitive pressures prevail. In this situation EU operators are forced to 
absorb additional costs from the change in the VAT regime in order to remain 
competitive. Prices are equalised, demand and gross turnover remains unchanged but 
there is a net loss in market profitability of 5.9% of gross turnover; and 
  Second, where a full price differential is maintained between EU and non-EU 
operators. For this scenario, prices on average increase by nearly 7% with a 
consequent loss of demand of just over 6%. As price rises and falling demand almost 
offset each other, only a slight reduction in gross turnover of 0.1% occurs. The result 
therefore, is a net loss in market profitability of 6.0% of gross turnover which is 
similar to the above situation. 
In both of these cases, the loss in profitability is smaller than in the departure/arrival 
option, but very similar in total magnitude. The effects, however, experienced by the 
individual operators is quite different.  
In the first case, the full amount of the VAT rise is absorbed by EU operators with prices 
and demand unchanged. By contrast in the second case, the full amount of the VAT rise 
is passed onto the customer which results in costs to existing customers in the form of 
price rises. These different methods of absorbing the VAT increase represent the upper 
and lower boundaries of the likely outcomes in the real world. In practice, EU operators 
may absorb some of the additional costs (it is unlikely that they could, and would want to, 
absorb the full amount) as well as being able to maintain some price differential against 
other operators due to reasons of non-price competitiveness, such as consumer loyalty or 
a higher quality of service. 
The factors described under the departure/arrival option will determine the difference 
between the effects experienced in the example above and the other case studies. For 
example, the overall effect of a harmonised rate on the Helsinki-Stockholm route will be European Commission 
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less as more business travellers exist, and the potential shift between modes will be more 
as competition is greater. 
The difference between the effects experienced in the example above and other case 
studies is due to the same factors described under the departure/arrival option. For 
example, the overall effect of a harmonised rate on the Helsinki-Stockholm route will be 
less as more business travellers exists and the potential shift between modes will be more 
as competition is greater. 
To summarise, 
  for routes consisting entirely of EU operators, the economic impact of a harmonised 
rate under the operator option will be identical to that under the departure/arrival 
options; and 
  for routes with non-EU operators present the impact of a harmonised rate on key 
economic variables such as demand, fares and profits will also be identical provided 
that the non-EU operators are treated consistently and brought within the scope of 
VAT. 
5.5.4.2  Fiscal impact 
Under the operator option the total effect of harmonisation is identical to the 
departure/arrival options above. In addition, due to the dominance of the air sector, net 
losses
133 in percentage terms are again broadly consistent across countries. Net losses as a 
percentage of gross turnover range from 2.7% to 4.2% with Germany, Spain and the UK 
experiencing the greatest losses (details can be found in the Appendix). 
When analysing the amount of VAT paid by operators in comparison to the amount 
collected by fiscal authorities, significant differences begin to emerge. The most striking 
change occurs for France and the UK. Under the operator option, VAT revenues paid by 
UK operators are 719 million ECU while French operators only pay 261 million ECU. 
This is in contrast to the departure/arrival options where revenues collected by the UK 
and French fiscal authorities were approximately equal. The reason for this change, which 
is shown in Figure 5.1 for all EU15 countries, is the large market share that UK operators 
have in comparison to French operators, with for example: 
  in the scheduled market, British Airways accounting for a 19% of the scheduled 
market while for Air France the share is only 10%; and 
  in the charter market, more marked differences with UK operators having a 40% 
market share compared to less than 5% experienced for French operators. 
To summarise, the introduction of a harmonised VAT rate under the operator option 
will adversely affect countries with airlines which command large market shares in the 
intra-EU market, in comparison to the  departure/arrival options. 
                                                      
133 Recall that net losses are defined as the difference between the change in fiscal revenue and the change in 
gross market turnover. European Commission 
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Figure 5.1 A comparison of options: revenue collected by fiscal authorities 
(departure/arrival option) and revenue paid by operators (operator option) - (1994 


















































































































Departure/Arrival Option Operator Option
 
 European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




In terms of net losses experienced by country and by operators, a similar picture arises 
which is shown in  Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 A comparison options: net losses by country (departure/arrival option) 
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5.5.5  Multi VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the operator option 
under a multi rate scenario.  
5.5.5.1  Practical example 
At present, a flight from France to Greece is not subject to a VAT charge in either 
Member State.  However, if the operator option was adopted in a multi VAT rate 
scenario, the same flight could attract a French VAT charge (at 5.5%) if performed by an 
airline established in France, or a Greek VAT charge (at 8%) if performed by an airline 
established in Greece.  It would be VAT-free if performed by an airline established in the 
UK.  Clearly, this could give rise to significant levels of distortion. 
5.5.5.2  Economic impact and route specific examples 
In the multi VAT rate scenario, there is the potential for the effective rate of VAT on 
passenger transport to change as operators of different nationalities would charge 
different rates of VAT in line with the existing different VAT regimes across EU Member 
States.   European Commission 
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With existing VAT rates maintained, the operator option would be likely to give a cost 
advantage to operators based in Member States with zero, or very low rates of VAT.  This 
could encourage low-cost air, coach and sea operators to enter markets to take advantage 
of their lower VAT costs.  Depending on the market structure, this may put pressure on 
operators from countries with positive VAT rates to absorb the additional costs in order to 
compete in price terms with operators from low VAT countries thereby impacting 
profitability. 
These issues can be best clarified with the aid of the Paris-Lyon domestic route case 
study although they equally apply to intra-EU travel. For this route, the market is 
unaffected by a switch from the current distance-based system to the operator option 
(identical to the departure/arrival option), since the full French rate is already charged on 
the entire journey and, at present, only French operators exist on the route. However, the 
operator option will provide incentives for operators from other Member States with 
lower rates of VAT to enter the market and take advantage of lower costs as a result of 
lower rates of VAT.  
For example, one future possible scenario on this route is where UK operators enter the 
French domestic market. In this situation, UK operators would have a 5.5% cost 
advantage over their French competitors, which would mean, assuming that competitive 
pressures prevail, lower prices across the market. This fall in the price of rail and air 
transport results in an increase in total number of trips by 1.7% or 193,000 trips and, 
taking the changes in VAT revenues and gross turnover into account, profitability falls by 
0.6% of turnover with all of these losses borne by incumbent French operators. A more 
detailed analysis is given in Appendix 5. 
Direct entry into a given market may, however, be limited by the start-up costs that would 
be required; for example, an entrant would need to set up offices, a ticketing system, 
distribution networks, and invest a new rolling stock, aircraft or coaches etc.  Unless 
confident of capturing a significant market share an operator may not be willing to 
undertake such a large scale investment.  However, an alternative might be for an 
operator from a low VAT country to buy a significant share in companies based in high 
VAT countries and by changing ownership in this way, to reduce the VAT liabilities of 
the incumbent operators. 
Operators in competitive markets and from high-VAT countries may be tempted to 
indulge in “rate shopping” by registering for VAT purposes in countries with low or zero 
rates of VAT.  In the extreme case, the result of such rate shopping could be convergence 
on a harmonised zero rate of VAT in the EU passenger transport market.  Aside from 
protecting their competitive position, rate shopping is unlikely to have any significant 
wider economic effects, e.g. on employment within the industry or its downstream 
suppliers.  Indeed, the losers would be the fiscal authorities who currently levy VAT on 
passenger transport, while consumers could expect to gain from lower fares. 
Overall, if the present variation of rates of VAT across the EU continues, those 
Member States applying low or zero-rates of VAT on transport services would be placed 
at an advantage over those with higher rates. 
5.5.5.3  Fiscal impact 
Under the operator option and assuming that a price differential is maintained between 
operators from different countries and that non-EU operators are subject to the same European Commission 
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regime as EU operators the overall effect is similar to the departure/arrival options and 
includes: 
  a rise in demand of around 84,000 passenger trips, with a larger proportionate rise for 
rail and coach travel; 
  an increase in VAT revenues paid by the operators of 54 million ECU; and 
  a fall in market profitability with a net loss experienced of 58 million ECU with the 
rail market again taking most of the losses. 
For Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the UK there are some 
differences, since operator shares by country differ from shares of passenger travel by 
country. In general however, these operators face significant reduction in their VAT 
liabilities as trips to, from and through positive VAT rated countries, which take up a 
large proportion of their business, are no longer subject to a VAT levy. This causes a 
reduction in the effective VAT rate, operators’ fares fall and passenger demand rises. 
Net losses again occur for countries with positive VAT rates such as Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Spain. These are caused by the increase in prices 
associated with a rise in the tax burden faced by operators from these countries. 
In addition, for Germany and Spain, the VAT revenues paid by operators is nearly double 
the amount collected by the fiscal authorities under the departure/arrival option, explained 
by an increase in the effective VAT rate. Using the same example as above, trips to and 
from France by German operators now involve a 15% levy for the whole journey whereas 
previously only the proportion within Germany was subject to a charge. The same 
reasoning also applies to Spain. For other countries, there are some net gains in certain 
other countries, such as Sweden and Luxembourg, but these are insignificant. 
The fiscal impact of a switch to the operator option under the current regime is similar 
in magnitude to the departure/arrival options. German operators pay 71 million ECU 
in the EU, a 27% increase over the amount collected by the German fiscal authorities 
under the departure/arrival options. French operators pay less VAT, as they can now 
provide services in positively taxed countries such as Germany or Spain without 
incurring a levy. 
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5.6  Place of taxation options: the customer option 
This section explores the impact of the customer option in a harmonised and multi VAT 
rate scenario. 
Under a harmonised VAT rate scenario, a VAT charge would fall due, in all 
circumstances, in the Member State of the customer.  The taxation treatment of intra-EU 
passenger services provided to non-EU customers will need to be considered. 
The adoption of the customer option, in a multi VAT rate scenario, would mean that a 
VAT charge would arise in circumstances where the customer was established in a 
Member State which currently applies a positive rate of VAT on passenger transport 
services.  In circumstances where the customer was not established in the EU, 
consideration needs to be given to whether an alternative mechanism for bringing VAT to 
account would be required. 
5.6.1  Definition options 
The 6th Directive
134 currently fixes the place of supply of intangible services, in certain 
circumstances, as the place of establishment of the customer.  Such a place is defined as 
“the place where the customer has established his business or has a fixed establishment 
to which the service is supplied or, in the absence of such a place, the place where he has 
his permanent address or usually resides”.  
In the context of passenger transport services, it may be possible to use a similar 
definition for the purposes of the customer option.  However, as outlined above, there are 
a number of related issues which need to be considered. 
Once again, it will be important that the scope of taxation be clearly defined to ensure that 
non-EU customers are subject to a VAT charge on journeys made within the EU and that 
both EU and non-EU operators are treated consistently in terms of the requirement to 
account for VAT due.  In this context, it may be necessary for a secondary rule to apply 
to ensure that operators bring VAT to account on such journeys.  A clear definition of 
which journeys are subject to EU VAT will also be required; in this context, the treatment 
of journeys to or from non-EU countries will need to be addressed. 
Unless a common tax deduction system is adopted by the EU as a whole, the customer 
option could give rise to distortions of fiscal revenues since business customers 
established in a number of Member States might seek to bring the tax payable to account 
in those Member States which permit deduction of tax incurred on business travel. 
5.6.1.1  Documentation Issues 
In terms of the documentation of the VAT payable, it would appear unlikely that 
operators’ ticketing and accounting systems could cope with the requirements.  Fiscal 
Authority audit assurance would be made very difficult and the production of satisfactory  
documentary evidence for purchasers of travel services to use for VAT deduction or 
refund purposes may be impossible since it is understood that operators’ ticketing 
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systems will be unable to record the customer’s place of establishment on the face of the 
travel ticket. 
5.6.2  Modal Specific Issues 
5.6.2.1  Airlines 
Because of the nature of the ticketing arrangements in the airline industry (with a vast 
majority of tickets being sold by independent travel agents located anywhere in the 
world) it is likely that the adoption of the customer option will cause a number of 
difficulties.  Beyond this, the increasing introduction of automated ticketing machines in 
this sector may also make it very difficult for the customer’s status to be determined to 
the point of sale.  In this context, the airline industry is slightly different from other 
passenger transport modes in that the airlines themselves rarely, if ever, deal with the sale 
of the ticket direct (employing, instead, a network of independent travel agents).  
It is understood that the relationship between the airlines and the independent travel 
agents is often difficult and that the re-patriation of ticketing revenues and accurate 
ticketing information is often delayed (sometimes by weeks or months).  The introduction 
of an additional requirement, placed upon independent agents, to determine and verify the 
customer’s status is, it is understood, likely to cause further friction between the airlines 
and the agents.  Further, it appears unlikely that the airlines will be able to exercise any 
control over the collection of this data by the independent agents.  The scope for error in 
airlines’ VAT accounting procedures is likely, therefore, to be increased significantly. 
In terms of reservation and ticketing system capability, it is understood that the IATA 
ticketing format would not, at present, enable the airlines to capture the necessary 
customer information (apart from the customer’s name) on the face on the ticket.  As 
such, a number of systems changes will need to be implemented to enable the customer 
option to be adopted. 
By the same token, inter-airline accounting, under the IATA system, would be made 
relatively simple (either under a VAT charge at source or “tax shift” structure). 
5.6.2.2  Rail 
Within the rail sector, the increasing incidence of automated ticketing machines is likely 
to make it very difficult to capture, accurately, the customer’s status for sales made 
through these machines.  Further, an additional requirement for booking office staff to 
capture and verify the customer’s status, accurately, is likely to place an additional 
administrative burden on railway operators at the point of sale. 
The railway industry also utilises the services of independent travel agents (albeit in a far 
more limited manner).  As such, the potential compliance issues outlined within the 
airline section above are also likely to apply in the rail industry. 
The COTIF system will not be able to be utilised to enable operators to account for VAT 
correctly (since no details of customers are held thereon).  Inter-operator VAT accounting 
will be facilitated, however, (with VAT being payable in the country of the operator 
making payment through the COTIF system) if the “ticketing” operator acts as principal, 
for the whole journey, for VAT purposes. European Commission 
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5.6.2.3  Road 
In the EU bus and coach industry, operators deal directly, on a more regular basis, with 
passengers as far as the ticketing arrangements are concerned.  However,  the accounting 
and ticketing systems are not automated and a requirement to verify the customer’s status 
at the time of booking the ticket (or, in many cases, boarding the vehicle) is likely to 
place an additional, possibly considerable, burden upon the operators themselves. 
For sub-contracted supplies between operators, the customer option would be relatively 
straightforward to implement provided it could be accompanied by “tax shift” 
arrangements, enabling the principal operator to account for VAT in his home EU 
Member State.  If the sub-contracting operator is required to levy a VAT charge at source, 
however, there is likely to be an increased requirement for these operators to become 
VAT registered elsewhere in the EU.  In both circumstances, there will be no increase in 
the instance of Eighth and Thirteenth Directive claims for “ticketing operators”). 
5.6.2.4  Maritime 
Within the EU shipping and ferry industry, ticketing is generally organised by 
independent travel agents.  As such, the potential issues outlined within the airlines 
section above are likely to apply to this sector. 
However, EU ferry operators often contract with business customers.  There customers 
are likely to be coach operators and, in these circumstances, the ferry operator would 
issue a single ticket to cover all of the passengers travelling on the coach.  In these 
circumstances, it may be possible to implement a “tax shift” mechanism in a limited form. 
5.6.3  Tax deduction: purchasers 
The customer option is likely to simplify the tax deduction mechanism for purchasers 
considerably (since the customer will always be incurring a VAT charge in his home 
Member State).  The incidence of EU Eighth Directive claims is likely to diminish 
significantly, therefore.  Similarly, the incidence of EU Thirteenth Directive claims, as far 
as passenger transport services are concerned, is likely to be reduced, almost to zero. 
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5.6.4  Harmonised VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the customer option 
under a harmonised rate scenario.  
5.6.4.1  Practical example 
Under a harmonised VAT rate scenario, the scope for tax avoidance, as far as EU 
customers are concerned, would be limited since tax would be chargeable irrespective of 
the Member State of belonging of the customer. 
5.6.4.2  Economic impact 
The harmonisation of VAT rates has the effect of simplifying the economic issues that 
arise under the customer option.  Harmonisation of VAT rates between Member States 
would mean that the issue of differential pricing arises only if non-EU passengers are 
exempt from paying VAT under this option. In addition for routes where the proportion 
of non-EU customers is negligible, the economic effects will be similar to the 
departure/arrival and operator options. 
Recall that in the operator option, the market can impose a discipline on higher fare 
operators as passengers will switch to low-fare operators, so forcing prices to converge. 
Under the customer option however, no such competitive pressures exist as a passenger’s 
nationality is clearly beyond his or her control. 
The differential treatment of EU and non-EU operators remains an important issue and 
may have implications for competition if non-EU operators are treated in practice in a 
different way to EU operators, because of difficulties of properly accounting for the 
passengers of EU origin on intra-EU journeys by non-EU operators. 
Therefore, under the customer option there are  two effects contributing to make the 
impact of a harmonised VAT much smaller than under the departure/arrival and 
operator options. In particular: 
  non-EU customers are likely to escape the tax as it will be very difficult to enforce 
the VAT rate for these passengers;  and further 
  it may also be difficult to collect VAT from EU customers using non-EU operators 
5.6.4.3  Fiscal impact 
The fiscal impact of harmonisation under the customer option is broadly similar to the 
operator option in terms of the direction of change for demand, gross turnover and 
profitability. 
However the magnitude is less, since non-EU customers will be outside the scope of the 
VAT regime. The total reduction in demand is 6.7 million trips which is approximately 
5% smaller than the effects experienced in the departure/arrival or operator options. A 
fuller discussion is presented in the Appendix. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




5.6.5  Multi VAT rate scenario 
This section explores the practical, economic and fiscal impacts of the customer option 
under a multi rate scenario.  
5.6.5.1  Practical example 
Under a multi VAT rate scenario, a VAT charge would fall due in the Member State of 
the customer only if that Member State currently applies a VAT charge on passenger 
transport.  Accordingly, it is conceivable that implementation of this option under a multi 
VAT rate scenario could lead to customers seeking to engineer the most efficient VAT 
treatment (particularly in circumstances where the customer is not entitled to full tax 
deduction or where the customer is identified for VAT purposes in a Member State which 
prevents deduction of tax incurred on passenger transport). 
The distinction between return journeys, round trips, stopovers and transit passengers will 
not be important since the VAT charge will be determined by the customer’s place of 
establishment. 
5.6.5.2  Economic impact and route specific examples 
Under the customer option with a multi VAT scenario, passengers from Member States 
which taxed passenger transport at the zero rate might expect to see fares fall and their 
purchasing power increase, the opposite holding true for passengers from countries with 
high rates of VAT.  Furthermore, operators from countries with a positive VAT rate (e.g. 
German, Belgian rail operators) would in general be more negatively affected as they will 
be carrying a greater share of passengers from the same country. 
Under the customer option, the revenue allocation will reflect the passenger mix of the 
passenger flows. For example on the Paris-Brussels route, it is assumed that Belgian 
passengers, for whom costs and prices would rise, account for one third of all passengers.   
For the markets as a whole, however, prices are very slightly lower as all other passengers 
see prices fall, but the change in prices is insufficient to have any effect on demand 
volumes.  The distribution of additional VAT revenues in this option depends on the 
nationality mix of passengers, so in principle all Member States would benefit. 
5.6.5.3  Fiscal impact 
Under the customer option the overall effect in terms of magnitude is slightly less than 
the departure/arrival and operator options, due to the size of the non-EU sector who face 
zero rates of VAT. At the country level the changes in the results can be attributed to how 
shares by nationality of customer differ from the operator and country of departure/arrival 
shares under the other options.  
Again, Germany experiences the largest net fall in turnover because it has the largest 
customer base and applies the highest rate of VAT. A fuller discussion is presented in the 
Appendix. European Commission 
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5.7  Level of a harmonised VAT rate 
How do total tax yields vary according to changes in the level of the harmonised VAT 
rate? 
This section addresses the question of what is the appropriate level for a uniform VAT 
rate. 
The effects of varying the rate of harmonisation between 5% and 15%, in terms of VAT 
revenues collected and net losses experienced in the market is summarised in Figure 5.3 
using the departure/arrival options as an example. Similar results would be obtained in 
aggregate under the other options. These show that for any rise in the harmonised VAT 
rate, the profitability of the market suffers.  
For a 5% harmonised rate, the revenue collected by the fiscal authorities is 1,890 million 
ECU with a net loss in the market of 1,473 million ECU. For a 15% harmonised rate, the 
revenue collected increases to 5,359 million ECU, with a net loss in the market of 4,328 
million ECU. 
Overall the relationship between VAT rate and profitability of the market is very 
constant and reflects the dominance of the air sector where uniform rate increases 
occur across all countries. 
Figure 5.3: VAT revenue collected by fiscal authorities and net losses experienced in 
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5.8  The impact of future regulatory developments in the European 
passenger market 
The estimates of the economic and fiscal impact under a harmonised or multi-VAT 
regime (and throughout this chapter) are for 1994. Since then, there has been a number of 
distinct changes in the EU transport market. These trends are expected to continue in the 
future, especially with respect to the regulatory environment. This section discusses the 
developments with related specifically to the intra-EU passenger transport market and the 
potential impact on our estimates of the economic and fiscal effects for each of the 
taxation options under harmonised and multi-VAT rate scenarios. 
5.8.1  Regulatory developments 
Two regulatory developments are thought to be significant: 
  first, the further liberalisation of the European air market; and 
  second, changes in the regulatory environment, and to some extent liberalisation, in 
the rail market. 
5.8.1.1  Liberalisation in the air market 
The deregulation measures implemented are quite recent and their effects have been 
relatively small as the lack of capacity at many airports hindered the entry of new airlines. 
A few Member States have developed much more dynamic regulatory regimes and 
pursued privatisation programmes which have increased their competitive advantages of 
their operators. Over the next few years, the effects of deregulation in the sector will 
become more apparent. In particular, the implications of the further liberalisation of the 
air market are the following: 
  the continued liberalisation of air travel will lead to faster growth, further increasing 
the fiscal revenues accruing to the authorities, following the introduction of a 
harmonised VAT rate; 
  liberalisation will also increase competition and  will reduce the ability of airlines to 
absorb the introduction of a new tax; a greater percentage of any given VAT will 
therefore get passed on to the customers. Competition will be further enhanced as the 
privatisation of those airlines still in state ownership continues; and 
  increased competition will force further consolidation within the industry in order than 
airlines will remain competitive both within and outside the EU. This will be focused 
on the big players forming international alliances. Conversely, the number of smaller 
operators may increase as the niche point to point market increases. 
  increased inter-modal competition on all intra-EU routes, will imply that the routes 
where there is competition with HSR will become more important for the airlines; any 
distortions created through the VAT system will therefore be also more important in 
routes. 
Finally, a possible threat to airlines growth in the future could be high speed trains. The 
evidence is that the traffic diversion although measurable is quite small in relation to the 
overall scale of the air market. A differing view is that high speed rail services are European Commission 
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complementary and could actually play a role for the airline industry by providing inter-
modal access facilities; a number of airports are currently examining the possibility of 
providing access to HSR networks. 
5.8.1.2  Changes to the regulatory environment in the rail market 
Liberalisation of the EU rail market, albeit more gradually, is also a policy aim of the EU. 
Under this situation, operators would become more sensitive to market forces and likely 
to adjust their services and hence infrastructure accordingly. The EU Transport Ministers 
developed guidelines in 1991 to improve the efficiency of railways and to encourage their 
adaptation to market conditions. The key objectives were to: 
  ensure management independence of railways; 
  separate rail track operation from the delivery of rail services; 
  improve the financial situation of the  national railways; and 
  provide access to the railway infrastructure. 
Progress has been made in all Member States towards meeting these objectives, 
especially management independence and separation, whereas problems have been 
created in the provision of access rights to infrastructure. 
The separation of rail track operation from service provision will lead to increased 
competition for the acquisition of licences to offer rail services.  Airline operators could 
therefore obtain licences to offer rail services, thus reducing competition in routes with 
HSR links.
135  This would reduce any competitive implications of different VAT 
treatment of air and rail operators. 
The separation of rail track operation from the provision of rail services will also imply 
that it will not be possible to use any subsidies for rail track operation for service 
provision and vice versa.  Any VAT induced distortions for the provision of rail 
passenger transport services will therefore become more significant. 
5.8.2  Quantification of the future developments 
5.8.2.1  Departure/arrival option 
Since 1994, there has been a steady growth in the passenger transport market. The main 
driver of this growth is the increase in the air market which dominates intra-EU travel, 
with increase of around 8% per annum while for rail/coach travel growth is much less at 
around 1%
136. As a result, under a harmonised VAT, rate VAT revenues will, in total, be 
approximately 20% higher for 1997, although there may be some differences at the 
country level.  
Taking into account the factors in the above section, these trends are expected to 
continue, albeit with slightly lower growth rate of 5% for air travel as the market matures 
and a higher growth of 3% for rail travel (see Table 2.1) due to the introduction of HSR. 
                                                      
135 For example, Virgin, of the UK, participates in the consortium offering channel tunnel HSR services and 
also offers air passenger transport services between London and Brussels. 
136 Panorama of EU Industry 1997. European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




Therefore, the total amount of VAT revenues collected is expected to increase by around 
5% per annum in the future. 
Under the multi-VAT rate scenario, the magnitude of the  fiscal impact of switching from 
the current distance based regime towards any of the taxation options is small. The 
magnitude of our estimates are therefore unlikely to be affected by the growth or change 
in the market to any significant amount in comparison to the total market. VAT revenues 
still expected to increase by 20% by 1997 and 5% per annum thereafter. 
5.8.2.2  Operator option 
Under the operator option, VAT revenues will be 20% higher by 1997 and grow at a rate 
of around 5% per annum in the future for the same reasons identified in the above section. 
Liberalisation and deregulation of the air market has caused a gradual decline in the 
dominance of  flag carriers since 1994 (see Chapter 2) as other carriers, both large and 
small, enter the market. To date, most of these new entrants have been European.  
Thus, under a harmonised VAT rate scenario, total tax revenue collected will not be 
significantly affected as European operators all face 8% VAT increases There may, 
however, be some distinct changes at the country level. For example, a majority of low-
cost entrants are from the UK and Ireland and thus, the share of intra-EU market for these 
countries will rise resulting in  increases in the size of their tax burden. 
Under a multi-VAT rate scenario, service providers from countries with 0% VAT rate 
will be able to bid to offer services in EU Member States with positive (or higher) VAT 
rates, taking advantage of the VAT discrepancy to make more competitive bids.  This 
would affect especially Germany and Austria, which levy the highest VAT rates on rail.  
This would be true for both intra-EU and domestic rail travel. 
5.9  Conclusions 
The key findings are as follows: 
Current regime 
  in the intra-EU market, estimates suggest that 61 million ECU in VAT revenues, a 
small proportion of gross turnover, is collected by the European fiscal authorities. All 
of this revenue is collected in the rail and coach market, as air and sea travel is zero-
rated, and a vast majority by the German authorities. 
Harmonised VAT rates 
  the conclusion is that with harmonised VAT rates, many of the competitive effects and 
practical difficulties outlined above disappear since existing distortions between 
modes are removed. Harmonisation also has the effect of removing the scope from one 
Member State to gain at the expense of another as a result of imposing a low VAT 
rate; 
  the impact of harmonising VAT rates on demand volumes and gross turnover will 
clearly depend on the rate chosen and its effect will vary according to the market 
under consideration. Where the existing rate is lower than the rate chosen then the 
impact on the transport markets is likely to be negative since this will result in rising European Commission 
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costs and prices, whereas the opposite effect will occur for Member States with an 
existing rate higher than the chosen rate; 
  in terms of the effects on the particular modes, demand will fall by the largest amount 
in the sea and air markets where a zero rate of VAT is currently imposed. 
Furthermore, sea will be affected to a larger extent as it is predominately leisure travel, 
which is more sensitive to price changes; 
  for countries with a high initial rate of VAT on rail and coach travel, harmonisation 
will have the impact of increasing the competitiveness of rail travel. In terms of 
particular routes, the medium distance HSR segment will be most affected with mode 
shifts towards rail occurring. The other medium distance segment will be affected, but 
due to smaller amount of competition between modes, the amount of shift will be 
considerably lower; and 
  the impact of harmonisation will be determined predominately by the air sector, which 
has a market share that dominates other modes of travel. Under harmonised rates, 
consistent rises in air fares will occur across the market, since the current rate of VAT 
in EU15 for air travel is 0%. Furthermore, as air travel dominates other modes, the 
overall market will suffer a fall in passenger demand while revenues collected by 
fiscal authorities increase. 
Under each of the taxation options, the effect of harmonisation with a uniformed rate 
of 8% impacts most on the air sector which accounts for 92% of the market in value 
terms. Furthermore, since VAT increases in the air sector, will occur for all Member 
States, the effects at the country level are broadly similar in percentage terms. 
  in terms of the wider economic effects of a uniform 8% rate, an overall loss of 2.8 
million passengers occurs in the air/rail/coach segment and an extra 3,021 million 
ECU is collected by the EU fiscal authorities. In terms of profitability, the market 
experiences a loss of 1,546 million ECU or 5.7% of gross turnover. The net loss in 
profitability of the sector is proportional to increases in VAT rates, a conclusion which 
results from the dominance of the air sector which experiences uniform increases in 
VAT in all Member States; and  
  for certain Member States, the magnitude of changes is vastly different under the 
departure or arrival options on the one hand and the operator option on the other. For 
example, under the departure or arrival option, the UK fiscal authorities would collect 
534 million ECU, while under the operator option UK operators face a greater VAT 
charge of  719 million ECU. 
Multi-VAT rates 
  for a lower harmonised VAT rate of 5%, revenues collected by the fiscal authorities in 
the intra-EU market are reduced to 1,890 million ECU and the market experiences a 
net loss of 1,473 million ECU. For a higher rate of 15%, the revenues collected 
increase to 5,359 million ECU with a net loss of 4,328 million ECU. Overall the 
relationship between VAT rate and profitability of the market is very constant and 
reflects the dominance of the air sector where uniform rate increases across all 
countries occurs. 
  for intra-EU travel involving Member States with a positive rate of VAT on some, but 
not all, modes, the departure and arrival options could have the effect of increasing 
existing distortions by raising the effective rate of VAT rate paid by the taxed modes; European Commission 
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  the operator option provides a potential incentive for operators from Member States 
where VAT on passenger transport services is levied at a reduced or zero-rate to enter 
the markets where operators from Member States with high VAT rates currently 
provide transport services in order to exploit cost advantages arising from the different 
VAT regimes. Non-EU operators may also seek to base themselves in low rate or 
zero-rated Member States to exploit this distortion; 
  the customer option is likely to have a similar impact (but smaller in magnitude) in 
terms of competition as the operator option, as operators from countries with a 
positive VAT rate will be carrying relatively more passengers from that country; 
  in terms of wider economic effects, these are driven by price changes that arise from 
changes in VAT costs. Given the size of the price changes under consideration, the 
effects on any given transport market are likely to be relatively small. There is also an 
effect on the allocation of fiscal revenues with the distribution of revenues varying 
according to the option chosen. In practical terms, the customer option could be 
extremely difficult to apply; 
  overall, the fiscal impact of a switch to the different taxation options under the current 
VAT regime is negligible, with only a loss of 0.2% of gross turnover experienced by 
the total intra-EU market; and 
As a general conclusion, it appears that harmonising VAT rates across modes and 
countries at a positive rate in line with current VAT rates is likely to have larger 
economic effect than moving to the alternative taxation options under existing rates. This 
is because, in the case of harmonisation, all operators would have to levy VAT rather than 
just some as is presently the case. This, in turn, would lead to bigger changes in costs and 
prices and bigger effects on demand volumes. 
In terms of the practical administration of the options (for transport operators and fiscal 
authorities alike), the adoption of the departure, arrival and operator options should not 
have a significant impact.  The customer option would be very difficult to implement, 
however, and the requirement for operators to verify the customer’s status could have 
serious consequences as far as the free movement of persons within the external EU 
frontiers is concerned. Whichever scenario is adopted, it is clear that effective provisions 
will need to be introduced to ensure that non-EU operators are brought within the scope 
of the tax.  Further, EU fiscal authorities must ensure that non-EU operators are subjected 
to the same levels of control as EU-based operators. 
The scope of the VAT charge will also need to be defined clearly.  A requirement for 
operators to account for VAT on intra-EU legs of journeys to/from non-EU countries (or 
on journeys which merely transit EU territory) is likely to bring many more operators into 
the scope of a VAT charge.  The cost of operator compliance (and fiscal authority 
administration) is not likely to justify the tax revenue which would fall payable if such 
journeys were taxed. European Commission 
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6 EU-third country and domestic passenger transport 
markets. 
6.1  Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide an assessment of the extent to which a policy of a 
harmonised VAT rate would damage the EU transport industry, EU airline and maritime 
operators, with regard to third country operators. An assessment of the appropriate level 
of a harmonised rate is also provided in this chapter. The section is organised as follows: 
  first, a summary of the scope and basis of  VAT for EU-third country travel; 
-  highlighting the distortions present in the existing regime; 
-  providing a description of any problems of implementation that may occur if VAT 
was applied to this type of travel; and 
-  outlining a presentation of a methodology for applying VAT within this market 
  second, where a positive VAT rate is applied to intra-EU leg of a journey, demand for 
air passenger transport would favour a direct trip rather than a stopover trip. This 
analysis presents findings for all EU-third country travel by building upon the case 
study of the Frankfurt-New York route modelling which is presented in the Appendix. 
  third, an analysis of the competitive position of EU operators vis-à-vis non-EU 
operators in both the third county-EU and intra-EU markets;  specifically, the extent to 
which there may be a switch to non-EU operators if a positive rate was introduced but 
was unequally enforced between EU operators and non-EU operators (which is a 
possibility, as the German experience of the application of the VAT charge on certain 
domestic legs of international and intra-EU air journeys suggests).  
  fourth, an analysis of the effect of harmonising VAT rates at 8% within domestic 
markets. 
6.2  Scope and basis of taxation 
6.2.1  EU and non-EU operators 
Under the current regime, Member States generally apply a zero rate of VAT on 
international air transport, while at the same time maintaining a positive VAT rate on 
rail/coach. The justification for this different VAT treatment is the complexity of 
international air passenger transport in terms of the potential competition of any number 
of operators from different countries on any route. Under a harmonised rate, this implies a 
real risk of creating competitive disadvantages for national airline operators vis-à-vis 
other EU and international operators. 
It is important also that EU and non-EU based operators providing passenger transport 
within the EU are subject to the same rules and are treated consistently for VAT 
purposes.  Failure to do so could cause competitive distortions and place EU-based 
operators at a commercial disadvantage. European Commission 
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The VAT audit of non-EU operators is likely to be problematic if for no other reason than 
the principal accounting centre may be located outside the EU.  As indicated above, it is 
in the interest of both Member State authorities and EU-based operators to ensure that an 
effective and practical mechanism of taxation is established and applied so that no 
distortions of competition arise. 
6.2.2  EU- third country market 
In  the third country-EU market, the major problem of a harmonised VAT rate is, when a 
positive VAT rate is only applied to intra-EU leg of a journey, demand for air passenger 
transport would favour a direct trip (e.g. Frankfurt–New York) rather than a stopover trip 
(e.g. Frankfurt–Other EU–New York). This is illustrated with an analogy to the current 
situation where a positive rate of VAT is applied only on the domestic leg of an intra-EU 
trip resulting in a shift towards direct trips. Data for Germany shows the significance of 
this distortion, where some 5% of international flights, including intra-EU, originating in 
Germany
137 are broken by a domestic stopover. 
In contrast, in the intra-EU market, harmonisation of VAT rates across modes and 
countries would have the benefit of removing this potential problem associated with 
defining the place of departure for journeys with stopovers (or changes of operator or 
mode) as the same rate of VAT would be charged irrespective of whether the journey 
counts as one or two trips. 
It will be necessary to formulate a clear definition of which journeys are subject to EU 
VAT.  EU operators would not be required to levy VAT on journeys which take place 
wholly outside EU territory but the taxation treatment of journeys which start or finish 
within the EU (having terminated or commenced in third countries) will need to be clear. 
A “hybrid” taxation system could be introduced where tax is applied to the element of the 
journey within EU territory.  This means that the current distance based system would be 
applied to EU-third country travel (to enable the apportionment of ticketing revenues) 
while one of the taxation options (departure/arrival, operator or customer) would be 
applied to intra-EU travel. Under this system, the problems of diversion between direct 
and indirect services would be limited and many more non-EU operators would be likely 
to be brought within the scope of EU VAT. 
However, even though taxing intra-EU legs of international journeys at a positive rate 
remains an option under each of the alternative proposals for passenger transport taxation,  
the effect of so doing may be to transport many of the burdensome aspects of the current 
taxation system to the revised structure. 
6.2.3  Transit journeys 
The current taxation system also obliges Member States to tax journeys which cross its 
territory. However, those Member States which exempted such services as at 1 January 
1991 may continue to do so until the end of the transitional period
138. Such taxation is 
generally restricted to land-based transits.  If, under the new taxation system (particularly 
one involving a uniform, positive rate), transits remain subject to EU taxation, many 
                                                      
137 Source: German airline industry. 
138 Article 28(2): EU Sixth Directive European Commission 
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operators (principally airlines) which do not currently provide services to, from or within 
the EU would technically be brought within the scope of EU VAT. 
In summary, the taxation of intra-EU legs (or transits) of international passenger transport 
is likely to increase the compliance burden of operators significantly, bring more non-EU 
operators within the scope of EU VAT, intensify the administrative burden on EU fiscal 
authorities and create further competitive distortions. 
6.3  Quantification of the distortion in the EU-third country market
139 
6.3.1  Direct and indirect services 
What is the impact of a harmonised VAT rate of 8% on competition between any direct 
and indirect air services in the whole EU-third country market? 
This section quantifies  the impact of a harmonised VAT rate on competition between 
direct and indirect air services. Only the air market is dealt with as no significant amount 
of third country travel exists for the other modes. It builds upon the case study of the 
Frankfurt-New York route model which is presented in detail in the Appendix. A 
summary of the findings from this route model with a 8% VAT rate for the Frankfurt-
Other EU airport leg of the indirect service to New York are: 
  an effective leisure price increases for the whole Frankfurt-New York journey in the 
region of  3%; 
  total demand is almost unaffected, but route distortions have been introduced with a 
0.4% shift away from indirect travel towards direct air services 
  profitability of the market
140 is virtually unaffected, with a net loss of only 302 million 
ECU occurring as the increase in gross turnover almost offsets the increase in VAT 
revenues.  
  there are however, definite winners and losers. The winners are all operators with 
direct services to destinations outside the EU through increased turnover on direct 
routes, of which a large proportion would be non-EU operators. German operators 
face a redistribution of their passengers from the indirect to the direct service while 
losses occur for other-EU operators. 
Expanding this case study to the overall European market, German operators are also 
likely to suffer; if for example, passengers from Austria, Denmark and Sweden, who 
previously used connecting services to Frankfurt or other German airports, now avoid 
Germany altogether by travelling direct. The quantification of this total distortion, and its 
effect on competition between EU and non-EU operators, is the subject of the next 
section where groups of routes in the EU are examined under each of the taxation options. 
These groups are identified in terms of particular attributes such as: 
  the proportion of business travellers; 
                                                      
139 Indirect air mode is defined as passengers who transfer at another EU airport while direct air mode is 
defined as all direct services with a possible transfer outside the EU territory. 
140 In order to allow the assessment of the true impact of each option for the operators, the net gains/losses 
that arise under each option are determined by subtracting the increase in VAT liabilities from any increase 
in gross turnover. European Commission 
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  the extent to which the VAT increase is passed on to consumers; 
  the size of the non-EU sector; and 
  the proportion of passengers travelling indirectly via other EU airports. 
6.3.1.1  Departure/arrival options 
Table 6.1 shows the impact of a harmonised rate, under the departure/arrival options, on 
competition between direct and indirect services. Thus, depending on route 
characteristics, the effect of a switch to the departure/arrival option under a harmonised 
rate of 8% is a reduction in demand on the indirect leg of between 1.8% and 2.8%, with 
a significant proportion of this demand diverting to the direct service. Further, this shift in 
demand increases as the proportion of the non-business segment and the percentage pass 
through in the business segment rises. 
Table 6.1: Competition between direct and indirect routes, under harmonised VAT 
rates of 8% - departure/arrival option. 
Indirect Route
1 
% Business Share   % pass through (business)  % Change in Demand  Examples of Routes 
0% n/a  -2.8%  Barcelona-New  York 
15% 100%  -2.4%  Lyon-New  York 
15% 25%  -2.2%  Frankfurt-New  York 
30% 100%  -2.0%  Paris-New  York 
30% 25%  -1.8%  London-New  York 
Source: KPMG analysis 
6.3.1.2  Operator option 
Under the operator option, identical results to the departure option will occur if it is 
assumed that non-EU operators on intra-EU routes are subject to the same harmonised rate 
of 8%. If this assumption is relaxed, then prices remain unchanged for non-EU operators, 
and the level of demand switching from indirect services will be less as shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Competition between direct and indirect routes
1, under harmonised VAT 
rates of 8% - operator option. 
Indirect route  
%Business Share  % Non-EU operators   % Pass through  Change in Demand (%) 
0% 20%  n/a  2.2% 
0% 40%  n/a  1.7% 
15% 20%  100%  1.9% 
15% 40%  100%  1.4% 
15% 20%  25%  1.8% 
15% 40%  25%  1.3% 
30% 20%  100%  1.6% 
30% 40%  100%  1.2% 
30% 20%  25%  1.4% 
30% 40%  25%  1.1% 
Source: KPMG analysis European Commission 
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Overall the analysis shows that the amount of switching from an indirect service to a direct 
service will become smaller as the level of non-EU operators’ market share increases or 
alternatively as the level of competition increases. In terms of the effect on key variables, if 
non-EU operators command a market share of 20% then estimates suggest that at worst 
(routes with a non-existent business sector) just over 2% of demand transfers, whereas at 
best (mainly leisure routes, with low pass through rates in the business segment) only 
1.4% of demand transfers from the indirect to the direct service. If the market share of 
non-EU operators rises to 40% then these figures are reduced to 1.7% and 1.1% 
respectively. 
6.3.1.3  Customer option 
Under the customer option, the diversion of passengers from the indirect to the direct 
route will be identical in magnitude and effect to the operator option where the proportion 
of non-EU customers equals the proportion of non-EU operators. This means that as the 
market share of non-EU customers on the indirect route rises, then the demand shifting 
away towards direct services  becomes smaller. 
To summarise, under the each of the options, the effect of harmonisation of VAT will be 
to introduce competitive distortions between direct and indirect air services, if the VAT 
rate is applied to legs within the EU, and if journeys commencing within the EU and 
terminating outside the EU are not subject to VAT.  
6.3.1.4  Multi-VAT rates 
Under the existing VAT regime for the Frankfurt-New York via an other European airports 
route, a switch to any of the place of taxation options will have no effect since, in practice 
all international air transport is zero rated in EU Member States. If however, the other 
European airport is within Germany, then domestic VAT rate would apply on the 
Frankfurt–Other German airport leg of the journey and a significant distortion will occur.  
This is unlikely for this particular route, but may be significant for other routes emanating 
from other parts of Germany, such as Munich–Frankfurt–New York. 
6.3.2  EU and non-EU air operators 
What are the quantifiable distortions, arising from the introduction of a harmonised VAT 
rate, between EU and non-EU operators in the EU-third country market? 
In terms of the whole EU-third country travel, the magnitude of the distortion between 
direct and indirect services, and therefore competition between EU and non-EU operators, 
is determined by the proportion of indirect air travel. 
Recall, from the Frankfurt–New York case study that this share was around 16% of the 
market. If it is now assumed that in the whole intra-EU market the proportion of indirect 
air travel is in a range around this share, then an illustration of the likely range of effects, 
vis-à-vis competition between EU and non-EU operators, can be formulated. Table 6.3 
presents the results of such analysis with the proportion of indirect air trips assumed to 
account for 10%, 20% and 40% of the market.  European Commission 
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From Table 6.3, depending on route characteristics, demand falls from 1.4% to 2.2%, if 
non-EU operators command a market share of 20% (the current market share) and avoid 
the harmonised VAT rate applied. 
Table 6.3: Competition between EU and non-EU air operators under unequal VAT 
rates
1 
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20% of intra-EU air passengers travelling on to third country  
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40% of intra-EU air passengers travelling on to third country  
Number of intra-EU 
passengers travelling on 



































Source: IATA, AEA, KPMG analysis. 
Notes 
1 harmonised VAT rate of 8% for EU operators and a 0% rate  for non-EU operators 
2  Best case assumes a fall in demand of 1.4%, while the worst case assumes a reduction in demand of  2.2% 
For illustrative purposes, the analysis assumes that all of the passengers who divert from 
the indirect service, derived in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, will transfer to the direct service. 
Furthermore, if it is assumed that operators retain their market share, then the shift in 
demand towards non-EU operators can be quantified, with the exact amount of switching 
dependent on operators share in each market.  
Currently, in the intra-EU market, 71 million scheduled international air trips were made 
in 1994 with 79% made by  EU operators. For the 98 million third country-EU trips made 
the market share was slightly in favour of non-EU operators, who account for a 54% European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




share. Thus, from Table 6.3, with 10% of intra-EU air passengers using indirect routes for 
ongoing third country travel, the effect of a harmonised rate will be: 
  a shift of 79,000 passengers onto direct routes in the best case scenario, rising to a 
shift of 123,000 passengers in the worst case scenario; and 
  non-EU operators gaining between 42,000 and 67,000 passengers from EU operators. 
Under the assumption that 40% of the intra-EU market is ongoing traffic (i.e travelling on 
to third countries), then estimates suggests that the loss of passengers experienced by EU 
operators is between 170,000 and 266,000 passengers.  
To summarise, if a VAT rate is applied on the intra-EU legs of indirect services to third 
countries, this will have the effect of switching demand from indirect services and from 
EU operators.   
6.4  Quantification of the distortion between EU and non-EU operators 
in the intra-EU market 
What are the quantifiable distortions, arising from the introduction of a harmonised VAT 
rate, between EU and non-EU operators in the intra-EU market? 
This section looks at the effects that a harmonised VAT rate has on competition between 
EU and non-EU operators for intra-EU travel only, with all modes of transport included 
in the analysis. In terms of terms of extending the above results to the intra-EU air 
market, two alternative scenarios have been investigated which are as follows: 
  In the first case, it is assumed that no route substitution takes place and that passengers 
who might have diverted to the other routes instead simply transfer to the less 
expensive non-EU operator on the same route. This results in between 1.4% and 
2.2% of demand being lost by the EU sector to the non-EU sector. 
  In the second case, non-EU and EU operators would charge the same price, either by 
non-EU operators increasing prices and therefore raising profits, or by the EU sector 
reducing prices to match the non-EU sector. Market shares would remain the same 
and there would either be a reduction in profitability for EU operators, or an 
increase in profits for the non-EU sector.  
The actual effect will be somewhere between these extremes, with some degree of 
competitive pressure forcing EU operators’ prices, some extra profits taken by the non-
EU sector, and some demand switching from the EU to the non-EU sector. 
For the other modes - rail, coach and sea - the effect of a harmonised VAT rate will be 
much less significant, than in the air market, as both the level of demand and 
proportion of non-EU operators is considerably lower than in the air market.  
However, significant effects will occur in certain areas, affecting Eastern European 
operators in the coach market, and ‘flag of convenience’ vessels in the sea market on 
routes such as Greece–Italy. 
Table 6.4 summarises the effects of a switch to harmonised rates where non-EU operators 
avoid the charge. For this analysis, the effective VAT rate for rail and coach travel is 
assumed to be broadly similar to the harmonised rate; this does not affect this analysis as 
the main concern is the effect of differences between EU and non-EU operators. European Commission 
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Table 6.4: Competition between EU and non-EU operators (air, rail, sea and coach)  
under harmonisation, with unequal VAT rates
1  (initial rail/coach VAT rate of 8%)  







No change in demand 
No change in mode shares 
No significant change in non-EU operators share 
Small decrease in fiscal revenues 






No change in demand 
Small shift towards air and sea travel 
Increase in non-EU operators market share 
Decrease in fiscal revenues 
Long-distance, intra-









Increase in demand 
Small shift towards air and sea travel 
Large increase in non-EU operators’ market share 
Large decrease in fiscal revenues 
Long-distance,  intra-
EU other  
travel 
Air
1  Increase in demand 
No change in mode shares 
Increase in non-EU operators’ market share 
Decrease in fiscal revenues 
Long distance, 
EU-third country travel 
Air
1  No change in demand 
Large shift from indirect to direct services 
Large increase in non-EU operators’ market share 
Large decrease in fiscal revenues 
Source: KPMG analysis 
Notes 
1   Non-EU operators have a significant share of the market 
  
6.5  The impact of future developments in the transport market 
In the future, it is likely than non-EU operators will enter the intra-EU market in greater 
numbers as liberalisation of the air market continues. As a result, total revenues collected 
by the fiscal authorities will be less (all things equal). However, the general growth in the 
air market of around 5% will dwarf this effect and ensure that total VAT revenues 
collected increase. 
At present many of intra-EU routes are considered not to be particularly profitable. If 
costs were increased in the European market significantly, it would be difficult to 
envisage a situation in which they could be absorbed without a further reduction in 
profitability or increase in loss. Many operators use the intra-EU markets as access 
markets for more profitable transatlantic routes and so indirectly, EU-third country routes 
would suffer. 
In addition, the specific competition between US and EU operators needs to be analysed, 
as a 10% sales tax
141  is expected to apply in the US for the intra-US leg of the indirect 
service from late 1997 (see Section 4.3.3). Thus, in an analogy to the situation in the EU 
market above, for US-third country travel, there may be a switch from indirect to direct 
services. However in terms of a switch from US to EU operators for intra-US traffic, the 
effect is likely to be small as EU operators currently have a negligible share of the intra-
US market. This may change with the EU-US open skies agreement. 
                                                      
141 Interview with airline operators; the tax is imposed on sales in the US, for domestic travel within the US. European Commission 
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6.6  Country-specific issues 
Intra-community travel taking place over non-EU countries and travel to third countries 
raises a number of country-specific issues, most notably for Greece, Portugal, Ireland, 
Finland and Sweden.  
In the case of Greece, Portugal and Ireland, and to a significant extent Finland and 
Sweden, very limited competition exists between air and the other modes of transport for 
intra-EU travel. The introduction of a harmonised VAT rate would therefore affect 
negatively air travel to and from these countries, without having any corrective effect, in 
terms of competition between modes. Our quantitative estimates (see Appendix 5.3) of 
this effect are the following:  
  in Greece the demand in the air market falls by 197,000 in comparison to a fall in the 
total market of only 200,000. In terms of additional VAT revenues raised, the air 
market alone accounts for 78 million ECU out of the total 80 million ECU collected; 
  in Ireland changes in the air market, accounts for a fall in passenger demand of 
190,000 out of a total fall of 210,000. Air travel accounted for 77 million ECU out of 
the total 78 million ECU additional VAT revenues raised by the fiscal authorities; and 
  in Portugal changes in the air market accounted for a reduction in passenger demand 
of 180,000 out a reduction in the total market of 184,000. 
In the case of Greece and to a lesser extent Finland/Sweden, travel to neighbouring non-
EU countries could be favoured in terms of tourism flows, as travel to and from these 
countries would be treated as international travel and therefore attract a 0% VAT rate. A 
broad estimate is a 2.8% reduction in demand derived from the impact of a harmonised 
VAT rate on direct/indirect services (see Table 6.1). This estimate is an upper bound as a 
demand switch from indirect to direct services (ie Frankfurt-Amsterdam-New York to 
Frankfurt-New York) will  be considerably less sensitive to price changes than 
destination shifts (i.e. UK-Greece to UK-Turkey). Broad estimates of this effect is a 
reduction of. 
  90,000 passengers per annum in the tourist market to and from Greece; and  
  120,000 passengers per annum in the tourist market to and from Finland/Sweden. 
In  the case of  Switzerland, in addition to the tourism flow issue mentioned above, there 
is a potential problem of intra-EU travel taking place on the territory of this country; for 
example journey between France and Austria (i.e. intra-EU) could potential pass through 
Switzerland (third-country). 
This does not have any implications for the departure/arrival option in both the 
harmonised and multi-VAT rate scenario as Switzerland will be treated in the same 
manner as any other zero rated Member State. For example on the France-Austria route, 
under the current distance based system rail and coach travel incur VAT on the 
proportion of journey within Austria (approximately one-quarter) with a resultant 
effective VAT rate of 2.5%. Now under the departure/arrival system, the whole of the 
Austria to France journey incurs a 10% VAT charge whereas in the opposite direction a 
0% VAT charge is incurred. This result is a price rise for rail and coach travel as the 
effective rate of VAT increases from 2.5% to 5%. The implications for the tax system 
with respect to this route are identical to those analysed in the London-Brussels case European Commission 
A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 




study (see Appendix 5) except that the level of VAT for the positive rated country is now 
10% instead of 6%. 
However, under the operator option the introduction of a harmonised VAT rate across the 
EU could favour Swiss air, rail and coach operators present in the intra-EU market. This 
is likely to be greatest for routes through Switzerland between neighbouring countries. 
Our estimates
142 suggest that as many as 20,000 air and 15,000 rail/coach passengers 
would travel by Swiss operators if the VAT rate is unequally applied between Swiss and 
EU operators. The effect in the rail and coach market is almost as large as the air sector, 
as Swiss air operators do not have a very large presence in the intra-EU market
143. 
A similar argument also holds for eastern European operators (especially coach) in 
neighbouring countries such as Germany, Austria and Italy. However, the penetration of 
these operators in intra-EU markets is quite limited at present.  
 
                                                      
142 This has been derived by estimating the proportion of intra-EU rail and coach services which are likely to 
travel through Switzerland  (and therefore have a high proportion of Swiss operators). The estimate of the 
switch to Swiss operators, instead of EU operators, is then derived based on the analysis in Section 6.4. 
143 Estimated from Table 2.2 and AEA 1995. European Commission 
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6.7  Impact of the harmonised VAT rate for domestic travel  
This section examines the effect of harmonising VAT rates at 8% within domestic 
markets (the discussion for sea travel is presented in Appendix 6.2). Recall, from Chapter 
2 that the size of the domestic market is considerably larger than the intra-EU market, 
accounting for 31 billion passengers or 99% of all trips made within the EU. However, 
due to the smaller distances involved, the share of the market in value terms is much 
lower at 60%.  
Table 6.5 presents a summary of key statistics in terms of volume of passenger trips and 
gross turnover; a detailed presentation of the data and its derivation is shown in Appendix 
6.1. In terms of the importance of  the different market segments, the market is dominated 
by urban trips. These account for just over 84% of all trips, with Germany, the UK, 
France and Italy having the largest markets. In terms of VAT revenues, estimates suggest 
that the fiscal authorities collected over 7 billion ECU or 5% of gross turnover in 1994, 
with Germany collecting the largest proportion of this, over 2 billion ECU.  
It should be stressed that the figures provided in this section are very broad estimates. 
Furthermore, the prime concern is with the proportional changes that occur from the 
current regime rather than the absolute values presented. 
Table 6.5 Domestic EU passenger transport market  in 1994 - volume and gross 
market turnover by country of arrival/departure  
  Passenger trips (millions) 
 




 Urban  Non-urban Total  Total  Total 
Austria  405 105 510  4,150  378 
Belgium  304 132 436  3,450  194 
Denmark  316 68 384  3,800  0 
Finland  405 66 472  2,550  143 
France  4,316 756 5,072  25,950  1,354 
Germany  7,873 1064 8,938  28,250  2,320 
Greece  668 136 804  1,950  144 
Ireland  192 47 238  800  0 
Italy  3,154 748 3,901  26,350  803 
Luxembourg  18 5 24  150  4 
Netherlands  390 201 591  5,100  290 
Portugal  1,109 129 1,239  4,100  195 
Spain  2,168 512 2,680  14,100  1,246 
Sweden  405 114 520  4,300  464 
UK  4,347 763 5,110  17,700  0 
         







Source: IATA, AEA, UIC, Eurostat, KPMG analysis 
A key feature of domestic markets under the current regime is the application of 
differential rates of VAT for urban and non-urban travel. For example, in Germany urban 
travel, or travel over distances less than 50km, attracts a reduced rate of VAT of 7%, 
while for non-urban transport the normal rate of 15% is levied. A switch towards a European Commission 
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harmonised rate of 8% will therefore have different effects according to the market 
segment; to reflect this, urban and non-urban markets are modelled separately. However, 
a detailed disaggregation of data by mode for urban and non-urban travel in each of the 
EU15 countries was not available. Assumptions have therefore been used to derive this 
data together with specific assumptions, about  how changes in VAT rates affect fares, 
and how sensitive the market is to these fare changes (a more detailed description is given 
in Appendix 6.1) 
Note that market segmentation in the domestic model has been increased to cover three 
groups; business, leisure and commuting. The additional category of commuting has been 
included, as this reacts in a different way from the business and leisure markets.  
6.7.1  Harmonisation of VAT rate 
What is the fiscal impact on total tax yields, at the Member State and EU level, of the 
introduction of a harmonised VAT rate in EU domestic markets? 
The effects of a harmonised VAT rate of 8% is shown in Table 6.6. Overall, VAT 
revenues collected are increased by nearly 50%, or by 3672 billion ECU. Passenger 
demand is reduced by 0.1% while profitability of the market falls by 0.3% of  gross 
turnover. These effects are however, vastly different according to market segment. For 
instance, profitability falls in the urban market by 0.6% of gross turnover, while in the 
non-urban market it increases by 0.3%. These results are a function of the different 
starting rates present in the urban and non-urban markets which on average increase in 
the urban market and fall in the non-urban market, as a result of the harmonisation. 
At the country level, the most significant change in magnitude terms occurs for the UK 
which currently imposes zero rates of VAT on all domestic travel. Under harmonised 
rates, demand falls by 2.3% with a consequent fall in profits of 2.7% of gross turnover. 
Large proportional falls also occur for Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg but as these 
countries have much smaller markets, the magnitude of the changes is considerably less. 
Italy also experiences similar falls to the UK in the profitability of the urban market, but 
as an opposite effect of rising demand and market profitability occurs in the non-urban 
market, profitability in the country as a  whole remains broadly unchanged with a small 
reduction of 0.2% of gross turnover. 
In terms of the amount of VAT revenues, the largest rise in revenues collected occurs in 
the UK with an extra 1.5 billion ECU raised, followed closely by Italy which raises an 
extra 1.4 billion ECU. 
Thus, the impact of a harmonised VAT rate in the domestic market is determined 
predominately by the urban market. Only a few of the EU Member States show 
significant changes in VAT revenues collected (particularly the UK and Italy) and the 
changes in demand for all countries range from -3.3% to +1.7%. 
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Table 6.6 Summary of a 8% harmonised VAT rate applied in the domestic market - 
by fiscal authority 







Change in VAT revenues 












Austria  +3 
(+0.5) 
-82 -62  19 
(+0.4) 
Belgium  -3 
(-0.7) 
69 44  -25 
(-0.6) 
Denmark  -7 
(-1.8) 
319 221  -98 
(-2.3) 
Finland  -3 
(-0.6) 
51 34  -17 
(-0.6) 
France  -36 
(-0.7) 
644 486  -158 
(-0.6) 
Germany  +77 
(+0.9) 
-204 2  206 
(+0.7) 
Greece  0 
(0.0) 
0 0  0 
(0.0) 
Ireland  -8 
(-3.3) 
71 44  -27 
(-2.8) 
Italy  +66 
(+1.7) 
1437 1385  -53 
(-0.2) 
Luxembourg  0 
(-1.3) 
8 5  -2 
(-1.4) 
Netherlands  -4 
(-0.6) 
101 66  -35 
(-0.6) 
Portugal  -9 
(-0.7) 
126 94  -32 
(-0.7) 
Spain  -9 
(-0.3) 
-192 -19  173 
(+1.1) 
Sweden  +7 
(+1.3) 
-160 -111  49 
(+1.1) 
UK  -117 
(-2.3) 
1486 946  -540 
(-2.7) 
By mode 
Air  0 
(+0.3) 






1576 1284  -291 
(-0.5) 




2092 1801  -291 
(-0.4) 
       
Non-Urban  71 
(+1.5) 
-127 18  145 
(+0.3) 
Urban  -114 
(-0.4) 
3799 3117  -683 
(-0.6) 
       
Total  -43 
(-0.1) 
3672 3135  -537 
(-0.3) 
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6.8  Conclusions  
The aim of this section is to evaluate the fiscal impact and the impact on demand for 
passenger transport services in both the EU-third country and domestic travel markets 
under a multi-VAT and harmonised rate scenario. The key findings are as follows: 
Impact of multi-VAT rates in the domestic and the EU-third country market 
  the conclusion is that the departure and arrival options will make no difference to the 
existing competitive position of operators providing services in the domestic and 
international (EU to third country) market. 
Impact of harmonised VAT rates in the EU-third country market 
  the introduction of a positive rate of VAT across the EU, but not applied consistently 
for EU and non-EU operators, will adversely affect the competitive position of EU 
operators and increase the demand for services offered by non-EU operators under 
each of the taxation options. For a situation with non-EU operators commanding a 
20% market share in the air market, it is estimated that demand for EU operators’ 
services will fall by between 1.4% and 2.2% unless a mechanism is found to bring 
such operators within the scope of the EU VAT system.  
  for EU-third country travel, a positive rate of VAT will have the effect of moving 
demand away from indirect routes, via other EU airports, to direct routes in order to 
avoid incurring a VAT charge on the intra-EU leg. Since non-EU operators are likely 
to have a greater market share of these direct services, demand for services for non-EU 
operators will again increase. 
Impact of harmonised VAT rates in the domestic markets 
  in the current regime, some Members States have identified urban, non-urban and 
intra-EU travel as distinct markets by imposing differential rates of VAT. 
  in the domestic market, under the current regime, an estimated 7,536 million ECU, a 
very small proportion of gross turnover, is collected by the European fiscal authorities, 
of which the vast majority is collected by Germany. 
  the key feature of domestic markets under the current regime is the application of 
differential rates of VAT for urban and non-urban travel. A switch towards a 
harmonised rate of 8% will therefore have different effects according to the market 
segment. 
In the domestic market, urban trips dominate the market, accounting for over 84% of 
all trips and 60% in terms of gross turnover. Thus, the impact of a harmonised VAT 
rate in the domestic market will be determined predominately by gross turnover and the 
current taxation regime in place within the urban area. 
  in terms of the economic effects at the country level, the most significant changes in 
magnitude terms occurs for the UK, which currently imposes zero rates of VAT on all 
domestic travel. Under a harmonised rate system, demand falls by 2.3% with a 
consequent fall in profits of 2.7% of gross turnover. Large proportional falls also 
occur for Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg but as these countries have much smaller 
markets, the magnitude of the changes is considerably less. European Commission 
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  Only a few of the EU Member States show significant changes in VAT revenues 
collected, particularly the UK and Italy, while in terms of changes in passenger 
demand, all countries show relatively modest changes, ranging from -3.3% to +1.7%. 
  In the domestic sea market, there is a loss in passenger demand of around 3% and an 
additional 84 million ECU is collected in VAT revenues by the fiscal authorities. In 
terms of profit, the market experiences losses of 113 million ECU or 3% of gross 
turnover. 
Although relatively modest changes in passenger demand occur, any reduction in 
demand for public transport in urban areas is likely to have significant consequences 
in terms of the additional congestion costs involved, as passengers switch to private 
cars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 